Western and Islamic foundations of mind

Islamic cognitive science and the internal senses

Rajesh Ranjan Mahapatra

Avicenna’s internal senses show that a mind does not first receive a neutral world and then reason about it: it unifies, retains, recombines and appraises particulars before intellect begins, while self-awareness belongs to a different explanatory boundary.

© 2026 Rajesh Ranjan Mahapatra. 29 min read

Islamic cognitive science and the internal sensesAll Human–Machine Convergence

Western and Islamic foundations of mind

Islamic cognitive science and the internal senses

Avicenna’s internal senses show that a mind does not first receive a neutral world and then reason about it: it unifies, retains, recombines and appraises particulars before intellect begins, while self-awareness belongs to a different explanatory boundary.

TLDR

  1. Perception is already organised activity, not a passive delivery of neutral data.
  2. Avicenna’s “common sense” binds sensory forms; it does not mean everyday good judgement.
  3. Estimation, or wahm, grasps the particular significance of an object for an embodied creature.
  4. Retentive and compositive imagination preserve and transform particulars before universal reasoning.
  5. The flying person isolates primitive self-awareness, but it does not empirically prove an immaterial soul or machine consciousness.
The kitchen at 2:13 a.m.

Nadia wakes to three weak signals. A hiss comes from the kitchen. A bitter odour hangs in the corridor. Through the half-open door she sees a small blue flame where no flame should be. She is moving towards the shut-off valve before she silently forms the proposition, “The cooker may be leaking gas.”

Which part of that episode was perception, and which part was reasoning? The simple answer says that her senses delivered sound, smell and colour; then a central reasoner inferred danger and selected an action. Yet that answer hides nearly everything that mattered. The signals had to be treated as belonging to one event. Their pattern had to persist long enough to be compared. The scene had to acquire the significance dangerous for me and this household. A possible intervention had to be imagined. A remembered rule had to become available. Only then could explicit reasoning articulate what the organised perceptual system had already made actionable.

Nearly a millennium ago, Ibn Sīnā, known in Latin as Avicenna, constructed a vocabulary for these middle operations. He called them the internal senses. His account is not modern neuroscience in antique dress. Its ventricular anatomy is obsolete, its metaphysics is contested, and its faculty boundaries were disputed within Islamic philosophy itself. But the causal question remains exact: what transformations must occur between receiving a stimulus and thinking a universal thought?

The world no single sense receives

The phrase “Islamic cognitive science” can mislead if it suggests one settled doctrine shared across a civilisation. The useful object is narrower: a sustained research tradition in Arabic and Persian philosophy, medicine and theology that argued about the powers of the soul. Avicenna offered its most influential architecture. Al-Ghazālī adopted much of the descriptive psychology while challenging what it could prove. Averroes questioned the need for a separate estimative faculty. Abū al-Barakāt and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī pressed a deeper objection: perhaps one soul makes hybrid judgements, so multiplying faculties only redescribes the work rather than explaining it. Black 1993 Adamson 2023

That disagreement gives us the right starting point. A faculty should not be posited merely because a label is available. Avicenna distinguishes capacities by their proper objects and operations. A power that receives a form differs from one that retains it. A power that preserves a seen shape differs from one that retains the unsensed significance attached to it. A power that combines particulars differs from intellect, whose characteristic objects are universal intelligibles. This is a functional decomposition joined, in Avicenna, to a physiological localisation in the brain’s ventricles. The localisation did not survive. The decomposition remains testable as a way of asking where cognitive work occurs. Ivry 2008 Kaukua 2014

The internal-sense observatory
The internal-sense observatory External sensory beams enter a central dome for common-sense unification, pass to stores and workshops for retaining and composing forms, then to appraisal and memory of particular meanings. Intellect appears above as a different object-domain. Intellect: universals and demonstration A different object-domain, rather than only the last sensory box SightSoundSmell, touch, taste Common senseunifies sensible forms Retentive imagestores sensible formsafter the object departs Estimation, wahmgrasps particular meaningfriend, threat, edible, mine Compositiveimaginationcombines and separates Memory of particular meaningsreunites significance with retained forms
Decision: do not place “reasoning” immediately after raw sensors. First identify the transformations that create a unified, retained and agent-significant particular. Source: reconstruction from Avicenna’s al-Najāt and Kitāb al-Nafs; terminology cross-checked against Black and Kaukua.

Common sense is a binding operation

Avicenna’s al-ḥiss al-mushtarak, usually translated as common sense, is not prudence and not public consensus. It is the receptive power in which inputs from different external senses can belong to one sensible object. A pomegranate is red to sight, cool to touch, faintly fragrant to smell and tart to taste. No external sense receives the pomegranate as red, cool, fragrant and tart. Yet the animal encounters one thing, not four unrelated streams. Common sense names the operation that makes cross-modal comparison possible. Avicenna 1952 Ivry 2008

Thought experiment 1: move one sensory cause

Place a ripe pomegranate behind a screen. Pipe its scent from the left while projecting its red shape on the right. Keep the timing exact. Do you expect one fruit, two causes or uncertainty? Now move the scent gradually towards the image. The signal qualities have not changed, only their apparent common cause. The point is not that Avicenna anticipated Bayesian modelling. It is that unification is a cognitive achievement with failure conditions, not a transparent handover from world to mind.

One fruit, two possible causes
One fruit, two possible causesTwo panels compare aligned and displaced sensory cues. Aligned colour, scent and touch converge on one pomegranate. Displaced scent creates uncertainty about whether there is one cause or two. Aligned cuesDisplaced scent red shapetart scentcool surface one cause scent here one cause or two?
Causal question: when cues cease to share a plausible source, integration should weaken or become uncertain. That failure reveals the work hidden by ordinary perception. Illustrative thought experiment; modern comparison developed later in the paper.

Retention is not another act of sensing

Close your eyes after seeing the pomegranate. Its sensible form can remain available even though sight no longer receives it. Avicenna therefore separates reception from retention. Common sense receives the unified sensible form; the retentive imagination preserves it. The distinction seems modest until a task depends on what happened a moment ago. Following an occluded object, comparing two tones, recognising a partly hidden face or finishing a movement all require a present operation over something no longer present to the external sense.

Mechanism

Change only the delay between stimulus and decision. If performance collapses while immediate discrimination remains intact, the lost operation is not basic reception. It is the preservation of a particular form across absence. State earns its name when removing it changes what the system can do with its own recent past.

Modern vocabulary can blur this. “Memory” may refer to model weights, a cache, a document store, an episodic record, a recurrent state or an authoritative world model. Avicenna’s distinction is narrower. The retained item is a sensible particular, not a universal proposition and not the disposition created by learning. A useful comparison must preserve that object and its temporal role.

The wolf is dangerous before it becomes a proposition

Avicenna’s most distinctive internal sense is wahm, commonly translated as estimation. His canonical animal example is a sheep encountering a wolf. Colour, shape, movement and sound are sensible forms. Hostility is not red, angular, loud or fast. Yet the sheep does not need to form the universal proposition “wolves are predators” before fleeing. It apprehends this particular as to-be-avoided. Estimation names the capacity that receives such unsensed, particular meanings. Memory, in the paired sense, retains them so a later particular can be encountered under the significance of the earlier event. Black 1993 Black 2000

The word “meaning” can make the view sound linguistic. That is the wrong starting point. The sheep need not possess a sentence. What changes is the action field around the object. A neutral patch of terrain becomes escape route; a shape becomes pursuer; proximity becomes urgent. The meaning is particular because it belongs to this encountered object, not to a universal definition. It is unsensed because no external sense receives hostility in the way sight receives colour. It is agent-relative because the same wolf can mean danger to the sheep, opportunity to a hunter and kin to another wolf.

The same wolf in three significance fields
The same wolf in three significance fieldsOne wolf silhouette stands at the centre. Three curved landscapes represent a sheep, a hunter and another wolf. The identical sensible form lies in an avoidance basin, an approach basin and an affiliation basin depending on the agent. SheepHunterPack memberavoidanceapproachaffiliationOne sensible form, different particular meanings
Mechanism: agent state changes the significance landscape while the perceived object remains recognisably the same. This is stronger than attaching a verbal label after recognition. Conceptual figure based on Avicenna’s wolf and sheep example; the three-agent extension is illustrative.
Thought experiment 2: preserve appearance, remove the cause

Present the sheep with a harmless wolf-shaped mask moved by a concealed rail. The outline, colour and motion remain wolf-like, but smell, sound and interactive behaviour do not. In the first encounter the sheep may flee. Across repeated harmless encounters the response may weaken. Which property changed? Not the visible form. The causal history linking that form to threat changed. Now restore one contingent cue, such as a growl, without changing the silhouette. If avoidance returns, the test reveals which evidence controls the particular meaning. A mere classifier can still say “wolf”; an appraisal process must answer “what does this mean for this agent now?”

Worked example 1: one crate, two agents

A sealed crate weighs 18 kilograms and sits three metres from a loading bay. For a mobile robot with a 12-kilogram safe lifting limit, the crate means requires assistance. For a forklift, it means routine lift. The visible geometry and weight estimate are shared. Change only the agent’s capacity. A system that preserves object recognition but changes action priority has represented something like agent-relative significance. A system that emits the same “heavy crate” label for both has not yet shown the relevant operation.

significance = A(particular, agent_state, context, remembered_encounters) A is an appraisal relation, not a claim about felt emotion. The particular is this object or event; agent_state includes current capacities and vulnerabilities; context supplies the situation; and remembered_encounters carry prior particular significance. The equation is useful only if changing one input while holding the others fixed creates a selective change.

Why estimation was disputed

Avicenna’s decomposition invites a clean story: external senses receive forms; common sense unifies them; estimation receives intentions or meanings; memory stores those meanings. Yet the most interesting judgements are mixed. “This coloured moving thing is dangerous” binds sensed properties and unsensed significance in one act. Why assign them to different faculties? Deborah Black shows that later philosophers challenged both the logical status of estimative meanings and the need for a separate faculty. Averroes redistributed much of the work. Al-Ghazālī used the psychology while resisting some Avicennian conclusions. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī often preferred the activity of a unified soul over a proliferation of powers. Black 1993 Adamson 2023

This disagreement supplies a modern break test. If form recognition and appraisal can be altered independently, a functional separation earns support. If every intervention changes both together, the distinction may describe two aspects of one process rather than two causal components. The test does not settle Avicenna’s metaphysics. It tells us whether the decomposition improves explanation in the target system.

Imagination is controlled transformation of particulars

Retention alone cannot explain a winged horse. The system must preserve forms and then combine parts that were not received together. Avicenna therefore distinguishes the store of sensible forms from a compositive power that joins and separates them. In animals, estimation can direct this operation towards action. In humans, the cogitative use of imagination can prepare particulars for intellectual thought. Mehmet Zahit Tiryaki’s reconstruction highlights this active role: perception is not finished when an image arrives; internal activity reorganises the sensible material. Tiryaki 2025

Calling every generative output “imagination” is too weak. Randomly splicing fragments demonstrates combination but not cognitively useful composition. The mechanism matters when a retained scene can be changed along a controlled dimension and the change informs prediction or action. Nadia imagines the flame extinguished after turning the valve. The useful contrast is not real versus fictional. It is received particular versus deliberately transformed particular.

Thought experiment 3: give composition no control signal

Show an agent a room containing a chair, a locked cabinet and a key on a shelf. Remove the image. Ask it to picture the key inside the cabinet. In condition A, allow arbitrary recombination. In condition B, require the transformed scene to preserve the cabinet’s size, the key’s identity and the causal constraint that the cabinet must first be opened. Both conditions can produce a sentence about “key in cabinet”. Only the second demonstrates controlled composition tied to the original particular. Now remove the retained scene while preserving language statistics. If the answer remains fluent but violates the room’s geometry, generation has survived while imagination in the relevant sense has failed.

From received scene to controlled counterfactual
From received scene to controlled counterfactualA horizontal temporal ribbon shows a room first perceived, then absent but retained, then transformed by moving a key into a cabinet, and finally checked against preserved identity and causal constraints. ReceiveRetainComposeConstrain room present object absent key moved identity + geometry The counterfactual stays about this scene because selected relations survive the change.Without retention, composition loses its particular. Without constraints, it becomes unconstrained generation.
Worked distinction: useful imagination changes one property while preserving the identity and constraints that make the counterfactual answerable. Illustrative controlled-composition task.

Ablate operations, not historical labels

A modern experiment should not ask whether a system “has common sense” or “has wahm”. Those questions invite impressionistic scoring. Give the system matched tasks, then remove one state or transformation. A binding ablation should impair cross-modal object identity more than single-cue recognition. A retention ablation should spare immediate judgement but damage delayed comparison. A composition ablation should spare recall while damaging controlled scene changes. An appraisal-state swap should change action priority while leaving object description stable.

Selective failure is stronger evidence than fluent output
Synthetic ablation results across four tasksA grouped bar chart shows an intact system and four selective ablations on cue binding, delayed form retention, counterfactual composition, object recognition and safe action. Each ablation mainly damages its predicted task. Values are illustrative. 0255075100 Cross-modal bindingDelayed form retentionComposition + safe action intactbinding ablationretention ablationcomposition ablationappraisal ablation Illustrative rates only. The prediction pattern, not the values, is the contribution.
Design lesson: a benchmark that scores only recognition can miss the causal role of retention, composition and appraisal. Ablate the operation, rather than only the name. Illustrative synthetic values; no human, animal or production-system measurement is claimed.
Strongest boundary

Avicenna’s internal senses are not a validated map of neural modules. The ventricular placements reflect medieval physiology, and the one-faculty-per-object strategy may over-partition a unified process. The durable contribution is a set of discriminating interventions: remove cross-modal binding, remove retention, remove compositional transformation, or hold form fixed while changing agent-relative significance. If no distinct failure appears, the proposed faculty boundary has not earned its keep.

The argument in one pass
Chart · flow
flowchart LR
  A["The world no single sense receives"] --> B["The wolf is dangerous before<br/>it becomes a proposition"]
  B --> C["The person with no world"]
  C --> D["A disciplined bridge to modern<br/>cognitive systems"]
  D -. "re-test" .-> A
  classDef first fill:#0a1424,stroke:#087A98,stroke-width:2px,color:#e6f3ff
  classDef step fill:#0a1424,stroke:#3f7da0,stroke-width:1px,color:#e6f3ff
  class A first
  class B,C,D step
A structural route through Islamic cognitive science and the internal senses: from The world no single sense receives to Comparison test. Reading use: follow the relation, then return to the surrounding argument for evidence and limits.

The person with no world

Avicenna then performs a more radical boundary experiment. Imagine a person created all at once, mature and sound, suspended in empty air. The person’s limbs are separated so no skin touches another part. There is no sight, sound or contact with an external object, and no acquired sensory history. Would this person affirm that they exist?

Avicenna asks the reader to say yes. The person would not affirm a hand, face, heart or brain, because none is sensed. Yet the person would not be absent to themselves. The experiment appears in several forms across Avicenna’s works and has generated a large interpretive dispute. Michael Marmura reads it within Avicenna’s argument for the soul’s incorporeality. Jari Kaukua emphasises its appeal to familiar first-person self-awareness. Contemporary work by Shaun Gallagher treats it as a probe of minimal, pre-reflective self-consciousness rather than reflective self-knowledge. Marmura 1986 Kaukua 2015 Gallagher 2023

Thought experiment 4: remove the world, then remove the conclusion

Run the case in two passes. In the first, remove every sensory object and every point of bodily contact while preserving the stipulated person. Ask whether first-person presence remains conceivable. In the second, refuse Avicenna’s metaphysical inference. Grant that the experiment isolates a form of self-givenness, but ask whether a brain, bodily regulation or developmental history is still a constitutive condition even when it is not represented. The first pass tests the content of awareness. The second tests what can be inferred from that content.

What the flying person removes, and what the argument retains
The flying person boundary experimentA human silhouette floats within concentric boundaries. Sight, sound, touch, limb contact, acquired images and world objects are crossed out. A marker labelled first-person presence remains. A lower boundary separates what the case isolates from what it cannot empirically prove. Istipulated first-person presence sightsoundtouchlimb contactacquired imagesworld objects Isolates:awareness need not present itself as a sensed body partDoes not prove:consciousness exists without biological conditions
Boundary: the flying person is strongest as a distinction between what self-awareness presents and what bodily conditions may enable it. Treating absence from content as proof of ontological independence adds a contested premise. Conceptual reconstruction from Avicenna’s flying-person passages and modern interpretations.

Self-awareness is not another internal image

The flying person matters to the internal-sense architecture because it prevents a simple upward pipeline ending in a self-model. Common sense unifies forms. Imagination retains and recombines them. Estimation can mediate an animal’s awareness of its body and activities. Yet Avicenna holds that human self-awareness is direct: no representation stands between the self and its awareness of itself. Ahmed Alwishah’s reconstruction contrasts this with animal self-awareness, which Avicenna treats as bodily, intermittent and mediated by estimation. Alwishah 2016

Whether that contrast is correct is a separate question. Contemporary theories often make minimal selfhood depend on interoception, proprioception, agency or multisensory body models. The flying person deliberately subtracts those contents. It therefore creates a useful disagreement rather than a result. If minimal self-awareness vanishes when embodied regulation is genuinely removed, Avicenna’s directness claim weakens. If a first-person structure remains while body representation is absent or distorted, the claim gains support. Neither outcome alone establishes an immaterial substance.

Worked example 2: same self-report, different generator

System A says “I am present” because a prompt template inserts the phrase. System B says it because a recurrent self-model tracks its uncertainty and action history. A human says it during sensory attenuation. The sentence is identical. The generators differ. The flying person asks about the condition under which first-person presence would remain, not about the availability of first-person grammar. Therefore self-report is evidence about an output until its causal dependence is tested.

Alternative explanation

The experiment may smuggle in the subject it claims to discover. “Imagine a newly created person” already supplies an embodied, developed kind of being, then asks the reader to ignore its body. The reader’s confidence may reflect ordinary self-experience projected into an impossible setup. This objection does not make the experiment useless. It changes its evidential status from proof to disciplined variation: a way to expose which feature of self-awareness our concept treats as dispensable.

Optional depth: three conclusions often run together

Phenomenological conclusion: awareness of oneself is not ordinarily presented as awareness of a body part. Epistemic conclusion: one can be more certain of one’s existence than of a particular bodily description. Ontological conclusion: the self is an incorporeal substance capable of existing independently of the body. Avicenna’s wider philosophy supports the third, but the thought experiment’s force does not make the move from the first two conclusions uncontested. Keeping them separate prevents a modern reader from either dismissing the case too quickly or claiming too much from it.

A disciplined bridge to modern cognitive systems

A historical architecture becomes useful to engineering only after two temptations are refused. The first is dismissal: the ventricles were wrong, therefore the cognitive distinctions are irrelevant. The second is annexation: a familiar modern component is renamed “common sense” or wahm, therefore Avicenna anticipated it. Both moves avoid the harder question. A defensible comparison must preserve a named relation, survive an intervention and state where the mapping fails.

Consider multisensory binding. Modern causal-inference models ask whether two cues arose from one source and predict partial integration when common-cause evidence is uncertain. That supplies a mathematical account Avicenna did not possess. His common sense supplies a different explanatory demand: qualities received by distinct senses must become jointly available as qualities of one sensible particular. The relation preserved across the comparison is not a shared algorithm. It is the need for an operation whose success and failure determine whether one object can be encountered through several modalities. Körding et al. 2007

The same discipline applies to estimation. Contemporary research shows that affect and relevance can alter perception, attention, memory and choice, but this does not turn wahm into an “emotion module”. Avicenna’s claim concerns an unsensed particular meaning such as threatening, friendly or to-be-avoided. A modern appraisal process may preserve the agent-relative relation while implementing it through learned value, bodily regulation, task policy or social history. The mapping breaks if the modern target is merely a scalar reward, a text label or a post-hoc explanation. Brosch et al. 2013

Historical-to-modern claim concordance
Source structurePossible modern targetRelation worth testingBreak condition
Common senseMultisensory object bindingSeveral sensible streams become properties of one particular cause.No shared probability model, neural location or training rule is implied.
Retentive imaginationPerceptual buffer or scene stateA sensible form remains available after its immediate cause departs.A checkpoint, document store or full episodic archive is not the same object.
Compositive imaginationGenerative scene transformationRetained particulars can be combined, separated and rehearsed offline.Fluent generation alone does not show controlled transformation of a retained scene.
Estimation, wahmEmbodied appraisal or affordance valuationThe same object acquires a particular significance relative to an agent’s condition.Reward, sentiment and semantic classification can produce similar outputs by different routes.
Memory of meaningsEvent-linked significance recordA prior encounter’s particular significance can shape a later encounter.Vector retrieval without provenance, subject or occasion does not preserve this relation.
Direct self-awarenessNo established engineering counterpartThe self is not presented through another sensible image.Self-report, confidence and a self-model do not establish first-person presence.

Worked example: an inspection system that must not hide appraisal

Worked example 3: the battery-room inspection rover

Build a synthetic inspection rover for a battery room. At 10:04 it receives five cues: a thermal patch at 62°C, a faint hiss, a volatile-gas reading near the sensor’s uncertainty threshold, a video region that may be vapour, and a worker badge inside the room. The question is not whether the model can produce the sentence “possible thermal runaway”. The question is which transformations make a safe proposal inspectable.

The rover first forms a candidate scene: the hot patch, hiss, vapour region and gas reading probably concern one battery cabinet rather than four unrelated causes. It retains the scene across several sensor cycles because any single frame is weak. It generates two controlled variants: the hiss ceases after valve isolation, or the thermal patch continues rising. It appraises the current scene as hazardous to the worker now present, rather than only anomalous in the abstract. A planner proposes withdrawal, zone isolation and human escalation. A deterministic authority kernel checks identity, permitted actions, current world state and the reversibility of each step before execution.

This configuration is not Avicenna’s psychology implemented in silicon. It is a modern system forced to expose distinctions his model makes hard to ignore. The fused scene belongs in authoritative world state. Recent sensor frames belong in an event buffer. Counterfactual variants belong in a scene model. The particular hazard judgement belongs in a typed appraisal record with its inputs and policy basis. The action remains a proposal until authority is checked. When appraisal is buried inside the planner, the system can act for reasons its final explanation never reveals.

A configured system with appraisal visible
A battery-room inspection rover with separable cognitive operationsA cutaway rover receives thermal, acoustic, gas, video and identity cues. Inside are distinct regions for scene binding, event retention, scene composition and agent-relative appraisal. A planner sends a proposal through an authority ring before a typed action. Dotted labels show limited historical correspondences, not equivalence. Battery roomcabinet 462°C · hissuncertain vapourworker present Scene bindingone cabinet event?common-sense relation Event retentionfive sensor cyclesretentive relation Scene variantsisolate valve · observe risecompositive relation Typed appraisalhazard to worker nowbasis + uncertainty + expirywahm relation, not identity Plannerwithdraw · isolatealert operator Authorityidentity · permissionworld state · reversibilityTyped action + effect receiptauthoritative path
Implementation lesson: expose fused world state, retained evidence, counterfactual scene changes and appraisal as different objects. Keep the planner probabilistic and the authority path enforceable. Illustrative configured system. No deployment or measured performance is claimed. Scroll the figure horizontally on narrow screens.
scene = bind(sensor_cues, common_cause_hypotheses)
significance = appraise(scene, agent_state, commitments, policy)
proposal = plan(scene, significance, available_actions)
authorised_action = kernel(proposal, identity, authority, world_state) Meaning of the variables: scene is the best current particular event; agent_state includes relevant vulnerability or mission condition; commitments are standing goals and duties; policy constrains appraisal; and the kernel alone can convert a proposal into an action. The decomposition is valid only when these objects can be separately observed or intervened upon.

The intervention fingerprint matters more than the vocabulary

Suppose two architectures produce the same safe action. In the first, a fused scene feeds a separate appraisal process whose state can be swapped while the scene remains fixed. In the second, a single network maps sensor history directly to action. Calling the first process wahm adds no evidence. What matters is the fingerprint. Hold the scene constant, change only agent condition or remembered significance, and see whether appraisal and action change in the predicted direction. Then hold appraisal constant and alter the scene. Distinct sensitivities support a functional separation. Their absence supports the objection that one integrated process may be doing all the work.

Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s challenge therefore becomes an engineering test. Hybrid judgements such as “this coloured shape is harmful to me” may be acts of one unified subject rather than outputs handed between specialised faculties. A recurrent model may encode form, retention and significance in one evolving state. If intervention cannot separate them, we should not force the state into medieval compartments. The Avicennian decomposition earns modern use only where it predicts a dissociation that a unified alternative does not.

The concordance aperture
A decision instrument for historical-to-modern comparisonConcentric apertures represent increasing evidential demands: shared label, defined operations, preserved relation with intervention, and a core requiring a rival test plus break condition. Direct self-awareness remains outside the engineering aperture. A locked region states that equivalence is not licensed. shared labeloperations definedrelation + interventionrival test+ breakhomology candidate common sensecompositionwahmretention directself-awarenessno establishedtarget operation Equivalence lockedNo preservation proof or inversehas been supplied.
Decision rule: a shared label permits a question, not a conclusion. Functional correspondence requires defined operations. A structural-homology candidate additionally requires a distinctive intervention, a rival generator and a stated break condition. Practitioner synthesis developed for this paper. Scroll horizontally on narrow screens.
Open research hypothesis

In a multimodal agent with explicit appraisal state, swapping only that state will alter action priorities while preserving object recognition and scene description. The finding would strengthen the claim that agent-relative significance is a separable causal operation. It would weaken the claim if the swap has no selective effect, or if the same effect appears after arbitrary hidden-state perturbations. A rival explanation is that the “appraisal” field is merely a convenient control variable learned by the planner. The smallest useful implementation is a synthetic gridworld with one scene, two agent conditions, a matched end-to-end policy and preregistered state-swap tests.

The failure mode: salience laundering

Worked example 4: a stale incident changes a live priority

An appraisal process can be causally decisive yet disappear from the explanation. Imagine a maintenance assistant ranking pumps for inspection. Pump 17 receives highest urgency because an old incident record remains attached to its serial prefix. Current vibration and temperature are within tolerance. The planner uses the inherited significance state, then generates a fluent rationale emphasising a minor vibration fluctuation. A reviewer sees a plausible reason but not the actual cause. Remove the stale significance record while preserving all current sensor evidence, and the ranking falls.

This is salience laundering: an unexamined relevance assignment enters upstream, while downstream reasoning supplies a respectable narrative. The recovery is not “ask for a better explanation”. It is to preserve the appraisal record, expose its provenance and expiry, and run a counterfactual removal. The concept is inspired by the distinction between form and particular meaning, but the failure mode is a new practitioner synthesis rather than a claim found in Avicenna.

Salience laundering through a fluent rationale
A causal intervention diagram for salience launderingCurrent sensor evidence and a stale significance record both enter a planner. The stale record has the stronger causal path to an urgent ranking, but a generated rationale cites only the current evidence. A counterfactual intervention deletes the stale record and changes the ranking, revealing the hidden cause. Current evidencevibration within toleranceminor transient fluctuation Stale significanceserial prefix linked toold high-risk incident Plannerpriority ranking+ rationale generator Urgent rankingpump 17 firstactual dominant cause hidden Fluent rationale“recent vibration changewarrants early inspection”plausible, not causally faithful counterfactual deletion lowers the ranking
Assurance lesson: explanations should be tested against causal removals. If a hidden appraisal record changes the action while the cited evidence does not, the rationale is not a faithful decision receipt. Illustrative failure path and recovery test developed for this paper. Scroll horizontally on narrow screens.

Executable lab: internal-sense concordance audit

Classify a historical-to-modern comparison by the evidence it actually carries. The tool deliberately refuses to output “equivalence”.

Which target operations are demonstrated?
What comparison evidence is present?

No comparison assessed yet

Select the target operations and evidence, then run the audit.

How to read the audit

A positive result at the strongest level permits one limited move: treat the comparison as a structural-homology candidate worthy of replication. It does not establish a shared substrate, ontology, phenomenology or historical anticipation. A negative result means the mapping should remain a heuristic or be abandoned. It may also reveal that the target architecture entangles operations too tightly for the proposed distinction to be useful.

The audit encodes six assumptions. Source and target objects must be specified independently. A relation must be named rather than inferred from similar language. An intervention must target the proposed operation. A matched rival must be able to produce the same output by another route. The break condition must be explicit. Finally, the direct self-awareness claim is capped as unresolved because no behavioural checkbox converts first-person presence into a third-person engineering property.

Python 3.10+ · concordance_audit.py
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
from enum import Enum
from json import dumps
from typing import FrozenSet


class Status(str, Enum):
    LEXICAL = "lexical analogy"
    FUNCTIONAL = "functional correspondence"
    INCOMPLETE = "structural claim incomplete"
    HOMOLOGY = "structural homology candidate"
    UNRESOLVED = "unresolved comparison"


EXPECTED_OPERATION = {
    "common_sense": "unify",
    "retentive_imagination": "retain_form",
    "compositive_imagination": "compose",
    "estimation": "appraise",
    "meaning_memory": "retain_meaning",
    "self_awareness": None,
}


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ConcordanceClaim:
    source_claim: str
    target_operations: FrozenSet[str]
    source_defined: bool = False
    target_defined: bool = False
    relation_named: bool = False
    intervention: bool = False
    rival_tested: bool = False
    break_stated: bool = False

    def classify(self) -> Status:
        if self.source_claim not in EXPECTED_OPERATION:
            raise ValueError("Unknown historical source structure")
        if self.source_claim == "self_awareness":
            return Status.UNRESOLVED
        expected = EXPECTED_OPERATION[self.source_claim]
        operation_matches = expected in self.target_operations
        definitions = self.source_defined and self.target_defined
        if not operation_matches or not definitions or not self.relation_named:
            return Status.LEXICAL
        if not self.intervention:
            return Status.FUNCTIONAL
        if not (self.rival_tested and self.break_stated):
            return Status.INCOMPLETE
        return Status.HOMOLOGY

    def receipt(self) -> str:
        result = asdict(self)
        result["target_operations"] = sorted(self.target_operations)
        result["status"] = self.classify().value
        result["equivalence_permitted"] = False
        return dumps(result, indent=2)


if __name__ == "__main__":
    example = ConcordanceClaim(
        source_claim="estimation",
        target_operations=frozenset({"appraise"}),
        source_defined=True,
        target_defined=True,
        relation_named=True,
        intervention=True,
        rival_tested=True,
        break_stated=True,
    )
    print(example.receipt())

What the code tests: whether a comparison has progressed from a shared label to defined operations and a discriminating intervention. A homology result licenses replication, not equivalence. An unresolved result for self-awareness records the measurement gap rather than turning self-report into proof.

Extended tests and expected negative results

Run the script once as supplied. It returns structural homology candidate for the estimation example. Set intervention=False; the result falls to functional correspondence. Keep the intervention but set rival_tested=False; it becomes structural claim incomplete. Change the source to self_awareness; it returns unresolved comparison regardless of self-model operations. These are intentional constraints. The tool lowers claims when decisive evidence is absent.

Practical rule

Before naming a modern component after an internal sense, write the source operation, target operation, preserved relation, intervention fingerprint, rival generator and break condition. If any field is blank, use ordinary engineering vocabulary and keep the historical comparison in the question column.

How the claim changes under pressure
Chart · state
stateDiagram-v2
  [*] --> Claim
  state "Common sense is a binding<br/>operation" as Claim
  state "Retention is not another act<br/>of sensing" as Test
  state "Why estimation was disputed" as Revision
  Claim --> Test: expose mechanism
  Test --> Decision: evidence survives
  Test --> Revision: rival survives
  Revision --> Claim: narrow or rebuild
  Decision --> [*]
The revision loop begins with Common sense is a binding operation and keeps counterexamples inside the reasoning path. Reading use: follow the relation, then return to the surrounding argument for evidence and limits.

Separate binding, retention, composition and appraisal

The familiar architecture says that perception supplies neutral facts and reasoning decides what they mean. Avicenna’s internal senses make that split difficult to sustain. A creature must already have one sensible object rather than unrelated signals. The object must remain available after it vanishes. Its parts may need to be separated or recombined. Most importantly, it must acquire a particular significance for this creature in this condition. Explicit reasoning inherits a world already organised for possible action.

The decision is therefore not to add five medievally named modules to a modern stack. It is to treat binding, retention, composition and appraisal as separate causal questions before evaluating reasoning. For a cognitive experiment, intervene on each operation and look for selective failures. For an AI system, give each consequential appraisal a typed record, provenance, expiry and counterfactual-removal test. For a philosophical comparison, stop at the level the evidence supports.

The flying person adds a final discipline. It prevents the architecture from quietly identifying every mental fact with an internal representation. Avicenna claims that human self-awareness is not another image passed along the chain. A modern system may model itself, report confidence and describe its own processing. Those are important functions. They remain third-person mechanisms until a measurement bridge connects them to first-person presence. Do not infer a subject from fluent self-reference, and do not infer the absence of a subject from an unfamiliar substrate.

The strongest alternative remains live. Perhaps a unified recurrent process performs all these operations without stable faculty boundaries. Perhaps appraisal is inseparable from perception rather than added after it. Perhaps bodily regulation constitutes the minimal self that the flying person asks us to imagine away. The correct response is not to average the positions. It is to build interventions that make them disagree.

When Nadia crosses the corridor towards the gas valve, her action does not begin with a neutral picture followed by a detached syllogism. A scene has cohered, persisted, mattered and opened a path. That middle is where many intelligent systems succeed, fail and conceal their causes. The practical inheritance of the internal senses is a better place to look.

Glossary

Common sense
Al-ḥiss al-mushtarak: the internal receptive power through which qualities from different external senses belong to one sensible particular.
Form
The sensible character received from an object, such as shape, colour or sound. It is not identical to modern data or a vector representation.
Particular meaning
An unsensed significance attached to this object in this encounter, such as threatening, friendly, edible or one’s own.
Retentive imagination
The capacity that preserves sensible forms after the external object is absent.
Compositive imagination
The capacity that combines and separates retained particular forms, supporting rehearsal, invention and some animal action.
Estimation
Wahm: the disputed faculty by which an animal apprehends particular, unsensed meanings.
Intellect
For Avicenna, the human power whose proper objects are universals and intelligibles, distinct from operations over sensible particulars.
Flying person
Avicenna’s thought experiment in which a newly created person lacks sensory contact yet is asked to affirm their existence.
Structural homology candidate
A comparison with defined source and target operations, a preserved relation, a discriminating intervention, a rival test and an explicit break condition.

References

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