Indian systems of mind and awareness
Yoga I: vṛttis, knowledge and error
The five vṛttis become a useful instrument only when the route by which a cognition relates to its object is kept separate from the habit that repeated engagement with it forms.
TLDR
- A vṛtti is a changing event in citta, not a personality type or clinical identity.
- The five families classify cognitive route: valid cognition, misapprehension, conceptual construction, sleep and memory.
- Kliṣṭa and akliṣṭa form a second axis: what the event reinforces in practice.
- A true cognition can deepen grasping, while an objectless construction can support discernment.
- The practical unit is a provenance-and-practice record, not a verdict about the person.
The meeting at three
At 08:55, Arun says, “The review is at three.” Beena says the same sentence. So does Charu. Their words match exactly, and all three sound equally certain.
Arun has the signed calendar invitation open. Beena has noticed that the review usually occurs on a Thursday afternoon and has inferred the time. Charu remembers last month’s review and has silently substituted that memory for today’s schedule. At noon, the organiser moves the meeting to four. Arun sees the update. Beena revises her inference. Charu repeats the old time with growing irritation because the correction feels like a challenge to her competence.
The obvious first judgement is content based: the sentence was true, then became false. That judgement matters, but it misses the mechanism. The same content arrived through different routes, met different defeaters and trained different responses. Looking only at the sentence erases exactly the information needed to correct it.
Pātañjala Yoga offers five families of vṛtti: pramāṇa, viparyaya, vikalpa, nidrā and smṛti. They are often presented as a list of “mental modifications”. The list becomes much sharper when read as an audit of how a cognitive event stands to an object, a source and a prior trace. Yet the text adds another distinction before naming the five: vṛttis may be kliṣṭa or akliṣṭa. That second distinction asks what the event does to the ongoing pattern of cognition and action.
Content tells us what was said. The vṛtti family asks how the event was constituted. Its practice loading asks what recurrence is making easier next time. Confuse those questions, and an ancient discipline of discrimination collapses into a modern taxonomy of “good thoughts” and “bad thoughts”.
The thought is not the route
Before asking which of the five vṛttis is present, we need to stop treating citta as a container of sentences.
In the Sāṃkhya-inflected ontology of classical Yoga, citta is the mutable cognitive instrument. It belongs to prakṛti, the domain of change. It is not identical with puruṣa, the non-agentive seer. Translating citta as “mind” can be convenient, but it easily imports a modern bundle containing brain, awareness, personality and private narrative. The classical term is narrower in some respects and metaphysically more demanding in others. This paper therefore leaves it mostly untranslated.
An editorial choice matters here. Modern readers often meet the sūtras as isolated aphorisms, while the earliest surviving explanatory layer is printed as a separate commentary. Recent philological work argues that the sūtra and bhāṣya layers should be studied as one Pātañjalayogaśāstra, although not every historical question is closed. This paper therefore marks where an argument comes from. The fivefold division and the kliṣṭa-akliṣṭa distinction are in sūtra 1.5-1.6. The explicit wheel in which vṛttis form same-kind saṃskāras and saṃskāras form later vṛttis appears in the commentary. If a reader brackets that commentary, the classificatory distinction remains. The feedback account becomes less secure. Keeping those evidential layers visible prevents a later interpretation from masquerading as the bare aphorism.
Vṛttayaḥ pañcatayyaḥ kliṣṭākliṣṭāḥ: vṛttis are fivefold and afflicted or unafflicted. The commentary then describes vṛttis and same-kind saṃskāras as producing one another in a recurring wheel. See Pātañjalayogaśāstra 1.5.
The weather image corrects two common mistakes. First, a storm passing across a field is not the field’s identity. “This event functions as viparyaya” is therefore different from “I am deluded.” Second, weather cannot be classified only by its visible outline. Two clouds may look similar while forming through different pressure systems. Likewise, two sentences may match while one is remembered, another inferred and a third merely generated by words.
Two questions hidden in one list
Sūtra 1.5 gives two classifications at once. The event belongs to one of five families, and it is also related to affliction or its interruption. The commentary makes the relation dynamic. An unafflicted event may occur within an afflicted stream, and the reverse may also happen. That makes a one-dimensional ladder impossible.
The sentence that survives every replacement
Keep the sentence “The meeting is at three” fixed. Replace only its generator: live perception of the calendar, inference from a recurring pattern, testimony from the organiser, recollection of a previous invitation, or free verbal completion. Now ask what evidence would change the belief. The words are invariant, but the appropriate correction differs in every case. A content-only classifier cannot see that difference. A route-aware classifier can.
The causal property is not the sentence. It is the sentence’s relation to an object, source, trace and defeater.
For practical work, we can make the distinction explicit without pretending to formalise the whole Yoga system. Let a cognitive event be e. Record its family V(e), its object-and-source relation R(e), its loading L(e), and the tendency update it appears to support, ΔS(e).
R(e) = {source, object, temporal status, defeater}
L(e) ∈ {kliṣṭa, akliṣṭa, mixed, unknown}
St+1 = St + ΔS(e) // bookkeeping, not a psychological law
The last line only says that repeated events change what becomes easier to repeat. Take a deliberately crude score: mark an episode that strengthens aversion as +1, one that interrupts it through clear discrimination as −1, and an unresolved episode as 0. A sequence of +1, +1, 0 and −1 produces a net +1. The number does not measure a saṃskāra. It simply prevents a retrospective story from hiding the direction of practice.
The dual-axis vṛtti audit
Axis one records epistemic and temporal route. Axis two records recursive practice effect. The first asks, “What kind of event is this?” The second asks, “What does engaging it this way make more likely?” Neither axis licenses a diagnosis, a metaphysical conclusion or a claim of spiritual attainment.
flowchart TD A["The meeting at three"] --> B["The thought is not the route"] B --> C["Five forms, two axes"] C --> D["What survives translation"] D -. "re-test" .-> A classDef first fill:#0a1424,stroke:#D95545,stroke-width:2px,color:#e6f3ff classDef step fill:#0a1424,stroke:#3f7da0,stroke-width:1px,color:#e6f3ff class A first class B,C,D step
Five forms, two axes
The five families are easiest to grasp by changing one causal property at a time. Start with an event, alter its relation to evidence or time, and watch its classification move.
Pramāṇa: cognition with a warranted route
You look towards a hill and see a continuous column of smoke. You cannot see fire, but you know the relevant relation between smoke and combustion. You infer that something is burning. The classical list under pramāṇa names perception, inference and reliable testimony. These are not three topics that happen to be true. They are three routes by which a cognition can be warranted.
Smoke on the western ridge
Set four facts on the table. You perceive smoke. You have background knowledge that smoke of this kind normally depends on fire. The ridge is not covered by fog. A trusted ranger reports a controlled burn. The inference is strengthened because perception, relation and testimony converge. Now remove the background relation. Smoke becomes merely a visible plume. Remove the trusted ranger. The inference may remain warranted, but through fewer independent supports. Replace the smoke with a cloud that only resembles smoke. A stronger perception can defeat the original judgement.
The lesson is not that perception is infallible. It is that warrant has a route whose assumptions can be inspected.
Pramāṇa is therefore more precise than “a good thought”. It may be unpleasant, strategically inconvenient or morally misused. An accurate account of a colleague’s mistake can become material for humiliation. Its truth does not determine its practice loading. This distinction will matter shortly.
Its warrant is also conditional rather than magical. Perception depends on the sense conditions and the object presented. Inference depends on a relation that travels from observed sign to unobserved conclusion. Testimony depends on the speaker’s access and reliability. These dependencies supply concrete failure tests. Improve the light, attack the inference, inspect the speaker’s source or compare independent testimony. A pramāṇa audit is valuable because it tells us where to intervene when confidence and reality part company.
Viparyaya: a fitted appearance defeated by stronger cognition
At twilight, a coiled rope appears to be a snake. The event is not a free-floating concept. It has an object-shaped presentation and prompts bodily readiness. Bring a lamp closer and the apparent snake resolves into fibres. The original cognition is more than uncertain. It is atadrūpapratiṣṭha, established in a form that the object does not have, and it is displaced by a cognition better fitted to the object. The commentary’s example is seeing two moons, corrected by seeing one.
This gives a strict use rule. A disagreement is not automatically viparyaya. Neither is a doubt, a low-confidence guess or a perspective you dislike. The category earns its name when there is a determinate misfit and a stronger cognition that defeats it. Used without that condition, “viparyaya” becomes a Sanskrit way of dismissing someone.
Time matters as well. At the first glimpse, treating the coil as dangerous may be a sensible protective response under uncertainty. After the lamp reveals fibres, continuing to insist on a snake has a different structure. The event has met its defeater but has not updated. This separates the accuracy of the original perception from the flexibility of the later process. The distinction is useful in both contemplative reflection and system assurance: an error-tolerant process can still be reliable if it exposes and incorporates correction.
Vikalpa: word-led construction without the intended object
Imagine a golden mountain floating above the sea. The phrase is intelligible. It combines known predicates and supports further reasoning: perhaps the mountain reflects sunset, perhaps it cannot bear its own weight. Yet no corresponding object need be present. Sūtra 1.9 characterises vikalpa as following verbal cognition while being empty of an object. The commentary also uses ordinary linguistic constructions, not only fantasies. Language can organise action around absences, negations and abstractions.
The “average customer” in a design meeting
A product team speaks of “the average customer”. No individual user has exactly the mean age, income, device, risk tolerance and behaviour in the dataset. The phrase may still compress a useful statistical construct. It becomes dangerous when the team forgets its object status and treats the abstraction as a person who will encounter the interface. The right response is not to ban vikalpa. It is to mark the construction, state what operations generated it and test decisions against actual distributions.
Objectless does not mean meaningless, false or useless. It means the object relation must not be smuggled in by grammar.
Counterfactual plans, mathematical idealisations, legal persons, risk scenarios and interface personas all depend on constructions that need not correspond to one present object. Their usefulness comes from controlled relations, not literal existence. A disciplined vikalpa therefore needs an object contract: what the construction stands in for, which operations produced it, where it may guide action and which observation would expose misuse. That is more demanding than either believing the words or dismissing them.
Nidrā: a special event supported by absence
You wake and say, “I slept deeply; there was nothing there.” The statement presents a puzzle. How could an absence be reported if no relevant event occurred? The classical commentary reasons from post-waking recollection to a distinctive sleep cognition. It mentions waking assessments such as having slept pleasantly, painfully or in a stupor. Whatever one makes of the argument, nidrā is not simply a blank outside the system. It is a special case whose support is an absence-cognition.
Does a later absence report reveal an earlier absence?
Place a person in a perfectly dark room while awake. They later report, “I saw nothing.” Now let them sleep in the same room and give the same report on waking. The sentences match, but their temporal and evidential routes differ. The waking report may track continuous visual absence. The sleep report may be a reconstruction from the lack of retained content, bodily condition and transition into waking.
The thought experiment does not refute the classical account. It exposes its measurement bridge. A post-sleep report is evidence that must be interpreted, not a transparent recording of the entire interval. Modern dream and sleep research can refine that bridge, but it cannot simply certify the metaphysics of nidrā.
Smṛti: an earlier object carried into a later event
Memory is defined as the non-loss of an experienced object. The commentary connects the present memory to a prior cognition and a retained saṃskāra. This does not make memory an unedited photograph. The category concerns temporal dependence: the current event presents something as previously experienced. Whether it preserves, recombines or distorts the earlier event is a further question.
The diary after the reset
At night, Mira writes a detailed diary entry about an argument. In the morning she has no episodic recollection, but reads the entry and forms a vivid scene. Is the new scene smṛti, testimony or vikalpa? The answer depends on what carries the lineage. If her present cognition is generated by the diary as testimony, calling it direct recollection hides the source. If fragments of the original experience are reactivated and shaped by the diary, the event may contain both memory and conceptual reconstruction.
This boundary case shows why the five families are not mutually exclusive labels for long episodes. They are analytic types of event. A single minute can contain a remembered image, an inference about it and a verbal construction that fills a gap.
A useful record therefore has two temporal layers. The present event may be smṛti because it depends on a prior trace. The remembered content may originally have arisen through pramāṇa, viparyaya or vikalpa. “I remember seeing the snake” tells us how the current scene arrived, not whether there was a snake. This prevents memory from inheriting truth merely by presenting itself as past experience.
The second axis: what recurrence trains
Now change a different property. Keep the cognition true but alter how it is held. A manager accurately remembers a public insult. On the first review, the memory helps establish what happened and supports a proportionate response. On the twentieth review, the same event is rehearsed to renew anger, recruit allies and protect a threatened self-story. Its family can remain smṛti. Its practical loading changes.
Can truth intensify affliction?
Suppose every detail of the insult is verified by video. Remove all factual uncertainty. Does the repeated recollection therefore become unafflicted? No. Factual accuracy settles one axis. It does not settle whether the recurrence strengthens aversion, grasping or misidentification. Conversely, rehearse an objectless sentence such as “I can notice anger without becoming its owner.” As a conceptual construction, it may be vikalpa. Used skilfully, it may interrupt an afflicted stream.
Truth is not identical with liberation, and objectlessness is not identical with affliction. That is the strongest reason not to arrange the five vṛttis from best to worst.
| Family | Discriminating question | Strongest practical use | Common category error |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pramāṇa | Which valid route supports this cognition? | Expose assumptions, sources and defeaters. | Treating truth as automatically unafflicted. |
| Viparyaya | What stronger cognition defeats this fitted appearance? | Design a correction rather than issue a rebuke. | Calling disagreement, doubt or uncertainty “error”. |
| Vikalpa | What has language constructed without a corresponding object? | Mark abstractions, negations and simulations. | Equating objectlessness with nonsense or pathology. |
| Nidrā | What supports the later report of absence or sleep quality? | Separate interval, report and interpretation. | Calling sleep either pure blankness or proven awareness. |
| Smṛti | Which prior experience supplies the present event? | Preserve temporal lineage and later reconstruction. | Treating memory as a literal recording. |
This is not a diagnostic taxonomy
The five vṛttis do not map cleanly onto hallucination, delusion, rumination, dissociation, depression or any other clinical construct. Those categories have distinct operational definitions, evidence bases and care pathways. A person in distress should not be told that a symptom is “just vikalpa” or “just viparyaya”. The reflective audit in this paper is for examining ordinary cognitive events and research claims. It is not a substitute for assessment or treatment.
What survives translation
A classical category can sharpen a modern experiment without becoming a disguised modern theory. The comparison succeeds only when the preserved relation and the breaking point are both visible.
From pramāṇa to source monitoring
Modern source-monitoring research studies how people attribute a mental experience to perception, memory, imagination or communication. That offers a limited but useful comparison. Both frameworks resist the idea that content carries its own provenance. Both ask how a present cognition came to have its authority. Both predict errors when source features are weak, similar or reconstructed.
The comparison breaks at the level of purpose and ontology. Source monitoring is a family of psychological models and experiments. The five vṛttis sit inside a soteriological system that distinguishes citta from puruṣa and aims at cessation of vṛttis. No experiment on source attribution establishes that metaphysics, and no Sanskrit category supplies a neural mechanism. The bridge preserves a question, not an identity.
Every comparison in this paper uses the same five-part gate. State the source structure in its own vocabulary. State the target structure without borrowing prestige from the source. Name the relation preserved across the bridge. Mark the first point at which the mapping fails. Then derive a test or design change. Here the preserved relation is provenance-sensitive correction. The break appears at ontology and liberative purpose. The resulting test substitutes source routes while holding content fixed. A resemblance that produces no different intervention has not yet earned explanatory status.
Memory, confidence and reconstruction
Constructive-memory research gives a second bounded comparison. Remembering can recombine elements of past experience, and some of the same capacities support imagining possible futures. This helps prevent a crude reading of saṃskāra as a stored photograph. It does not prove that the classical trace is a neural engram or that the two theories carve memory in the same way.
Metacognition research adds another useful separation: first-order accuracy and confidence about accuracy can dissociate. That matters to all five families. A viparyaya may feel certain. A pramāṇa may be held tentatively. A memory may be vivid yet mis-sourced. Confidence is therefore evidence about the agent’s monitoring, not a substitute for the source and object relation.
Dynamic accounts of spontaneous thought make a related move. They examine how constraints tighten or loosen over a trajectory rather than treating “mind-wandering” as one content class. That supports the loop-level analysis developed here. It does not justify translating mind-wandering as vikalpa. One framework studies changing cognitive dynamics; the other places word-led, objectless construction inside a distinct philosophical project. See Christoff et al.
Source-monitoring, constructive-memory and metacognition research support distinctions among content, origin, reconstruction and confidence. They do not validate the fivefold Sanskrit taxonomy as a complete cognitive science. See Johnson et al., Schacter and Addis and Fleming and Lau.
Why sleep is the hardest translation
Contemporary sleep studies can compare reports of dream experience with physiology and neural activity. They can ask whether reported experience varies across rapid-eye-movement and non-rapid-eye-movement sleep, and whether particular patterns predict later reports. But the classical nidrā category is organised around an absence-supported vṛtti and post-waking recollection within Yoga’s own system. The target constructs do not line up automatically.
Even within modern research, the inference from neural pattern to dream experience depends on report timing, awakening procedures and what counts as “experience”. Published critiques of influential dream-correlate studies show that the measurement bridge remains contestable. The honest conclusion is modest: sleep provides a laboratory for separating interval, retained content, report and interpretation. It does not settle whether awareness is present in dreamless sleep.
The fivefold scheme may be pedagogical rather than natural-kind taxonomy
Perhaps the five categories do not identify five exhaustive mechanisms. They may instead organise the practitioner’s most consequential confusions: warranted contact, defeasible misfit, language without object, absence-supported sleep and temporal re-presentation. On this view, their value lies in disciplined inquiry, not in discovering five modules in a brain. The concordance below is designed to remain useful under that weaker interpretation.
A configured system: “Backup completed”
Consider an operations assistant that announces, “Backup completed.” The phrase could be copied from a signed effect receipt produced by the storage system. It could be inferred because a workflow reached its final node. It could be retrieved from yesterday’s log. It could be generated because completion usually follows the preceding message. The output is identical. Its authority is not.
A safe system keeps model proposal, world state, typed action, effect receipt and verified outcome separate. The model may propose the sentence. Only an authoritative readback can support release of the claim as fact. This is not an assertion that software has citta, vṛttis or experience. It is an engineering consequence drawn from the route distinction: when consequences depend on truth, provenance must remain outside the fluency of the statement.
Four identical completion messages
Version A carries an effect receipt with job identifier, checksum, completion time and storage readback. Version B carries only the orchestrator’s “success” state. Version C retrieves a similar receipt from the previous day. Version D is a model proposal with no tool call. A content-only evaluator gives all four the same score. A route-aware evaluator grants factual authority only to A, asks B for readback, rejects C because the temporal entitlement is wrong and holds D as an unverified proposal.
The practical analogy preserves the need to distinguish route from expression. It breaks before ontology: an evidence ledger is not saṃskāra, a model proposal is not vikalpa in the classical sense, and a server’s idle state is not nidrā.
The smallest useful test
To see what a content-only record loses, construct twelve synthetic events in pairs. Give each pair the same sentence but different provenance: current perception versus memory, supported inference versus pattern completion, current receipt versus stale receipt. Ask two schemas to record them. The content schema stores the sentence and confidence. The route-aware schema also stores source, object relation, temporal status, available defeater and practice effect.
The point is not that a longer form always wins. It is that the extra fields become decision relevant precisely when identical content demands different correction or authority. If no decision changes after the route fields are added, the framework is unnecessary for that case.
Route-preserving reflection should improve correction choice
When two claims share content but differ in provenance, a route-aware reflective protocol should select a more appropriate correction than a content-and-confidence protocol. Evidence would strengthen the proposal if independent raters choose better-matched interventions without increasing false certainty. It would weaken the proposal if the extra fields add burden but do not improve correction, calibration or recovery. A rival explanation is that any structured pause, not the vṛtti-inspired distinctions, produces the benefit.
stateDiagram-v2 [*] --> Claim state "Two questions hidden in one list" as Claim state "The sentence that survives<br/>every replacement" as Test state "The dual-axis vṛtti audit" as Revision Claim --> Test: expose mechanism Test --> Decision: evidence survives Test --> Revision: rival survives Revision --> Claim: narrow or rebuild Decision --> [*]
From labels to feedback control
The framework earns its keep only if it changes the next intervention. Classification without a change in observation, evidence or practice is decorative.
The loop is the unit of analysis
The commentary on sūtra 1.5 says that vṛttis produce same-kind saṃskāras and saṃskāras produce vṛttis. Read cautiously, this supplies a feedback model. A cognition is not important only because of its present content. It can alter readiness, salience and the ease with which a similar event recurs. A remembered insult can prime attention for fresh disrespect. The next ambiguous expression is then read through that readiness, adding another trace.
This is why a static label fails. It records a frame while discarding the movie. The useful intervention may occur at the source check, the object test, the rehearsal pattern, the action that follows or the environment that repeatedly triggers the loop.
When “vikalpa” becomes a weapon
Dev tells a meditation group that a recurring fear has intensified since a retreat. A facilitator replies, “That is only vikalpa. Do not feed it.” The response makes three unsupported moves. It classifies an extended experience from a short report, treats an objectless construction as unreal and assumes suppression is unafflicted. Dev stops reporting the episodes. The group loses information about frequency, sleep, functioning and risk.
A route-aware response asks what Dev experiences, what is perceived or remembered, what words add, what conditions intensify it and whether functioning is impaired. If distress or impairment is substantial, the correct next step is qualified clinical support, not a Sanskrit verdict. A framework designed to improve discrimination fails when it suppresses the evidence needed for discrimination.
Contemplative research warns against treating practice labels as self-validating. Definitions and interventions vary, brief mindfulness studies have produced contested false-memory findings, and qualitative work documents challenging experiences that require context-sensitive support. None of this maps a modern outcome onto a vṛtti. It establishes a simpler boundary: practice does not replace measurement, adverse-effect reporting or care. See Van Dam et al., Sherman and Grange and Lindahl et al.
A six-question practice protocol
Apply the audit to one event, not to “my mind today” or “this person”. Write the exact cognition before interpreting it. Then ask six questions.
- Route: Did this arise through current perception, inference, testimony, recollection, verbal construction, a post-sleep report or an unclear mixture?
- Object: What is the cognition about, and is a corresponding object intended?
- Defeater: What stronger observation, testimony or counterexample would revise it?
- Time: Is the claim current, remembered, imagined, inherited from an earlier source or reported after sleep?
- Loading: Does this engagement strengthen grasping, aversion or confusion, support discrimination, or remain mixed?
- Next action: Observe, verify, reframe, pause, seek help, or decline to act?
The protocol is deliberately asymmetric. It permits “unknown” at every disputed point. A forced answer is worse than a visible gap because false precision itself can become a source of viparyaya.
Return to the meeting case. Charu’s sentence is recorded as a present claim arising from recollection. The object is today’s schedule, but the retained source belongs to last month. The decisive defeater is the current invitation. Repeating the old time after seeing the update strengthens defensiveness, so the loading is likely afflicted in this episode. The next action is not “stop having smṛti”. It is to acknowledge the source mismatch, update the calendar and notice the urge to defend the old claim. The classification earns its place because it selects a correction at the right causal point.
Executable lab: the claim-and-practice concordance
The browser-local instrument below exposes the decision logic. It is not a consciousness detector, truth machine, clinical screener or spiritual score. It asks whether the supplied fields support a provisional vṛtti candidate and a separate practice loading. All data stays in the page and is cleared on reset.
Vṛtti concordance
Classify one event. Preserve uncertainty. Export the reasoning, not a verdict about the person.
Result
Complete the fields and run the concordance. An underdetermined result is valid.
How to interpret the lab
What it tests: whether the information supplied supports one provisional event family and a separate loading. What it assumes: that the user can distinguish the event from the person and can report at least some provenance. A positive result permits: a better-targeted check, such as verifying a receipt, testing a defeater or noticing a rehearsal pattern. A negative result means: the source relation is underdetermined, so more observation is required.
What it cannot establish: that the claim is true beyond the evidence entered, that someone has a disorder, that a practice is safe for a particular person, that citta has been measured, or that a machine instantiates any classical category. For significant distress, impaired functioning, safety concerns or consequential action, stop treating the tool as sufficient.
Implementation logic and typed invariants
The classifier gives temporal lineage priority for nidrā and smṛti, because a remembered cognition may preserve an earlier pramāṇa, viparyaya or vikalpa. It treats contradiction by stronger evidence as viparyaya, language with no intended corresponding object as vikalpa, and supported perception, inference or testimony as pramāṇa. All other combinations remain underdetermined.
Invariant one: family and loading are never collapsed. Invariant two: “unknown” is not coerced into a category. Invariant three: consequential use adds a review requirement. Invariant four: the record describes an event, never a person.
/** @typedef {'pramāṇa'|'viparyaya'|'vikalpa'|'nidrā'|'smṛti'|'underdetermined'} Family */
/** @typedef {'likely kliṣṭa'|'likely akliṣṭa'|'mixed'|'unknown'} Loading */
/**
* Invariants:
* 1. Classify one event, never a person.
* 2. Keep family and loading separate.
* 3. Preserve unknown rather than forcing certainty.
* 4. Consequential action always requires external evidence and authority.
*/
function classifyEvent(record) {
let family = 'underdetermined';
let reason = 'The supplied route and object relation do not select one family.';
if (record.temporalStatus === 'post-sleep' ||
record.sourceRoute === 'post-sleep-report') {
family = 'nidrā';
reason = 'The event is a post-sleep, absence-related report.';
} else if (record.temporalStatus === 'remembered' ||
record.sourceRoute === 'recollection') {
family = 'smṛti';
reason = 'The present event depends on a prior experience or trace.';
} else if (record.objectRelation === 'contradicted') {
family = 'viparyaya';
reason = 'Stronger evidence defeats the presented form.';
} else if (record.sourceRoute === 'verbal-construction' &&
record.objectRelation === 'no-object-intended') {
family = 'vikalpa';
reason = 'Verbal construction is operating without an intended corresponding object.';
} else if (['direct-perception', 'inference', 'testimony']
.includes(record.sourceRoute) &&
record.objectRelation === 'supported') {
family = 'pramāṇa';
reason = 'A stated valid route currently supports the cognition.';
}
/** @type {Loading} */
const loading = ['grasping', 'aversion', 'confusion']
.includes(record.practiceEffect) ? 'likely kliṣṭa'
: record.practiceEffect === 'discernment' ? 'likely akliṣṭa'
: record.practiceEffect === 'mixed' ? 'mixed' : 'unknown';
return { family, loading, reason };
}
Optional synthetic test cases
| Claim | Route and relation | Expected candidate | Why it may still be incomplete |
|---|---|---|---|
| “There is smoke on the ridge.” | Direct perception; currently supported. | Pramāṇa | Perceptual conditions and object identity still matter. |
| “That rope is a snake.” | Contradicted by closer inspection. | Viparyaya | The initial event may have been prudent under low light. |
| “The average user prefers blue.” | Verbal construction; no individual object intended. | Vikalpa | The statistical evidence behind the construct requires a separate audit. |
| “I slept without any experience.” | Post-sleep report. | Nidrā candidate | Report, retention and interval cannot be equated. |
| “The review was at three.” | Recollection of a prior invitation. | Smṛti candidate | The remembered source may itself have been mistaken or stale. |
| “The backup completed.” | Model proposal; object relation unknown. | Underdetermined | An effect receipt and readback are missing. |
sequenceDiagram participant Q as Question participant M as Mechanism participant E as Evidence participant D as Decision Q->>M: The meeting at three M->>E: Two questions hidden in one list E-->>M: compare rival explanations E->>D: Preserve provenance before interpretation D-->>Q: revise scope or act
Preserve provenance before interpretation
When a thought, report or system claim matters, do not begin by asking whether it belongs to a “good” or “bad” mental category. Ask how it was produced, what could correct it, what temporal lineage it carries and what repeated engagement is training.
That change is small enough to use in a meeting and deep enough to prevent several failures. It stops truth from becoming a licence for fixation. It stops conceptual construction from being confused with pathology. It stops memory from borrowing the authority of perception. It stops a fluent machine proposal from certifying its own outcome. It also stops a contemplative vocabulary from replacing clinical or operational evidence.
The practical decision is to preserve provenance before interpretation and to evaluate practice effect before repetition. Classify the event provisionally. Keep the person unlabelled. Gather the defeater. Match the response to the evidence and consequence. Then observe what the response makes easier next time.
The five vṛttis need not become a modern diagnostic taxonomy to remain intellectually alive. Their stronger use is more disciplined: they expose how cognition acquires a world, a past and a habit, while reminding us that none of those relations is identical with the seer in the classical system.
Glossary
- Citta
- The mutable cognitive instrument in Pātañjala Yoga, associated with prakṛti and distinct from puruṣa.
- Vṛtti
- A changing mode, event or operation of citta. This paper avoids treating it as a personality label.
- Pramāṇa
- Valid cognition, with perception, inference and reliable testimony named as its routes in sūtra 1.7.
- Viparyaya
- Misapprehension established in a form the object does not have and defeated by stronger cognition.
- Vikalpa
- Word-led or conceptual cognition without an intended corresponding object.
- Nidrā
- A sleep-related vṛtti supported by an absence-cognition, inferred in the commentary through post-waking recollection.
- Smṛti
- Memory as the non-loss or re-presentation of an experienced object through a retained trace.
- Saṃskāra
- A retained disposition or impression that conditions later cognitive events. It is not equated here with a neural engram or software memory.
- Kliṣṭa
- Affliction-related or affliction-strengthening, connected to kleśas and karmic accumulation in the classical account.
- Akliṣṭa
- Unafflicted or conducive to discriminative insight and interruption of an afflicted stream.
- Puruṣa
- The non-changing seer or conscious principle in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga framework, not a cognitive process.
- Defeater
- Evidence or intervention that weakens or overturns the present warrant for a cognition.
References
- Pātañjalayogaśāstra, with sūtra and bhāṣya, especially 1.2-1.12. GRETIL electronic text based on the 1904 Ānandāśrama edition, input and proofread by Philipp A. Maas. Primary Sanskrit text.
- Woods, J. H. (1914). The Yoga-System of Patañjali. Harvard Oriental Series, volume 17. Public-domain translation and commentary.
- Maas, P. A. “The Pātañjalayogaśāstra alias the Yogasūtra and the Yogabhāṣya.” Sahapedia. Provides the unified-work framing and a late fourth to early fifth-century dating argument. Article.
- Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. “Yoga Sutras of Patanjali.” Consulted for a scholarly overview of citta, the five vṛttis and Yoga epistemology. Entry.
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