Insight Editions · No. 304
Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and His Pupils
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume III
Karl H. Potter (ed.)
Karl Potter's volume surveys early non-dual Vedānta, from Gauḍapāda and Śaṃkara to their pupils, explaining how the Self and Brahman are held to be one and the world an appearance.
A study guide to Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and His Pupils by Karl H. Potter (ed.). Shared free for personal reading; not for sale and not endorsed by the authors or publishers. Please read and buy the original.
Ātman and Brahman are not ultimately two.
Six essays and 41 work studies.
Gauḍapāda, Śaṅkara, Sureśvara, Maṇḍana.
Source-first philosophical study.
The Book on One Page
Central claim. The nondual tradition maintains that the Self and Brahman are not ultimately two realities. Bondage depends upon ignorance and misidentification; release is the correction of that understanding, not the production of a new Self.
The argument. The central dispute concerns the epistemic force of scripture and the interpretation of ordinary experience. Changing states of mind and body are encountered, but their presence does not by itself show that the awareness disclosing them is another object or product.
The historical scope. This volume moves from Gauḍapāda through Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana Miśra, Sureśvara, Padmapāda, Totaka, and Hastāmalaka. Its scholars repeatedly distinguish the transmitted name of a work from evidence about when and by whom it was written.
The argumentative method. Objections are essential, not peripheral. Mīmāṃsā challenges the function of descriptive sentences; Sāṃkhya offers a plural account of selves and primal matter; Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika propose other causal and perceptual models; Buddhist schools challenge continuity and stable objects.
How to read. Every philosophical introduction appears in Potter's order, followed by all forty-one named works in their original sequence. Short works receive short treatments; the large commentarial and polemical works receive proportionately more space. Source passage labels are retained where reported.
Chapter map
| Chapter | Source sequence | Payload |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Historical Résumé | Historical identity is often less certain than the doctrines attributed to an author. |
| 2 | Theory of Value | The action that prepares a student does not produce the unproduced Self. |
| 3 | Philosophy of Language | A declarative sentence can disclose what a command cannot bring into existence. |
| 4 | Identity and Difference | The problem is not whether differences appear, but whether they exist independently. |
| 5 | Advaita Metaphysics | A changing appearance requires explanation without turning Brahman into a changing object. |
| 6 | Advaita Epistemology | The consciousness that reveals knowledge is not itself another object of knowledge. |
| 7 | Gauḍapāda | The argument from the three states questions whether origination belongs to reality at all. |
| 8 | Śaṅkara and the attributed corpus | The many commentaries and attributed manuals must not be treated as one historically certain corpus. |
| 9 | Maṇḍana Miśra | The power and limitation of injunction remain live issues for Maṇḍana. |
| 10 | Sureśvara | A commentary can extend a teacher’s argument while challenging rival explanations of how it works. |
| 11 | Padmapāda | The reality of superimposition determines whether knowledge can remove bondage. |
| 12 | Totaka / Trotaka | Instruction removes a confusion; it cannot manufacture an identity that did not exist. |
| 13 | Hastāmalaka | The reply repeatedly distinguishes the witness from social, bodily, and mental descriptions. |
Historical Résumé
The historical narrative matters because the authority of a text, its conventional attribution, and the argument it contains are different questions.
Historical identity is often less certain than the doctrines attributed to an author.
Vedic tradition → Upaniṣadic interpretation → Gauḍapāda → Śaṅkara → Early disciples
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Sources | Upaniṣads and sūtras: Shared textual basis |
| Interpretations | Advaita and rival schools: Different models of reality |
| History | Attribution and chronology: Claims require evidence |
Argument and evidence
Potter, printed pp. 3–21 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 7,616 words
What is Vedānta?
The Vedic literature represents the thought of the Aryans, IndoEuropean-speaking folk who perhaps entered India in the middle of the second millennium B.C. Consisting of a wide variety of materials, notably hymns and directions as to the proper performance of ritual, this literature also contains the beginnings of the philosophical and theological speculations that flowered eventually in classical Hinduism. These sections are termed 'Upaniṣads' (a term of doubtful etymology). Thus Vedānta philosophy, properly speaking, is that philosophy which takes its lead from the Upaniṣads.
rivalry among them as to which system 'really' represents the teaching of the Upaniṣads. It is an issue that, in the nature of the case, may well be insoluble. Vedānta philosophers are a particular section of those who specialize in mimämsä, or exegetics of the Vedic scriptures.
Much of the Vedānta literature is composed following the tradition of Sūtra and commentary that reflects the oral tradition in which it was born. Since the two sets of Sūtras refer to each others' authors one might suspect they are of roughly the same age, although one cannot rule out the very real possibility of multiple authorship.
Various sorts of commentaries are composed on Sūtras, and then subcommentaries and further commentaries on those.
a bhäsya is an extensive explanation of the meaning of the Sūtras, a. vrtti is a briefer explanation, a värttika a critical treatment of a bhä?ya, and so on. Far and away the most important instance of this phenomenon concerns the famous Mahäbhärata poem, the Bhagavadgitä. To both older and later Mïmamsakas §ruti, connoting that which is 'heard,' is either authorless or of divine authorship; not being a human production, it cannot be mistaken, though we may be mistaken about what it means, thus the necessity of exegetics. Thus it is that many Vedantic philosophers have written commentaries on the Bhagavadgitä, finding in Krsna's teachings an appropriate foil for expressing their particular slant.
//. What is Advaita Vedānta?
So far we have been discussing the general background that all Vedānta philosophy shares.
though so important has it become in the eyes not only of scholars but also of those who have been influential in molding the attitudes of enlightened Hindus toward India's past, that one will frequently find the term 'Vedānta' used to indicate only Advaita Vedānta. First, however, it will be well if we attempt to state as clearly as possible what is shared by and constitutive of the Advaita Vedānta philosophical position. 2. 3. 4. Since.bondage depends on ignorance, liberation is manifested upon the removal of ignorance by acquiring its opposite, namely, knowledge (vidyä). 5. Therefore, knowledge involves the awareness that all distinctions are false, especially the distinction between the knower and the known. The true Self is itself just that pure consciousness, without which nothing can be known in any way.
9. 10. 11. Pure consciousness is experienced during deep sleep; since we awake refreshed, it is inferred that pure consciousness (reality, Brahman, the true Self) is also the ultimate bliss. This is by no means an exhaustive list of Advaita tenets, but it will serve for the moment to indicate the tenor of the theory. Now for some 'practical' propositions. Since all distinctions are the product of ignorance, any positive account of a path to liberation, involving distinctions, must be ultimately false. However, some false views are less misleading than others. By criticizing worse views one arrives by stages at better ones. Or, again, atheism and agnosticism are worse views than theism; within theism, again, monotheism is preferable to polytheism; but ultimately preferable to all theisms is monism.
18. which accept as authority scriptures other than the Vedas are inferior to those views which accept the Vedas as authoritative; within this last, those who think that both sections speak of liberation, that both actions enjoined and knowledge conveyed in scripture are directly relevant to gaining liberation, hold an inferior view compared to those who believe that the two sections speak to different ends, injunctions leading one to heaven, declarations to liberation, Ultimately, however, scripture can provide no positive key to liberation, because the key lies in removing ignorance, a negative step; No contradictions are ultimately acceptable to Advaita, to be sure, because contradictions are clearly in the scope of ignorance, if only because they involve language and so distinctions. Frequently Advaita texts read as verbatim reports of teacher-pupil interviews.
his views. But which were the Advaitins? Who are the philosophers that this volume should treat?
///. Who Were These Philosophers'?
As we have seen, Vedānta in general can be safely stated to have arisen in the Upaniṣads. Our business is with Advaita Vedantins, however. Did an Advaita tradition exist in the first half of the first millennium A.D.? He even goes so far as to say that even a man wise in all the sciences is still like a fool if he has no tradition.2
Despite this, scholars of pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta have had little success in identifying beyond question more than one or two names of writers who may have been associated with an Advaita tradition. The same consideration weighs against our uncritically counting
Bädaräyana, the author of the Brahmasūtras, as an Advaitin, although it doesn't stop Advaitins from doing so. Bädaräyana mentions on occasion views of others by name. Since the Sūtra in question consists of precisely one word4
it is not hard to construct divergent readings. Once past the time of the Sūtras, however, we hear of a few names that may perhaps be linked with Advaita. The dislike Indians had for identifying people by name is a constant headache in this connection. Indeed, we are lucky to get even that; the bane of the efforts of the translator of Sanskrit philosophical texts is making sure when one is dealing with an opponent's view, since so frequently no signal whatsoever is given. For example,
Śaṅkara is frequently referred to by his disciples as the Bhäsyakära, since he wrote a Brahmas ütrabhäsy a. The relevance of all this to our present context is that, in many Vedānta works by Śaṅkara and his pupils, in those of some Mïmàmsakas, of Rämänuja and his followers, and of Bhâskara and others, there are constant references to one or more persons called £Vrttikâra.' Śaṅkara speaks frequently of Vrttikäras.
have suggested, a single commentary on both), and furthermore that Śaṅkara, who refers to Upavarsa as 'Bhagavän,' counted Upavarsa as a member of the tradition he follows.
Brahmasūtras and Bhagavadgitä by the same hand, but that the same author also wrote vrttis on several Upaniṣads.15
Śaṅkara, in commenting on some of the oldest Upaniṣads, makes three references to old teachers who apparently addressed themselves to the interpretation of the Chändogya Upaniṣad. Not all modern scholars have been willing to accept these two as Advaitins.
but little or nothing is known of his identity or date.
So far we have been dealing with figures who, except for Bàdarâyana, wrote works now apparently lost. The same tradition identifies the author of these stanzas as Gaudapâda. Modern scholarship has blossomed forth in vast controversy over a variety of matters relating to Gaudapâda. First, there is the question of the date of the Mäntjiükyakärikäs. On
this understanding the kārikās can date from no earlier than the end of the seventh century. Thus the kārikās must date not later than the early seventh century. But if we place the kārikās in the sixth-seventh century we must either reinterpret Śaṅkara's remark about his teacher's teacher, or else recompute Śaṅkara's date. Second, there is the name 'Gaudapäda.' ' Third, there is the matter of the alleged buddhistic leanings of the kārikās. That fact alone does not bother those who are willing to admit Advaita's affinities with certain buddhist systems (Vijnânavâda, Mâdhyamika) and who thus have no objection to allowing a general 'influence' on Advaita by buddhism. Fourth, there is the very interesting question of the relation between the stanzas and the Mändükya Upaniṣad itself. The first twenty-nine kārikās, constituting the first book of Gaudapâda's treatise, provide explicit commentary
on these twelve sentences: the relationship between sentences and stanzas is indicated in the commentary attributed to Śaṅkara. This is not the only relationship that has been suggested, however. Râmânuja also thought those kārikās were scripture. There are other issues surrounding Gaudapâda and the kārikās. However, no one really doubts that there are one or more works preserved in what we call the Gaudapädiyakärikäs and that at least one of these works (say, the second and third books) teach Advaita Vedânta in clearcut terms. Thus, despite the many interesting questions raised by scholarship it still seems safe to say that the kārikās of at least the second and third books constitute the earliest extended Advaita treatise that has been preserved for us. These traditions are embellished with interesting stories but can in no way be authenticated at this time.
literature that is attributed to him, he must have been composing every hour of the day! The basic problem however, not only for arriving at Śaṅkara's date but also for arriving at reasoned conclusions about much else about him and his philosophy, concerns the authenticity of the works attributed to him. Beyond these, the questions begin. They are usually held to have flourished in the seventh century. It seems likely that Śaṅkara also knew Dharmakîrti's work. These facts are enough to insure that Śaṅkara did not flourish before the seventh century but do not determine whether he lived in the seventh, eighth, or even the ninth century. According to the Advaita tradition, Mandana then changed his name to Sureśvara and became a pupil of Śaṅkara. Śaṅkara is said by some of his biographers to have been born in
Kalâdi, a small town in the Malabar region now included in the state of Kerala. Śaṅkara then began extensive journeying that took him throughout India. At Dwarka in the west he founded another maffia; he founded a third matha at Badrinath in the Himalayas and a fourth at Puri in the east. Some stories have it that he met the famous Kashmir Saiva savant Abhinavagupta, who cursed him with an ulcerous disease of which he eventually died, but not before Padmapäda had transferred it back to its donor, who also died of it. Their number attests the particular reverence felt for Samkarâcârya by Advaitins in particular, but also to a remarkably great degree by Indians of all walks of life, whether or not their philosophical and/or religious persuasions agree with his.
Overshadowed as an object of traditional reverence, Mandana Misra must not be underrated as a philosopher. Yet it seems to have been quite original. Śaṅkara had many pupils, but only four of them are remembered by name. is supposed to have been one of his first followers. Other works attributed to him are probably spurious. A third disciple of Śaṅkara's was, according to tradition, originally named Giri but was given the name of Totaka when he joined Śaṅkara's group. He is supposed to have been very devoted but was apparently not a quick learner until one day after Śaṅkara, to the irritation of the other pupils, had delayed lessons so that Totaka might attend. He eventually arrived and amazed all by producing first a poem of eight verses, Tofakäsfaka, and then a longer work, entitled
Srutisärasamuddhärana, which is supposed to have been spontaneously composed in the presence of his teacher and fellow pupils. When addressed by Śaṅkara, however, asking "Who art thou?" the boy blossomed forth with a four teen-verse poem on the Self, now called Hastämalakastoira. An approximation, based on evidence to be summarized below, is given of the dates we are at present inclined to assign to these writers.
A CHECK LIST OF AUTHORS AND WORKS Abbreviations: d. date; p. place; w. work(s); T, edited and translated; E, published but not translated; M, manuscript(s) available but not published; *, probably spurious
Upavarsa; d. before A.D. 200 (?); p. "the South"; w. Chändogyopanisadväkyabhäsya Sundara Pândya; d.?; w. Brahmasūtravrttivärttika Gaudapädäcärya; d. A.D. 600 (?); p. North Bengal; w. Mändükyopanisadkärikäs (also called Gaudapädakärikäs or Ägamaeästra), (T) Samkaräcärya; d. A.D. 725 (?);
*Vlvekacüdämani (T), * Sarvavedäntasiddhantasamgraha (T), *Advaitapancaratna or Ätmapancaka (T), *Väkyasudhä or Drgdrsyaviveka (T), *Upadesapancaka (T), *māyāpahcaka (T), *Laghuväkyavrtti (T), *Svetàsvataropanisadbhàsya (E), *Nrsimhottaratâpaniyopariisadbhäsya (E), *KauÊïtakyupanisadbhasya (E) Mandana Misra; d. A.D. 680-750 (?); HastämalakaSlokäh (T [German])
Śaṅkara is very much aware of the variety of philosophical views current in his time as well as those relevant to his purpose and which flourished at earlier periods. It would be instructive to measure the amount of time he gives specific systems. But in the Brahmaputrabhäsya Śaṅkara considers at length Sāṃkhya. In that work also, there are extended criticisms of Nyäya, Vaisesika, Yoga, buddhist, Jain, and Cärväka theories.
of Śaṅkara and Mandana. Once the question of influence is opened up in this way there does indeed seem to be some reason to suspect certain factors that conditioned the Advaita interpretation. Some of the influences are relatively uncontroversial. It is also evident that either Advaita takes over some of the Sāṃkhya psychology or that the two systems have a common source. The greatest notoriety has surrounded alleged buddhist influence on Śaṅkara's Advaita. On the face of it the charge is absurd. Sam« kara not only shows no self-conscious leanings toward buddhism he saves some of his choicest disrespectful language for the buddhists.27
Nevertheless, the issue has attracted considerable scholarly discussion. Furthermore, there are important parallels, up to a point, particularly with Vijfiänaväda.
Advaita's in certain respects. Other points of comparison can also be found.29
Loyal Advaitins have almost universally rejected the suggestion of any influence, and many of them will argue that the parallels just noted are accidental or the result of misunderstandings or foreshortened views. 2 ) Momentariness is a cardinal principle of buddhism, consciousness is fundamentally momentary for them. 5) Removal of avidyā leads to a ''blowing out" nirvana) for buddhists, but for Śaṅkara it leads to perfect knowledge (vidyä).zl
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Theory of Value
Early Advaita sets liberation against a detailed account of karma, death, rebirth and the apparent continuity of the embodied person.
The action that prepares a student does not produce the unproduced Self.
Karma and rebirth → Bondage → Qualification → Self-knowledge → Liberation
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Saṃsāra | Karma-conditioned return: Problem to be explained |
| Discipline | Ethics, detachment, inquiry: Preparatory means |
| Mokṣa | Knowledge of the Self: Not a new product |
Argument and evidence
Potter, printed pp. 22–45 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 9,876 words
/. Bondage: Life, Death, and Rebirth
As do all Indian philosophical systems (except for the Cärväkas), Advaita orients its entire approach around the quest for liberation (moksa), the release from bondage (samsara). In order fully to understand the Advaita theory about liberation it is necessary first to comprehend what constitutes bondage, that is, to review the cycle of life, death, and rebirth as it is conceived in Advaita. A. Death. In either case, however, a man comes to the point of death endowed with several relevant bits of equipment. These include his gross body, made up of material substances such as earth, water, etc.;
that is, which have not as yet produced their results. Karmic residues are of three kinds. ( This kind of karma is called sanely amäna or ägamin karman. These väsanäs appear to be decisions arrived at by the internal organ to seek certain kinds of outcomes. At any moment in one's conscious lifetime one is guided in acting by such väsanäs, which develop into desires (käma).3
The Upaniṣads themselves suggest several accounts of what happens to these various things at the time of death. What we provide next follows Śaṅkara Brahmas ütrahhäsya IV.2.1-21) where there are disagreements. The process goes as follows: 1. 2. That this is so is evidenced by the fact that a dying person, and for that matter one
asleep and not dreaming, is seen to breathe though his senses and his mind is not functioning. Now the jiva, thus encumbered, joins the subtle elements (tanmätras). However, since the external organs have stopped functioning, its consciousness at this point, like consciousness in dreams, is completely controlled by past karrna. Thus decided, the jiva-controlled subtle body leaves the heart by one or another of the many veins and arteries and eventually gains egress from the dead gross body by one or another opening. Śaṅkara tells us that it is those who observe ritual obligations but do not have knowledge of God (i.e., Brahman with qualities, saguna Brahman) who follow the southern path; those who know God follow the northern path. They follow a third path, which leads to Yama's world or city, called samyamanam here and also in Manu,
the Epic, and elsewhere, or else they are immediately reborn as small animals, insects, perhaps plants, etc.5
How does the passage along these paths proceed? It is thus exhausting some of its stored-up karmic residues as it proceeds and continues doing so in the place (sun, moon, or samyamanam, as the case may be) at which it in due course arrives. Śaṅkara explains that these are references to divinities that conduct the self along the path, since in its state it is not capable of finding its own way. It leads from smoke through night, the dark fortnight, the months when the sun is moving south, to the realm of the fathers, thence to äkäsa and thus to the moon. G. Heaven and Hell. being determined by the karmic residues of the selves that inhabit them, are rather quickly lived through, and the sub tie-body-enclosed self may move on quickly from one "body" to various others, all the while experiencing
appropriate pains "as in a dream." Actually, the sojourn in the moon is a period during which the meritorious residues are exhausted, and it is thus basically a happy interim. They do so until a small amount of karmic residue remains. If that thing is God, (saguna) Brahman, they will be led to the Brahmaloka. If they meditated on God under some symbolic manifestation, however, they will arrive at an appropriately different kind of heavenly place.8
It seems likely that Bâdarâyana thought that the Brahmaloka amounted to the state of liberation, Śaṅkara, though, cannot allow that one can literally "arrive at" the higher (nirguna) Brahman, since he claims that Brahman is quite unrelated to any second thing, and so he is forced here to interpret the Brahmaloka as a highest heaven, not liberation. The solution that Śaṅkara finds is rather complex. Brahmas ütr ab häsy a IV.3.10
tells us that such selves proceed, along with the god (Hiranyagarbha ) who rules the Brahmaloka, to "the pure highest place of Visnu," and that this is what is meant by "progressive liberation " (kramamukti), since the highest Brahman cannot be (literally) "reached." The nonreturning may be only relative: it may mean that those who go to the Brahmaloka remain there until the next reabsorption, but that after that they return to bondage in the next cyclical universe. This process does not take long, and the self loses consciousness during this period, just as one loses consciousness when falling from a tree (according to one account) or because the karmic residues that remain do not become operative again until they determine the next birth. E. Birth. In the case of many animals, including humans, this means that it enters the womb in semen. In each case there is influence of the parent on the new gross body, through
the food eaten by the parent, which interacts with the elements in the subtle body; this is why the child when born resembles his parents, both in the fact that it is a human child that is born (and not some other species of animal) as well as in its facial and other features. The purer jiuas find their way into purer foodstuffs (although exactly why still constitutes a mystery, it seems); then since the higher castes eat the purer foods, and so on down the natural order, it will ordinarily work out that the right jivas will turn up with the right parents. But this suggests several things. First, something happened in the womb to Vämadeva that led to his liberation; since this could hardly have been a hearing of the scripture or the words of a teacher, we must suppose that his purity resulted in removal of ignorance without special occasion. Second, since Vämadeva
is said to have subsequently been born and lived through a life determined by his prârabdhakarman, we must assume that the determination of his length of life and his experiences, as well as of his type of birth, were in fact fixed prior to his liberation in the womb. Third, it suggests that the distinction between Vamadeva's prârabdhakarman and his other karmic residues was already fixed prior to this "first birth ", since presumably at the point of liberation all the other residues became inoperative. F. Life. All of this brings us to what we ordinarily call the birth of the child, the "second birth" of the Aitareya. All the karmic processes are already under way, and have been for about nine months in the case of a normal child. It is in this sense that past actions determine future experiences. However,
this is a very loose relation. to counteract the influence of his väsanäs. This is not an alternative life plan, but a way of looking at life plans. In this second-order attitude toward bondage lies the key to liberation. In living one's life plan or style, however, one necessarily performs actions. The primary meaning of the word "karma" is action. There are a number of relevant kinds of actions. (3) desired acts kämyakarman), that is, those acts prescribed for one who wishes to obtain a certain result, say, increase in wealth, or heaven; (4) expiatory actions präyaEcitta), acts performed to purify oneself because one has failed to do certain prescribed acts either in this life or in past lives.16
On âarnkara's view all these kinds of acts are equally capable of producing karmic residues, which in turn will condition the type of birth, length of life, and kind of experience the jiva will inherit in the next life.
Which karmic residues work themselves out sooner, which ones constitute the prärabdhakarman for a given lifetime, and which are sancita, stored up for later fruition? Śaṅkara seems to think that in general the more intense and proximate residues, whether sinful or meritorious, tend to mature first, but that this general rule is subject to many exceptions because there are incompatibilities between several residues that have equal claim but only one of which can mature at a given time. In Brahmasūtrabhäsya III.2.38-41 Śaṅkara explains the difference between the views of Jaimini and Bâdarâyana on this score. Indeed, not only is it logically possible but it seems to happen all the time: why else would people do such things! God does not ordinarily match experience to simultaneous act on the ground of the merit-value of that act but rather on the ground of the merit-value of one or more past acts.
appropriately reflecting the valence of the past actions. As long as a person lacks Self-knowledge, the acts he performs will themselves breed future lives and experiences.
Practically all Indian philosophical systems view liberation as the highest aim of mankind, and Advaita is no exception. Liberation is nothing more nor less than being, knowing, and experiencing one's true Self. We cannot help being, knowing, and experiencing our Self; thus we are always liberated. It follows, first, that liberation does not require a positive change in us. One may contemplate desisting from performing any actions whatever, but the Gitä also warns us away from that: no ordinary person can avoid acting even for a moment; refusing to act is itself a kind of action.18
One must, therefore, identify a necessary condition for the workings of the mechanism of bondage, something removable and in whose absence the mechanism will cease to function.
or tendencies, will not be carried through into action, and without functioning väsanäs the karmic residues cannot determine birth, length of life, and experiences. But avidyā, fortunately, is not something that requires action to destroy it. It is destroyed by its natural opposite, perfect knowledge (vidyä). Knowing is not an act and so does not breed further karmic residues. Here we are merely considering some implications of what liberation is and is not. Śaṅkara tells us in one place that it is like what happens to the space inside a pot when the pot breaks, that is, nothing.19
As Gaudapâda says, there is no liberation really.20 Or, using another common Advaita analogy, it is like what happens to the light reflected in a dirty mirror when the mirror is cleaned. The condition under which this happens is avidyā.
etymology of the common verb used here, and like burned seed they no longer have the power to produce sprouts. As for the actions still to be performed in this life, they will no longer bind. Thus the liberated person normally continues in bodily existence, working out his prärabdhakarman, and this state is known as "liberation while living," iwanmukti. The jivanmukti state seems paradoxical. The liberated self has achieved Self-knowledge and thus no longer recognizes any distinctions; yet he moves among us, performs the necessary activities of eating, drinking, etc., that suffice to keep him alive through his allotted years. Having no desires he does not act, but he nevertheless does act. Whereas most Hindus view samnyäsa as an advanced spiritual state it is a peculiarity of Śaṅkara's thought that he construes this stage as
identical with liberation while living, that is, with jivanmukti. This is because of his relatively uncompromising insistence on the necessity of Self-knowledge for release, coupled with his thesis that Self-knowledge necessarily renders action of any kind impossible. For the same reasons the apparent problem about the possibility of backsliding from samnyäsa comes to nought. Having received liberation through Self-knowledge and thus passing into a state (like Yoga's nirvikalpakasamädhi, perhaps) in which no distinctions are recognized, one subsequently seems to come out of this state to live a life in which knowledge and actions presupposing the recognition of distinctions recommence; thus the charge of backsliding. But again the problem is semantic only. But the stage one reaches, that is, samnyäsa, is not a kind of samädhi at all, since prärabdhakarman is still operating.
standpoint from which questions about social mores matter. Now in order to be a true samnyäsin our individual must have Selfknowledge. But Śaṅkara is quite specific about what kind of a life one must lead before avidyā is removed and Self-knowledge results. and (4) that he desire liberation. He has no evil karmic residues to spawn opposing väsanäs. There is another aspect to the criticism, however, that requires further explanation. The charge is that the samnyäsin is antinomian, that is, that he is outside the obligations of social morality and thus likely to do anything at all, in particular, some harmful or antisocial thing. But this does not mean that samnyäsins are permitted to perform immoral actions. The point is, rather, that samnyäsins cannot perform actions at all, and therefore questions of both obligation and permission are irrelevant to his status. It
is evident that these charges are likely to come from the point of view of Christianity or sympathizers with it, for it is in the Christian religion that these particular virtues are especially celebrated.22 Advaita apologists have not been slow to respond.23
Some answers they give are not to be found in the texts we are considering. Still, it may be retorted, at least the Self-knower must love his fellow man, since what he knows is precisely that his is the one Self. But that doesn't follow either. To love one's fellow man one must presumably recognize him as one's fellow, but that means to distinguish him from oneself, and for the liberated man there are no distinctions. But it by no means follows that his is a selfish philosophy. We have seen that on Śaṅkara's theory no acts are enjoined on the samnyäsin, but by virtue of his preparatory training (the four requirements, or adhiharas, mentioned earlier) he will in fact behave in ways that will contribute to the same end. This is the Advaita justification for the Hindu theory
of the guru or spiritual adviser; the ideal guru is the liberated man.
///. The Role of Action in Becoming Liberated.
Liberation, then, is not something new that one acquires; it is nothing but the very nature of one's true Self. The question therefore arises: what is it that constitutes the immediate cause of the removal of avidyā? Broadly speaking, we may distinguish three kinds of position against which Śaṅkara argues. First, there is the position of orthodox Purvarnïmâmsâ. It also contrasts with Advaita's view in that liberation does not feature the perfect knowledge that is an antidote to avidyā. The orthodox Mîmâmsaka is thus calling by the name "liberation" something other than what Śaṅkara has in mind. But the Mïmâmsà view may be recast in a form that accepts Śaṅkara's sense of "liberation" while apparently preserving characteristic Mîmâmsâ tenets.
Self-knowledge upon which we are enjoined to meditate, which high meditative state constitutes liberation. Indeed, a major aspect of Ad vaita philosophy may be understood as providing a philosophical position supporting the rejection of most of the seven propositions just listed. First, if liberation is identical with the true nature of one's Self, then it has no beginning, because the Self has no beginning. But the result of an action is something that has a beginning; it comes into existence when the act has been performed. Therefore, foeing without a beginning, liberation cannot be the result of an action. Second, liberation requires the removal of avidyā. Therefore, the action (s ) whose result constitutes liberation must be such as to remove avidyā. But no action can remove avidyā; the only thing that can remove avidyā is knowledge, and knowing is not an act.
doctrine that liberation is gained solely by knowledge are one extreme to be avoided, and equally to be avoided is the other extreme, that, as the Mïmâmsaka holds, liberation is the result of action. Śaṅkara's reasoning is clear and simple, given his presuppositions. But any action can only proceed on the basis of the assumption of a difference between agent and action, action and result. Precisely because the liberated self is one who no longer recognizes any such distinctions, it follows that one who knows his Self cannot perform any action at all, whether enjoined by scripture or otherwise. Of course, prior to gaining Self-knowledge, the seeker practises action combined with meditation; but, once true knowledge is gained, no further action is possible.
C. Against Mandana Misrcfs Type of Advaita. There is a third position to consider, arising within the Advaita system itself. Mandana Misra does not accept the thesis of the incompatibility between Self-knowledge and action. Mandana's position seems to be as follows. If Śaṅkara persists in his view the result will be that Self-knowledge is not knowledge, since the required distinction is precluded by hypothesis. For example, consider the well-known example of seeing two moons because of double vision. When one comes to know, through a trustworthy authority, that there are not two moons, but only one, the illusion of two moons does not automatically cease. Thus, a false appearance continues to exist even after valid knowledge has been achieved. Thus Mandana provides a third position contrasting with Śaṅkara's, a more subtle challenge perhaps, but still diverging plainly
injunctions, and so, whatever the appearances, those Vedic injunctions cannot be addressed to him. Śaṅkara nevertheless appreciates the pious motivations of the other positions. The orthodox believer accepts the Mïmarnsâ distinction between nitya-, naimittika- and kämyakarmans26
and takes it very seriously. Śaṅkara points out in response that, first, a certain type of act, for example, the agnihotra, is not nitya or kämya by nature. Second, the desire to avoid evil, however natural, is a desire; thus in an ultimate sense nitya and kämya acts are essentially on the same footing, and there is no consistent way of maintaining that performance of one is essential for the samnyäsin whereas performance of the other is not. But that raises the general question: how does a samnyäsin behave?
IV. Stages of Life, and the Role of Toga.
We have been discussing the place of ritual action in the achievement of liberation.
of discipline, or yoga, spoken of regularly in Indian thought, and one may at this point raise the question whether any of these kinds of discipline other than the gaining of Self-knowledge (jnänayoga) has a place in the proper path. In this context, however, samnyäsa means (according to Śaṅkara) Patanjali's kind of yoga, that is, renunciation without Self-knowledge, so Śaṅkara's doctrine is unaffected. Although standard Indian tradition speaks of four stages of life, studentship, householdership, forest-dwelling, and renunciation, Śaṅkara, without rejecting this classification, provides at one point27
what he would take to be a more accurate division between (1) householders who respect scriptural injunctions, (2 ) ascetics who have renounced the world but do not have Self-knowledge, (3) "lifelong students," who study, teach, and practise penance throughout their lives without raising a family > and (4) the true samnyäsin, the one who "rests in Brahman," that is, the Self-knower.
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Philosophy of Language
Interpretation of Vedic sentences is the center of the dispute: are they commands that produce an end, or disclosures of what has never been absent?
A declarative sentence can disclose what a command cannot bring into existence.
Mīmāṃsā → Words and sentences → Mahāvākya → Understanding → Nondual disclosure
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Injunction | Prescribes an act: A result can be produced |
| Statement | Reveals a fact: Knowledge can arise |
| Mahāvākya | Nondual identity: Requires discernment |
Argument and evidence
Potter, printed pp. 46–61 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 6,157 words
In the previous chapter we saw that there are three main alternative views about the role of action in gaining liberation and that Śaṅkara distinguishes his own position from all of them. One must remember that Vedānta is first and foremost a kind of Mïmâmsâ or exegesis, and thus it functions, in the classical way of looking at these things, primarily to interpret the true meaning of the Vedic scriptures. The three alternative positions receive extended discussion as possible lines of scriptural interpretation.
nature of Brahman, the Self. There are, logically speaking, three possible relationships: (1) the karmakäntfa is primary, the jnänakända subsidiary; (2) the two sections have equal weight; (3)the jnänakända is primary, the karmakända subsidiary. It is Pürvamimämsä that takes position (1), Bhedäbhedaväda that takes position (2), and meditation-theory of Mandana's sort that takes position (3). Thus the view came to be that scripture's primary function is to ordain actions, including meditation, leading to the highest human goals. Scripture's validity depends on its relevance to matters lying beyond the sphere of ordinary experience; the other means of knowledge cannot operate successfully there, and if scripture's function were confined to this world it would have no specific role to perform and thus would not be valid. This argument from scripture's role as a pramäna is only one line of
argumentation put forth by the Mïmâmsaka. Other sentences do not have verbs in the optative mood, but the Mïmâmsâ proposes to construe such sentences as ancillary to injunctions, as what are technically called arthaväda. and sees his father leading the cow in. There are various terms for injunctions,2 but Sureśvara frequently uses the term niyoga to connote the notion of injunctive force. Thus a niyogavädin is someone who believes that enjoining is the primary function of scriptural sentences. Niyoga can also be used to designate, by extension, the optative mood, or lift, since it is the regular sign of niyoga, as well as the expected result (kärya) of the action enjoined, the thing-to-be-done, since an expected result is a regular concomitant and unique sign of injunctive force.3
The reader is directed to the summaries for a review of the many arguments developed by Śaṅkara and Sureśvara against the niyogavädin.*
As we have seen, one of Śaṅkara's major arguments against this sort of theory stems from the thesis that liberation, unlike heaven, is not a thing to be achieved. Thus it cannot properly be enjoined as something to be achieved. Thus the karmakända does, as the Mïmâmsaka suggests, make known future states that result from action, and the jnänakända helps make known the Self: in both cases scripture's content is previously unknown and thus scriptural passages of both sorts are authoritative. B. The Combined-path View. Other Vedānta philosophers agree that both the karmakända and the jnänakända are authoritative; in their view both kinds of passage in combination conduce to liberation. A view that might fall into the first class is that known as kämavilayauäda,5 which postulates that the primary path to liberation involves destruction of desires. Thus knowledge and action are both required, but action is primary.
Śaṅkara is unhappy with this account for several reasons. First, the notion that Brahman has a lower nature suggests that Brahman is not completely free from difference; Bhartrprapafica's view is termed bhedäbhedaväda, "identity-in-difference-ism" for this reason. Second, he professes not to understand the second part of Bhartrprapafica's story. If the former, since he recognizes no distinctions he cannot act and need not meditate; liberation will arise from hearing the scriptural sentences alone. Thus Śaṅkara's conclusion is that Bhartrprapafica's solution makes the worst of the various other solutions. G. Meditation Theory (Prasamkhyänaväda). This is in fact the view that Advaita takes. Thus the Vedas as a whole enjoin us to do two things, to perform prescribed acts and to meditate on Brahman, and they give us the information necessary for us to
successfully follow these commands; it remains true, though, that the supreme message of the Vedas is found in the Upaniṣadic passages that tell us of the identity of the Self with Brahman. Meditation, if enjoinable, is an action, and actions both presuppose and foster differences. These, then, are the rival views on the subject and Śaṅkara's ^reasons for rejecting them. Since liberation is not a result to be achieved, since the true Self is not an'agent, there is no way in which these injunctions can be construed as relating to liberation, except in the indirect way of specifying how one should purify himself in order to become eligible for Self-knowledge. On the other hand, the jnänakända consists, not of injunctions, but of declarations of fact, statements whose subject matter exists already, that is, Brahman, or the Self. Since the statements5 whole point is toimpl
that there are no differences in reality, they can only be comprehended by one who is just on the verge of appreciating the truth that Brahman, the true Self, is without distinctions. In particular, one cannot apply Mïmâmsaka methods of exegesis to the jnänakända. Scripture is authoritative throughout, but again its authority has to be understood with respect to distinct subject matters for the two sections. If hearing any passage, injunctive or declarative, prompts one to act in some way it must be because one desires something, so that it is the desire that does the prompting. By hearing "that art thou" and other passages from the jnänakända, one, if properly prepared, rediscovers his true Self, thus gaining liberating Self-knowledge; this result is not possible from hearing passages from the karmakända.
All of this brings us to consider how the sentences of the jnänakän^a are to be construed. Śaṅkara's overall view of language is ambivalent. He is, on the one hand, suspicious of language, it is the instrument of ignorance, breeding mental constructions that distort reality by hiding our true Self from us and distracting us to consider other things.8 But on the other hand, he finds the mechanism of liberation ultimately in an act that requires speech. His thesis appears to be that Brahman is consciousness, that consciousness is the power of speech, and so the conclusion follows that Brahman is of the nature of speech; the whole universe is a manifestation (vivaria) of speech. One may wrongly think that the words that
make up a sentence such as "that art thou" directly denote Brahman, or that they can do so indirectly or figuratively, but the hearer must not understand them this way if liberation is to result. The theory of meaning concentrates on questions such as (1) what are the meanings of words, and of sentences? ( 2 ) how are meanings established? ( and (4) how does all this apply to the proper interpretation of the mahä-
väkyas? A. Word-meaning. This view, known as aßohaväda, is difficult to state in a way that does not invite its rebuttal, but in the process of teasing out its implications Dignäga's school of buddhist logic seems to have developed an intriguing and subtle view that one hardly knows whether to classify as nominalism or conceptualism,
All the views catalogued so far identify the meaning of a word with something nonlinguistic, a universal or a particular, even a function of excluding.
Mandana Misra defends the sphota theory in his Sphofasiddhi, and one infers that the author of the Brahmasiddhi defends it also, although it is not specifically invoked there. Advaita Vedäntins agree with the Mïmâmsakas here. Mandana considers as an objector he who believes that the connection requires mediation through ideas, that it is because the word evokes an idea that in turn is connected to the object. Marujana rejects such a theory for a number of reasons and concludes that words are connected naturally to their objects. This is by far the richest of our first three questions and involves numerous subtleties. For Bhartrhari there is a "sentencesphofa" (väkyasphofa), which is expressed or manifested by the words
making up the sentence, just as the wovd-sphota is expressed or manifested by the syllables making it up. Mandana explores several ramifications of this position, notably its application to language learning. The latter group is in turn divided into two major sections. The Bhàtta Mïmàmsakas and Nyäya-Vaisesikas hold that not only is the meaning of a sentence composed of the meanings of the words in it, but also that one understands the meaning of the sentence by first understanding the meanings of the words. One may, on this view, subsequently come to understand the meanings of the words, but sentence meaning is made known by hearing the words alone, not by synthesizing their meanings. But Mandana, at any rate, finds it objectionable. Mandana points out that Prabhakara is able to say that sentence meaning arises directly from
hearing words, without needing other pramänas to provide the meanings of those words, precisely because Prabhäkara assumes that there is a primary injunction that gives the context for their meaning.
The refutation leads Mandana to make some interesting points about language learning. Note that he is assumed to understand the meanings of the two sentences first: this is the nub of the anvitäbhidhänaväda theory. Now, how does he come to understand the meanings of those injunctions? Prabhäkara insists the understanding comes from language itself (iabdapramäna), arguing that one understands the injunctive force from the intention of the speaker. Later on, Mandana declares, we can become aware of the connection by the instrument of knowledge called arthäpatti. This position is also subject to criticism by Mandana. In the end, although Mandana is not very explicit about it, one
presumes that he follows Bhartrhari and Sabdädvaita. In the remarkable, rather self-enclosed section in the Brahmasiddhi where he explains that view, he makes it clear that, because difference is ultimately unreal and modifications ultimately nothing but what they are modifications of, it follows that, whereas speech (väk, êabda) is real, collections of words, meanings, and so forth are not ultimately real but are instead reflections or manifestations vivarta) of speech. Śaṅkara, on the other hand, clearly rejects sphotaväda. However, Sureśvara's treatment lacks the characteristic êabdadvaita aspects. D. Interpretation of the Mahäväkyas.
Let us consider "that art thou." However, this straightforward explanation presents several problems for the Advaitin. It would seem to follow that if "that" means Brahman it must mean it indirectly, consistently with éamkara's thesis. No,
Śaṅkara replies: figurative language presupposes the speaker's knowledge that the things identified are really different, whereas "that art thou," insofar as it provides Self-knowledge, presupposes that the speaker knows that the things are really identical. But all such usage presupposes, as has been said, the operation of ignorance, a failure on our part to discriminate the true Self from the jiva, ego, or whatever. But no universals characterize the true SelfIt is "not this, not this". Which leaves us still seeking understanding of what "that art thou" means. The analogy with "that art thou" is evident. Of these the most common is to suppose that "that art thou" means that Svetaketu's self (Jiva) is identical with his true Self or Brahman. Indeed, on Advaita tenets, the jiva is a product of ignorance or māyāy whereas the true Self or Brahman is not, so they are
quite distinct5 and it would be as false to identify them as it would be to identify tße space in the pot with that outside the pot. This grasping will necessarily be accompanied by a realization that no words, which is to say no properties, properly apply to that which is conveyed through the sentence.
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Identity and Difference
The nondual thesis must explain why differences are encountered without treating relational appearance as independently ultimate.
The problem is not whether differences appear, but whether they exist independently.
Apparent difference → Causal dependence → Superimposition → Reflection → Nondual Self
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Real causation | Effect as genuinely new: Threatens changelessness |
| Vivarta | Apparent transformation: Protects nonduality |
| Reflection | One light, many media: Explains empirical plurality |
Argument and evidence
Potter, printed pp. 62–73 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 4,208 words
IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE: THE THEORY OF RELATIONS
It has become clear in the preceding chapters that the major thrust of Advaita, as its title implies, is that even though practical affairs of men require a belief in the difference among things, that belief is false, and, indeed, eradication of it constitutes a critical part of achieving release. But the clear testimony of our senses as well as of reason is that there are distinctions among things. Change does occur. From the lower level, the level of appearance, myriad distinctions are of course apparent, but this is entirely the work of avidyā or "ignorance."
The objector will hardly be satisfied, of course. Where is his proof that there are in reality no distinctions?" Gauclapäda's Ajätiväda. The argument for this principle stems from dreams. Because, though they appear to originate, exist for a time, and then go out of existence, it is clear on waking that none of these appearances are veridical: as we say, "it was all a dream." Accepting the unreality of dreams, we can then formulate the following inference: waking objects are unreal, because they originate, like dream objects. And Gaudapäda assumes that this inference is unobjectionable. Therefore, if there are any real objects they cannot have origination as their nature. But if so, they cannot originate, for a thing cannot lose its nature.
objects (in that sense) do not originate, which is hardly news. But the question, after all, was: does anything at all originate? And the argument doesn't prove anything about that. First, both the effect and the cause cannot be real. If the effect is different from the cause, then it cannot be real, since that which originates does not exist (yet). And, if the effect is the same as (has the same nature as) the real cause, it cannot originate, since that nature involves nonorigination. Second, suppose that the cause is unreal but becomes real as effect. But that is absurd, an unreal object such as a son of a barren woman cannot come to exist. Gaudapäda buttresses this line of argument with some others. Conio1
and Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya2 trace the buddhist originals of some of the arguments. Not every scholar accepts the implications of that parallel, however. The effect,
when viewed from the standpoint of its cause, will be found to have no origin; while viewed in its own form as mere effect it certainly possesses some kind of origin (i.e., vivarta or illusory appearance)."4
That is to say, Gaudapäda is not denying the obvious fact that causal relations characterize the world of appearances. That world appears, just as dreams appear, but the appearance is the result of e'construction" (vikalpa), of ignorance, or māyā. $amkara?s Theory, Śaṅkara provides numerous arguments relating to causality. Perhaps the richest resource is in Brahmasūtrabhäsya II. Another argument suggests that when scripture says that "in the beginning the universe was nonexistent (asat)" it means that the effect, before it arises, is the causal stuff but not yet developed in name-and-form. The assumption seems to be developed on the basis of one kind of Sanskrit grammatical theory. literally means "to make" or "to produce" something. But in addition we may want to identify whatever it is that is responsible for the form, here
the shape, that the stuff takes in its effect state. That determining force is termed the "agent" or kartr. Thus it is the agent that is responsible for the nature of the effect. But furthermore, Śaṅkara argues, the only thing that can properly function as agent is the effect itself. But suppose, someone suggests, the "agent" is simply the prior nonexistence of the effect; then the effect is the "counterpositive"6
of that absence, and a relation between an absence and its counterpositive is perfectly appropriate. Śaṅkara disagrees: absences or nonexistents cannot be causal agents; a son of a barren woman cannot produce anything. However, Safrikara, like Gaudapäda, does not admit that the effect really exists at all. The point is perhaps more clearly made by considering the distinction between two models of causation called in Sanskrit parinämaväda
Returning to Gauḍapāda, we need a closer look at his use of the notion of construction vikalpa). My best guess as to what Gauḍapāda means by it is "wrong interpretation." My own view is that he distinguishes between kalpanä and vikalpanä, the former bearing the sense of apparently producing something, the latter merely connoting our failure to properly understand something.7
If that is right, the fact that I wrongly interpret something, say, the rope as snake, does not necessarily imply that I apparently produce the snake. Gauḍapāda is also fond of the term māyā, which figures elsewhere in Advaita. The apparent-produ ction aspect carries the idea ofajätiväda, reviewed above; thus even that diversity which we wrongly interpret as different sorts of states is unreal. This idea recurs in Śaṅkara and later Advaitins,
who sometimes use "wrong interpretation" to help us understand apparent production and thus, by contrast, the ultimate ground of both, the nondual Brahman . It is remarkable that in the entire Brahmasūtrabhäsya Śaṅkara nowhere uses the term vikalpa in Gaudapâda's sense.8 But Śaṅkara develops a related theory, with his own terminology for expressing it. Śaṅkara's account implies the important consideration that supers imposition is not the free exercise of the imagination. It is the attribution of something experienced previously to something experienced now. Śaṅkara's own answers to these questions are not entirely free from ambiguity.
attributes to pure consciousness (of course not recognized as such at the time). This line of explanation, however, inevitably leads us to inquire how the first superimposition could take place, which provided the distinctions that subsequently provide the grounds for the "ordinary perceptual errors." Sometimes Śaṅkara Js answer to this is to disallow the question: avidyā is beginningless, and there was no first superimposition. In turn, these are manipulated by a higher yourself, God. What is provided by that higher self is not fully in control of the lower self: thus the feeling that one is subjected to conditions for experience not created by oneself. If these speculations are generally accurate it would seem that Śaṅkara follows a line much the same as Gaudapâda, the "threetiered" account mentioned previously as resembling the Yogâcâra view, but with an important emphasis. Though the ordinary level
Mandana's approach contrasts with Śaṅkara's perhaps because Mandana is writing an independent treatise, whereas, Sarnkara is commenting. It contrasts with Gaudapäda's approach, perhaps because Mandana writes in prose and Gauḍapāda composed stanzas. Some scholars profess to find more significant contrasts among these writers than merely those brought about by stylistic necessities, however. There certainly do seem to be differences between Mandana and Śaṅkara on other matters, notably, the issues over the path to liberation, but on the criticism of difference it is not clear that any substantial disagreement exists among the three. And the message is consistent: difference is unreal. Sureśvara develops all the themes and arguments reviewed in this chapter so far. Thus, Sureśvara develops Gaudapäda's ajätiväda, Śaṅkara's superimposition, and Mandana's arguments versus difference in various parts of his vast Brhadäranyakavärttika.
Padmapäda spares his reader nothing. It is Padmapäda who pioneers the epistemology we most likely associate with Advaita. He provides the bridge between Śaṅkara and later Advaita, which is as obsessed with epistemology as Śaṅkara was with the contrast between knowledge and action. Padmapäda's approach is to emphasize the positive identity between jiva and the ātman. Thus the function of "that art thou" for Padmapäda is not merely to remove error or ignorance, as it seems to have been for Śaṅkara and Sureśvara, but it actually propounds a declaration of identity between a reflection and its prototype. That, says Padmapäda, is why it is a positive rather than a negative judgment.
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Advaita Metaphysics
Brahman is described as unconditioned while the world of experience changes. The chapter compares explanatory devices without collapsing their differences.
A changing appearance requires explanation without turning Brahman into a changing object.
Brahman → Māyā and avidyā → Cosmic manifestation → Three states → Five sheaths
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Brahman | Unconditioned reality: Not a changing substance |
| Māyā | Apparent differentiation: Explains experience |
| States | Waking, dream, sleep: Witness across change |
Argument and evidence
Potter, printed pp. 74–91 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 7,700 words
We turn now to a positive account of the c'categories" of Advaita philosophy. As we have seen, there is only one real thing according to this school, and it is alternatively called c'Brahman" or "ātman."
We have seen, in passages such as "not this, not this," that no positive language is adequate to describe Brahman. It is nirguna Brahman, and it is knowledge of this Brahman that constitutes liberation according to Śaṅkara. It is, of course, the higher Brahman about which one cannot properly speak positively. These perhaps require no further comment here.
Three positive properties are commonly invoked in alluding to Brahman. These are truth (sat. or satya), consciousness (cit or caitanya), and bliss (änanda). ( The discussion of each of the three properties is instructive. Advaitins, who naturally view sat as the origin, explain away texts appearing to favor the converse view as saying something else.2
The explanations are rather forced. What is it to have or be sat? Later Advaitins search explicitly for a properly formulated criterion of reality. Far more informative is the second property in the triad. The Highest Brahman is pure consciousness (cit) or awareness (jnäna), the Witness (säksin), which is not Itself an object of thought. Brahman is self-luminous; indeed It is the sole source of consciousness. In Itself It has no specific form; whatever appears to It as cognized
is not intrinsic to It. Thus the consciousness that is Brahman is not a relational consciousness between knower and known. Although Brahman is self-luminous it should not be inferred that It is the object of Its awareness. Brahman can never be the object of knowledge, properly speaking. By the same token Brahman cannot be literally identified as the knower, the subject that knows objects. The third member of the triad is bliss. amkara's reasons can be easily guessed. Our happiness has nothing to do with Brahman's bliss, he implies; the case is unlike that of consciousness, since we do experience pure consciousness (Brahman) in deep sleep, etc., We share this bliss to the extent that we are or become self-complete; our pleasures are fleeting expressions of the joy that is our very nature.
The Higher Brahman, then, is unrelated to anything else, without internal differentiation, a very abstract though perhaps not austere reality. It is the one without a second. But then whence all this world of distinctions? What does it have to do with Brahman, after all? The answer is that the lower Brahman, God (isvara), is the cause of all the diversity. This basic point is set forth in the second Brahmasūtra. These notions are given Advaitic twists, however. He provides the opportunities for the jivas to experience and thus work off their karmic residues. He has no unsatisfied desires, no selfish interests providing Him with motivations to act. The answer is that God creates out of "play" lila). The meaning is that God responds in an appropriate manner to the karmic potencies
without any personal interest of His own in the outcome; He "cannot help expressing Himself in creative activity. He is also believed (but probably wrongly) to have composed devotional poetry.
We saw the subjective side of avidyā as superimposition in an earlier section, but that suggests only a small part of this critical concept in Advaita. Scholars have carried on lengthy investigations of the origins of these notions. "5 Deussen and others think, therefore, that Advaita's interpretation is firmly based in early Hindu tradition. In the Bhagavadgitä also, one finds māyā used to speak of God's power, but it is in no way related to avidyā. Joshi pertinently asks why, if the Svetäsvatara (for example) sets forth māyā in Śaṅkara's sense, Śaṅkara didn't even comment on that Upaniṣad, much less quote it extensively.8
By contrast with these infrequent instances of māyā in Hindu scriptures, Gaudapäda uses it in sixteen places. Still, Gaudapäda does not identify māyā with avidyā as Śaṅkara appears to do.
Specifically, where Gaudapäda did not equate avidyā and māyā, Śaṅkara does. The covering avidyā is the cause, projective avidyā the effect. Modern scholars have argued vociferously and at length about this distinction. Nämarüpa is not a power; rather, it is what illusorily appears when occasioned by (not caused by) superimposition. Superimposition doesn't need a cause, since as Śaṅkara says it is beginningless. And Śaṅkara does not mean by avidyā to designate the empirical objects in the world but rather to speak of our false awareness of those objects. On Sarasvati's showing Śaṅkara is a realist,
True knowledge does not remove the objects of the world but rather removes our false awareness of them. When Śaṅkara raises the question "whose is avidyā?" t Later Advaitins propose to force the issue further by developing the idea that ignorance is anirvacaniya, "not describable (as either real or unreal)," but Śaṅkara does not use the term that way. Mandana seems to.12
Mandana, in fact, finds that avidyā must belong to the jiva. Furthermore, since Brahman is perfect knowledge vidyä) by nature It cannot be visited with error. it is Brahman's. No, says Sureśvara, because avidyā is unreal and thus does not affect Brahman. This might seem to imply that avidyā is not the same as superimposition after all, but one must recall that Advaita's view of causality makes the effect identical with its cause.
It is God, then, who creates the world-appearance, according to our authors, and not the individual selves. The world is ' 'false, " not in the sense of being a figment of our imagination, but in the sense that it is not real, the only real ultimately being nirguna Brahman. But the complexity arises because there are several distinct kinds of diversity to account for. First, one must explain how undifferentiated, nirguna Brahman can develop into God, saguna Brahman. Second, one must try to explain how the one Self, the paramätman, can appear as many individual selves or jivas. Some of them play a major part in post-Śaṅkara developments.) Gaudapâda uses this analogy to explain how the self or jiva constructs various things from itself through its own maya. The mechanism is through memory, and the notion
clearly fits Śaṅkara's account of superimposition. Gaudapäda appears to think not only that the analogy helps explain the way we jivas construct our experiences from our own past memory traces, but also that it helps explain how the higher Self, perhaps God?, constructs the individual jivas. The commentator on Gaudapäda's kārikās (perhaps Śaṅkara?) Śaṅkara, in the Upadesasähasri, appeals to the rope-snake analogy to answer an objector who questions what it is that transmigrates. The puzzle is that the Highest Self cannot transmigrate, since it is changeless, but the individual self cannot do so either, since it is not real. A final instance of the rope-snake example may be noted in Padmapäda's Pancapädikä. This is a grave difficulty, since in order for there to be appearances there need to be jivas for things to appear to, and the objector's point is that the models
regularly appealed to in Advaita, though they may help us understand error once we have jivas as percipients, cannot help us understand the appearance of jivas themselves. Śaṅkara has in mind the same points when he utilizes the analogy. thus apparently creating portions of space. But such differentiation is merely a result of our failure to discriminate the Self from its adjuncts such as body, senses, etc. This notoriously buddhistic figure is appealed to by Gaudapâda in the fourth book of the kārikās. Furthermore, he argues that just as the appearances of the flickering stick are not produced from anything different from the stick nor do they become real external, or for that matter internal, properties, likewise, consciousness alone produces the apparent objects we experience, but those objects cannot be said to exist either outside or inside consciousness. This is an
interesting use of the wheel-of-fire example in that it was used by buddhists to make the reverse point, that a series of momentary flashes of light can generate the illusion of constancy. His comments seem to suggest the latter, but this appears to conflict with more realistic passages elsewhere in the work. D. Water and foam. In the Upadesasähasri the model is complicated so that it is dirty foam arising from clear water, but the point is not developed. E. Sun's rays y spider's web, sparks from a fire. F. Reflection analogies. They are invoked by Śaṅkara to explain the relation between God and thejivas. The analogy is used to rebut an argument by an opponent who wonders why, if there is only one Self operating the various bodies, the actions of the various bodies do not get mixed up. In Brahmasūtrabhäsya III.2.11 21 an objector points out
that in the case of the sun there is something different from the sun, namely, rippling water, for the sun to be reflected in, whereas there is nothing different from Brahman, Śaṅkara admits that this is a dissimilarity, no analogy is perfect, but argues that there are a number of points of similarity nevertheless. This use of the analogy implies that the undifferentiated universe, like ââmkhya's avyakta prakrti, is the medium that reflects pure consciousness, Brahman, with the jivas perceiving the Self and themselves in that medium in varied ways. But of course, it is Śaṅkara's view that ultimately there is no medium distinct from Brahman Itself. The original projection is more like dreaming, or a magic show. A piece of rock crystal sitting on the shelf may appear to be red in color because there is a red flower behind it undiscriminated by the observer.
Padmapâda develops the reflection analogy at some length. This ahamkära is not, however, an evolute of prakrti or avidyā, since this would make it completely different from the Self; rather, it is falsely attributed to the Self as a crystal is falsely held to possess red color because it is near the flower. according to Padmapâda, is the internal organ (antahkarana), that is, the buddhi. And the mirror reflection model is ultimately the right one, Padmapâda concludes. The ego is identical with Brahman, not just similar to It. This is handy, for it explains why upon liberation the jlva does not immediately disappear. Padmapâda, however, is constrained to confess that after all none of the models is quite sufficient to completely explain the mystery of creation. Later Advaitins continue to explore these models with the hope that they can ultimately be shown to resolve the mystery.
By comparison with his predecessors, however, Padmapâda's description is lucid. But most of Śaṅkara's thoughts on the topic of the relation between Self and self seem to come in criticizing other people's views. Śaṅkara understands Käsakitsna's view to be that they are nondifferent and argues that this is the correct view, in contrast to that of the other two, who admit at least some degree of difference. We learn how not to interpret the relation in question but are left singularly uninformed as to how Śaṅkara wishes us to interpret it. Such a myth is found in the first chapter of the Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad. In the absence of Brahmanawareness things are created through māyā. From Visnu, God supreme, comes Süträtman or Hiranyagarbha, knower and agent, and from him comes Viräj, which is apparently equivalent to
Sâmkhya's unmanifest prakrti. Indeed, in his Upadesasahasrl he provides a quintuplication explanation. Sureśvara develops other themes found in the Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad, such as the role of the breaths and of väsanäs. But generally the treatment by our authors of standard topics in metaphysics or science is unsatisfactory or nonexistent. For example, time and space are said by Śaṅkara to be the effects of avidyā, but scripture also alleges that Brahman "precedes the world." U. C. Bhattacharjee concludes that "Vedānta... does not give a quite satisfactory... account of Time,"18 but one might better have said that it, or at least its earliest advocates, give no account at all.
V. States and Sheaths of the Self
We have seen that our authors use many analogies to try to indicate how the one Self becomes many, and that none of them is quite without difficulty.
they require that there already be at least two things, namely, a percipient and an obstruction or adjunct. There is another type of analogy, however, that might succeed where the previous ones failed, because it does not require the prior existence of something distinct from the percipient. The most obvious example is dreaming. This is the thought that dominates Gaudapâda's kārikās, and which he relates there to the categories of the Mändükya
Upaniṣad. Although there are no objects presented in deep sleep, all sleep is accompanied by traces, seeds of future experiences; thus one cannot be liberated directly from deep sleep or unconsciousness. We jivas construct our dream objects, but God creates the objects of waking. Most important, in Brahmasūtrabhäsya II.2.29, he rejects the dream analogy by pointing out that only some waking objects are sublated, whereas
all dream objects are. He seems to think that in deep sleep Brahman is experienced, perhaps not so in a faint. Presumably the difference between deep and dreaming sleep is that in the latter the self has created a dream body to serve as "subject" of awareness of the dream objects. Sureśvara provides a graphic account of what happens in sleep,21
as well as of the process of waking. Sureśvara also makes the important point that in dream it is not that the Self creates dream objects from the väsanäs, but rather that the väsanäs are themselves the objects experienced. Also, one in deep sleep is not attached to the objects of his dreaming, since he frequently does not remember them after he wakes up.
The waking state of the waking stage is true knowledge; the dream state of waking is erroneous awareness (e.g., sensory awareness), and the deep sleep state of waking occurs when one is so carried away by passion or desire that one "loses one's senses," that is, one's discrimination altogether. There the Self is described as having five forms, frequently symbolized as five concentric circles, each subsequent one within its predecessor. Gaudapäda nevertheless endorses the identification, Śaṅkara and Sureśvara refuse to identify the fifth sheath with Brahman, perhaps another instance of Śaṅkara's reticence on the point about the bliss of Brahman.
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Advaita Epistemology
The theory of knowledge distinguishes changing episodes of cognition from awareness in which they appear.
The consciousness that reveals knowledge is not itself another object of knowledge.
Pramāṇas → Mental modification → Witness awareness → Scriptural testimony → Release
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Perception | Ordinary empirical cognition: Objects through faculties |
| Testimony | Upaniṣadic declarations: Discloses non-object Self |
| Witness | Self-luminous consciousness: Condition of knowing |
Argument and evidence
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The most distinctive notion in Advaita is probably that of pure, undifFerentiated or objectless consciousness. But Advaita elevates the distinction to new heights by identifying construction-free awareness with reality, Brahman. It may be helpful to bring it together now. First, pure consciousness is not an act of any sort. Even to talk of the Self as Witness is ultimately incorrect, because it suggests the improper model once again. Even ordinary knowing isn't an act, for that matter, or at any rate it differs from standard doings, as we have seen, in that one does
something to get something else, whereas knowing is not necessarily a means to something else. Second, consciousness proper is not adventitious; it does not come and go but persists eternally. One of the most acute discussions of the logic of this and of the preceding contrast occurs in the second chapter of the prose section of the Upadesasähasri. And thus consciousness is adventitious after all. A corollary of this second point about consciousness is that, whereas ordinary awareness not only has an object but also requires it as the occasion for that specific piece of awareness or judgment, pure consciousness has no more relation to its objects than does the sun that shines on everything without being in the least affected by or dependent on things. The Advaitin wishes to take
this model of empirical error and expand it to explain cosmic creation; the projective avidyā leads us to misinterpret the presented objects of the world along lines dictated by our väsanäs, our memories of past experiences. But the expansion carries with it an awkward implication: there must be something really presented that the projective avidyā leads us to misinterpret, and the only real thing is consciousness itself. Now consciousness is characterized in scripture as that which is never an object, Brahman is that by which all else is known but which is itself not known. amkara's answer has several parts. Thus it is in a sense an object, although not of pure consciousness. For Śaṅkara, apparently, äkäsa is not a presented object. Thus though in the cosmic projection there must be an analogous something for the world-illusion to be projected on, this something need not be pure consciousness or
Brahman and indeed cannot be insofar as we are speaking of and conceptualizing it. This point, however, continually recurs as a theme in Advaita, the theme of the self-luminosity of the Self. The apparent dualistic implication of this does not trouble Śaṅkara at all, it would seem, because, though awareness requires external objects, consciousness does not, for one can have objectless consciousness as in deep sleep. What is not accepted, on Śaṅkara's view of self-luminosity, is that consciousness knows itself. Thus Brahman, the Self, is not an object of pure consciousness; whatever Brahman we think we know must have an element of avidyā involved in it. We know of Brahman's existence, he notes, on the grounds of tradition and experience, but the Brahman we know of is one on which there are various erroneous opinions. As we now know? Śaṅkara
interprets these teachings ultimately in a negative fashion, so that in fact we never do know Brahman in a positive way; when all characterizations have been rejected, pure consciousness will remain unqualified by adjuncts, and that state of understanding will constitute liberation. What are those rules? In a memorable passage in the Brahmasūtrabhäsya (II. Thus the pramänas fail to tell us about reality and so are "false", at any rate, not "true." The admission cuts deep, however. And since instruction is required in order to realize one's Self the, impossibility of receiving that instruction would seem to preclude the possibility of liberation, and Advaita is reduced to a kind of skepticism or worse. Śaṅkara's response is astonishing when first heard, although it is not new with him; Nägärjuna the buddhist had offered it centuries
earlier. But we know by now that Śaṅkara's response will be to deny that liberation is an effect at all, as effect, it is unreal. Thus Advaitins spend a good deal of time discussing the number and nature of the pramänas, in particular the number and nature of those they feel are especially critical in bringing the adept to the brink of Self-knowledge. Discussions of that sort are not found among our authors, however, although references to numerous pramänas can be found. Advaita places a lot of emphasis on direct realization, on the immediacy of Self-knowledge. Perception, among the pramänas, is regularly identified as providing direct knowledge, and one might suppose that it would ultimately be perception that delivers the immediate awareness that constitutes liberation, Furthermore, if one is put in the position of
defending the possibility of Self-knowledge, surely verification through direct experience constitutes the most fundamental proof. It is true that Self-knowledge is immediate intuition (armbhavn), but that is quite different from perception. And in some Pickwickian sense anubhava rnay constitute a "proof," but it is not a proof that will ever be used. Exegetical methods, including the use of inference and other pramänas, provide the rational basis for Advaita in an important sense, then, but it is scripture itself that, on the Advaitin's own view, bears the weight. But this appears to provide the critic with the opening he was looking for after all. And clearly they do conflict, says the opponent, for perception shows us a multitude of different things, whereas according to Advaita scripture denies all difference.
The opponent argues that perception should be preferred to verbal testimony because verbal testimony depends on perception, because scripture is inconsistent, because perception precedes testimony in life, because one must first perceive a word before one can understand its meaning, and because one can explain away language but not the evidence of the senses. Mandana answers that neither pramäna depends on the other, that they don't conflict, because perception affirms whereas scripture negates, that is, removes or sublates error. This time an objector argues that since another pramäna such as perception can contradict scripture it follows that verbal testimony depends on perception and the other pramänas. The pramänas are independent of one another. But, he adds, even if one were to admit that Brahman can be known by another pramäna it wouldn't follow that scripture was not authoritative because dependent.
testimony alone. Sentences can be understood whether true or false; since a false sentence cannot very well be known by any pramäna this is also sufficient to meet the argument. As we terminate this essay at this point in what may. An introduction must remain just that. For further insights, whether scholarly or spiritual, we need to consult the literature itself.
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Gauḍapāda
Gauḍapāda turns the three empirical states into an argument for nonorigination, while the historical identity and composition of the text remain debated.
The argument from the three states questions whether origination belongs to reality at all.
Waking → Dream → Deep sleep → Turīya → Nonorigination
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Three states | Waking, dream, deep sleep: Modes of appearance |
| Turīya | Neither fourth object nor change: Nondual reality |
| Ajātivāda | No real origination: Ultimate conclusion |
Gauḍapāda: historical introduction
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The first extant piece of literature that can be safely classified as exclusively Advaitic is attributed in Advaita tradition to an author referred to as Gaudapädäcärya. Almost everything about this identification has been questioned; the literature on Gauçlapàda is vast and complicated.
The major difficulty with this date stems from the fact that Śaṅkara refers to Gaudapäda as his "highest teacher," paramaguru (Gaudapädakärikäbhäsya (IV. 100) or "teacher's teacher,5' guror garlyase (Upadesasähasri II. S. L. Pandey summarizes the responses and adds an important piece
of evidence, that is, that Śaṅkara (in the Chändogyopanisadbhäsya) clearly thought that the four books of the kārikās were written by one person.3
Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya points out that the term "Gauda" need not refer to a resident of Bengal, though it suggests some association with that area through family background. But the somewhat naive character of the Sāṃkhya commentary seems so alien to the depths of reflection suggested in the Advaita stanzas that the identity seems unlikely.
An important textual question concerns the status of the Mändükya Upaniṣad and the first twenty-nine kārikās of Gaudapâda's text. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya has advanced even more startling hypothesis that the prose passages of the Upaniṣad were composed subsequently
to the kārikās and were based upon them,1 He suggests that the entire Mändükya Upaniṣad may have been composed after Śaṅkara 's time. These suggestions have invited a torrent of criticism.
Others have apparently been persuaded, at least partly.
Another vexed question concerns buddhist authorship or influence.
Again devout Advaitins have inveighed against this thesis.
GAUDAPÄDAKÄRIKAS on the MAjypCKTA UPANISAD
Work 1: Gauḍapādakārikās / Āgamaśāstra
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also called AGAMASASTRA (Summary references "ET''refer to the edition and translation by Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya University of Calcutta, 1943).
1. kārikās 1, 5 (ET 1-2). . In the first state the Self is called visva, in the second taijasa, and in the third prajna. Prajna? The person who understands these three forms of the Self and their respective enjoyments is not affected through enjoying.
2. kārikās 6-9 (ET 2-4). Some say God enjoys the results; others say it is for the sake of His play (kridä), but that it must be natural to Him, for how can one who has accomplished everything have any desires?
10 (ET 4). .
4. kārikās 11-18 (ET 5-8). . Prajna knows nothing, whereas turiya is always seeing, is omniscient (sarvadrk). But this duality (of the world) is merely māyā', really there is only nonduality. But this way of putting it is for didactic purposes only; when (the truth) is known there is no duality.
5. kārikās 19-29 (ET 9-14). . The four states are identified with the three letters comprising the sacred syllable aum / om plus the undifferentiated ground of them, the turiya. The results accruing from meditation on Om are extolled. BOOK TWO UNREALITY (VAITATHYA)
6. kārikās 1-3 (ET 15-17). . Dream objects are unreal, since they are inside (antahsthäna) insofar as they are covered up (samvrta). This reasoning is consonant with scripture (cf.
4 (ET 17-18). .
8. kārikās 5-10 (ET 18-21 ). . The states of waking and dream are in fact identical, since their objects are alike unreal. Dream objects can serve a purpose as easily as can waking ones. kārikā 8 is obscure).
9. kārikās 11-15 (ET 22-26). . Objection: If both internal and external things do not exist, who is it that apprehends them? This is the view of the Vedānta (i.e., the Upaniṣads).
10. kārikās 16-30 (ET 26-37). . First the jiva is constructed and from it the various things, which in turn condition subsequent memo» ries. Stanzas 19-38 describe some of the kinds of things different people construct. Different numbers of categories are distinguished by different systems.
11. kārikās 31-38 (ET 38-47). . Ali such things are really nonexistent, imagined through the nonduai Self, thus nonduaiity is bliss. Thus having realized the truth both inwardly and outwardly, they remain steadfastly true to nature (tativa)* BOOK THREE: NONDUALITY
12. kārikās 1-10 (ET 48-54). . Duties of worship arise only for those who think something is born and who are thus miserable.
13. kārikās 11-16 (ET 54-58). . What is jiva? In reality nothing is born; there is no creation. References to it and its consequent distinctions are made only, out of kindness, for the purpose of spiritual instruction (upäya).
14. kārikās 17-18 (ET 59-60). .
15. kārikās 19-32 (ET 60-67). . Duality is not found in reality, for what is real »is naturally immortal and thus cannot become mortal, any more than what is naturally mortal can become immortal. But neither position is reasonable ultimately; the only reasonable position is that no creation takes place at all.
16. kārikās 33-36 (ET 68-70). Thus the unborn Brahman becomes manifest through the unborn (awareness). This kind of awareness is unborn, without sleep or dream, without name and form, all-knowing once and for all; it is not merely an approximation metaphor (upacära).
17. kārikās 37-48 (ET 72-82). . Since there are no thoughts about objects, the awareness rests in itself and attains equanimity. But it can and must be attained through control of the mind (manaso nigrahah ). or at least mentally inactive ), remembering that all is frustration (duhkha) one turns away from desires and enjoyments. He should make his awareness fixed in itself. Brahman ). Thus no jiva is born in reality.
18. kārikās 1-2 (ET 83-94). . and to him who has taught the contactless concentration that is free from self-contradiction and confutation by other systems. 19. -kārikās
3-5 (ET 101-107). .
6-10 (ET 108-112). .
21. kārikās 11-13 (ET 112-114). , (The Sāṃkhya says that) the cause itself is what is born as its effect. How can they consistently maintain that that very thing which is born and is different be nevertheless unborn and eternal?
22. kārikās 14-20 (ET 115-125). If one replies "it is like the seed and the sprout, there is a beginningless series of causes and effects, but that's how it is," Gaudapâda answers that the reply commits fallacies, specifically that of offering as example what has yet to be proved sädhyasama).
23. kārikās 21-23 (ET 126-129). . Answer: Since nothing (really) originates we do not know the point of origination of any effect. And so the conclusion does follow after all.
24. kārikās 24-28 (ET 131-138). Objection: Since we have ways (through language and thought) of identifying things prajiiapti), there must be an occasion (nimitta) for the identification, and so the identification must be dependent (paratantra) on something else, that is, an (external) object.
25. kārikās 29-41 (ET 140-147). . One who believes in the reality of origination cannot maintain consistently that samsara is beginningless but has an end or that liberation has a beginning but no end.
26. kārikās 42-44 (ET 149-153). In any case, the mere fact that someone speaks in practical terms of, say, an elephant cannot prove that elephants are real; we say that something exists whenever there is some practical reason for dealing with it.
27. kārikās 45-52 (ET 153-157). . Only consciousness (vijnäna) is real, though it appears in various guises as objects with beginnings and ends, movements, etc. But when the burning stick does not flicker it fails to appear at all and is thus "unborn"; so it is with awareness.
28. kārikās 53-56 (ET 158-160). In fact our attachment to the world and its objects depends on our adherence to a belief in causal relations; when we lose that belief we will lose the attachment and thus there will be no causes, no effects.
29. kārikās 57-60 (ET 161-165). On the other hand everything is by nature without origination, and thus without destruction either, so eternal. In such a case the words "eternal" and "noneternal" don't demarcate anything from anything else and so are useless.
30. kārikās 61-72 (ET 165-172). .
31. kārikās 73-81 (ET 174-188 ). . So we cannot even assert that they are from the highest standpoint "unborn," since from that standpoint they do not exist at all.
32. kārikās 82-86 (ET 190-195). One who realizes that the Lord (bhagavän) is not touched by these four alternatives (koft) is all-seeing (sarvadrk) and desires nothing more.
33. kārikās 87-89 (ET 196-198). Three stages in understanding are distinguished: ordinary (laukika), in which both objects and a subject are cognized as real; purified ordinary (iuddha laukika), in which perceiving, but not the objects, is cognized as real; and supramundane (lokottara), in which neither objects nor perceiving is cognized.
34. kārikās 90-100 (ET 199-217). . The unwise follow difference and are pitiable; the wise are certain about the unborn, undifferentiated Reality, but the people do not grasp it. This knowledge of the wise is free from attachment (asanga) because it does not relate to the dharmas. Not that the dharmas are really covered, they are primary awareness (?) (
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Śaṅkara and the attributed corpus
The source distinguishes principal commentaries from a large collection of later or doubtful treatises. Each is retained under its own work heading.
The many commentaries and attributed manuals must not be treated as one historically certain corpus.
Scriptural inquiry → Superimposition → The identity sentence → Knowledge and action → Freedom
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Bhāṣyas | Upaniṣads, Gītā, sūtras: Interpretative foundation |
| Prakaraṇas | Manuals and hymns: Often disputed attribution |
| Main argument | Ignorance to knowledge: Liberation not produced |
Śaṅkara: historical introduction
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As noted in the introductory essay, the date of Śaṅkara is not agreed on by scholars. But which are Śaṅkara's writings? (3) relatively infrequent use of the term māyā in comparison with avidyā; (4) frequent occurrence of the term Uvara (it is found less frequently in later Advaitins, including &amkara's pupils ); (5) reluctance or refusal to accept änanda as a positive property of Brahman; and (6) nonoccurrence of the term vivarta in its "illusionistic" sense as the relation between a cause and its only apparent, unreal effect. Using these tests Mayeda has argued for Śaṅkara's
authorship of the Bhagavadgitäbhäsya, UpadeÊasâhasri, Gaudapädakärikäbhäsya, and Kenopanisadbhäsya (as well as the Brahmas ütrabhäsy a, of course). Different but rather clearer evidence is available for those Upaniṣadbhäsyas on which Sureśvara comments, that is, the Brhadäranyakaand Taittiriyopanisadbhäsyas. Beyond this point, however, is only speculation. Therefore, we shall limit ourselves to these works in arriving at an estimate of Śaṅkara's date. No firm evidence forces us to date Śaṅkara any later than mid-seventh century, however. Finally, very recent work by Allen Thrasher based on a study of Mandana Misra confirms the dating of Śaṅkara in the late seventh and early eighth centuries rather than the frequently cited 788-820 date of Dasgupta and others.9
So far we have confined ourselves to scholarly data of a relatively firm sort. whatever he may
decide to do with it. Thrasher, for instance, argues that much of what we know on scientific grounds agrees nicely with the traditions.
Of the traditional accounts of Śaṅkara's life, Śaṅkaravijayas by Änandagiri, Mâdhava, Gidvilâsa, and Sadänanda11, all except Änandagiri agree that Śaṅkara was born in Kaladi, a small village in modern Kerala. Änandagiri insists that the birthplace was Gidambaram in Tamil Nadu. There are various stories, clearly apocryphal, about the circumstances surrounding Śaṅkara's birth.
After leaving home the young Śaṅkara is said to have met his guru Govinda on the banks of the Narmadà river, but he soon continued to travel and began his teaching in Banaras. He remained there for four years and, according to one account, though not yet sixteen he wrote his major works. He then returned to Banaras for more teaching and converting.
Returning, he defeated Bhâratï, and both she and her husband are supposed to have become his disciples, Mandana taking the name of Sureśvara. Another story tells of his meeting with the Saiva philosopher Abhinavagupta, who cursed Śaṅkara with a nasty disease,14 but Padmapâda caused the curse to rebound to Abhinavagupta himself, who died of it. Those who take the vows of Samkaräcärya's order of the Dasanàmîs, or "ten-names," receive one of ten names, Giri, Puri, Bhâratï, Sarasvatî, Tîrtha, Äsrama, Vana, Äranya, Pärvata, Sägara. The order also designates four grades of realization, brahmacärin, dandin, parivräjaka, and paramahamsa. Śaṅkara's life is agreed by all to have been a very short one in years, though remarkable in productivity. The foregoing has been based, as has been said, on traditional accounts.
Taittiriyabhäsya and part of the Upadetasähasri (section 11.19 at least) into his mature works such as the Brahmas ütrabhäsya. We have not tried to summarize all such works, whose number runs into the hundreds.
Work 2: Brahmasūtrabhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 119–180 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 25,874 words
BRAHMASŪTRABHÄSYA This is Śaṅkara's major and most authoritative work. FIRST CHAPTER (ADHYÄYA), FIRST SECTION (PÄDA) Introduction (El-4; T3-9). Now what is superimposition? Other philosophers define superimposition in slightly different ways. Objection: How can one superimpose an object on the interior Self (pratyagätman), which is not an object? Answer: The Self isn't nonobject in an absolute sense, for It is the object of our notion of "I" and is directly known to everyone. Superimposition is avidyā; understanding the true nature of reality by discrimination is vidyä. Since it is so, faults present in an x that is superimposed on a y are not transferred to y. Superimposition, that is, avidyā, provides the necessary condition on which all distinctions of practical speaking (pyavahära) are based, whether such speaking is ordinary or scriptural. Such distinctions involve means of knowledge (pramäna), their objects (prameya), injunctions and prohibitions, and even liberation (mok$a). How is it that means of knowledge, that is, perception, inference, etc., It is because they can operate only if there is a knower (pramätr), and the existence of a knower depends on notions of "I" and "mine" with respect to the body, sense organs, and such, which notions in turn depend on the operation of the senses, the body, and the superimposition of the Self on that body, so that without all this the Self cannot become a knower. Men become attracted or repelled by sense objects just as animals do in depending on their senses; since it is evident to everyone that animals do not discriminate their Self from what is not their Self, it follows that the same applies to men. Thus even the Vedic texts have as their purport that which is dependent on avidyā. Texts enjoining sacrifices presuppose that on the Self is superimposed caste status, stage of life, age, etc. 1.
1.1 (E4-6; T9-15). . The s Mr a reads: "Then, therefore, the desire to know." " Objection: Is Brahman generally known to us or not? If It is known we need not inquire about It; but if It is not, we cannot inquire about It. Answer: Brahman is known to us, because once we understand that the word "Brahman" connotes something that is "great" (an understanding we derive from etymology) and realize that Brahman is therefore omniscient, omnipotent, eternally pure, intelligent, and free, we know Brahman exists; and because Brahman is known to each person as his Self: no one ever says (or thinks) "I do not exist," but if the Self's existence were not generally known we would think and speak that way. Objector: Then, since Brahman is already known, we need not inquire about It. Answer: No, since there are mistaken opinions about Brahman. So there are all these conflicting opinions, based on both reasoning (yukti) and authority but which are only apparently authoritative. 1.
1.2 (E7-9; T15-19). . from the world's own nature, because natural causation needs special spatial and temporal occasions. This last argument is by itself not sufficient to prove the existence of God, however. The reason is that Brahman, unlike dharma, already exists. but the existence of something that already exists is not dependent on man's efforts. Objection: Since Brahman exists already other pramänas can provide knowledge of it as well as scripture; so we need not study the Vedānta texts after all. Answer: No, since Brahman is not an object of the senses. The Sūtra does not provide an inference to show Brahman's causality, but rather reflects scriptural passages (found at Taittiriya Upaniṣad III.l and 6). As for the omniscience of Brahman, it follows: 1.
1.3 (E9-10; T19-20). E10-12; T20-23) Objection: Scripture is not the means of knowing Brahman, for, according to Mimämsäsütra I.2.1, all scriptural passages have actions as their purport. Answer: "But that (is so, that is, Brahman is known from scripture), because (the passages in question) are connected (to Brahman) through (their) meaning." Answer: True, scripture does not speak of Brahman as an object but rather turns aside all distinctions produced by auidyä. Objection: Liberation may be a quality of the Self that needs purifying action to manifest it, just as a dusty mirror needs the action of rubbing to clear it. Answer: No, the Self is not the locus of any action, since an action must modify its locus; if actions could modify the Self It would be noneternal, and this contradicts scripture. Answer: No, for what is purified there is not the Self but a self joined to the body through avidyā, that is, the ego principle (ahamkära). El8-19; T34-36) Objection: But knowledge (which you claim produces liberation) is itself a mental act. Answer: No indeed. Objection: Then what about the Upaniṣadic passage that enjoins us that the Self should be seen and heard? Answer: The purpose of this injunction is to divert men's thoughts from the objects of ordinary activities and toward the Self. Answer: No, because the Upaniṣads are surely about the Self, and the Self cannot be an aspect (fesa) of something else. Answer: No, because the cause of embodiment is false awareness. Answer: But merit and demerit are caused by embodiment, so there will be the fallacy of mutual dependence (itaretaräeraya) as well as of a beginningless chain of blind leading blind. Objection: The Self is "agent" in the same sense that a king is, by (producing action by) Its mere presence. Answer: No, because kings get action by offering wages, whereas the Self can do nothing analogous. Objection: The notion in question is not false but is, rather, figurative (gauna). Objection: Scripture says there is no transmigrating self other than God. Answer: True, they are not different in reality.
1.8 (E31-32; T57-58). . And (the pradhäna cannot be the Self) because it is not referred to (in scripture) as something to be avoided. 1.
1.9 (E32-33; T59-60). . There is an etymological explanation involved. ) But the conscious Self cannot become united with the unconscious pradhäna.
I.I.10-11 (E33-34; T60-61). .
VI.9. (E34-43; T61-77. This section is known as the Änandamayisection.). , Question: Since the main thesis of Vedānta is now established why does the work go on further? Answer: Brahman is understood in two ways: as qualified by adjuncts, different kinds of name-and-form; and as the opposite of that, that is, free from all adjuncts. 1.
1.12 (E36-37; T64-66). . ( The Self) consisting of bliss (is the Highest Self) because of the repetition (of the word "bliss"). In Taittiriya Upaniṣad II. or as being a secondary usage. Objection: A self "consisting of" bliss cannot be the Highest Self since it is composite. 1.
1.13-19 (E37-43; T66-77). . Answer: The objection does not stand, since the word "consisting of " (maya) need not involve composition but instead may suggest "being full of (bliss)." The Sūtras answer yes, because scripture says so. The sufRx-"mayai9 is analyzed as involving präcurya, which' the previous interpretation took as meaning "being full of" but on this second interpretation is a technical term meaning a stylistic device. Since Brahman is spoken of as the cause (the Sūtras go on) it cannot be a mere appendage. And so forth. 1.
1.20 (E43-46; T77-81). . ( What is spoken of in Chändogya Upaniṣad I.6.6ff. as) the one within (the sun and the eye is the Highest Lord), because (His) properties are taught (in that passage). Answer: No, it refers to the Highest Lord. " 1.
1.21 (E46; T81). .
1.22 (E46-48; T81-84). Answer: No, because the passage doesn't say that äkäsa is the cause of only some things but of all things, and only Brahman can be so described, certainly not that elemental substance.
1.23 (E48-50; T84-87). .
1.24-27 (E50-56; T87-97). In Chändogya Upaniṣad IIÎ.13.7, the word) "light" (indicates Brahman) because of the mention of feet. because by that (naming) consciousness is directed (toward Brahman); it is so also elsewhere. äs its feet.
1.28-31 (E56-62; T97-106). The life breath is Brahman, because that is what is indicated (in Kausitaki Upaniṣad III. FIRST CHAPTER, SECOND SECTION 1.
2.1-8 (E62-69; T107-116). . ( Answer: No, because Brahman "in the heart" is a form in which we are to meditate upon Brahman, and because it is like the case of äkäea. Objector: But jiva and Brahman are said to be identical. Answer: No, they are different. 1.
2.9-10 (E69-70; Tl 16-118). .
2.11-12 (E70-74; Tl 18-123). . Answer: One can explain this by appeal to figurative usage. Answer: As is seen (in ordinary life), we sometimes speak this way, for example, we say "the men with the umbrella are walking" but don't mean they all have an umbrella. 1.
2.13-17 (E74-79; T123-130). . 15.1) is Brahman, because the properties attributed are appropriate, because locations are attributed to Him (in scripture), because of the context, and because of inferences from other scriptural passages. 1.
2.18-20 (E79-81; T130-135). . Why can't it be the jiva then? Because the Upaniṣad explicitly distinguishes the inner ruler from the individual self. 1.
2.21-23 (E82-86; T135-142). * "That which is not seen" (in Mundaka Upaniṣad 1.1.5-6) is Brahman, not the jiva or pradhana> because of the properties and form attributed to him (in the passage). As for "aksara" this term refers to Brahman. provided it not be supposed that it is an independent thing.
2.24-32 (E86-93; T143-153). . Vaisvänara (in Chändogya Upaniṣad V.I 1.18) is Brahman, because the two terms are such as to indicate that, and because of an inference from smrti. Objection: No. " Answer: No. Objection: The Upaniṣad says that this "Vaisvänara" has spatial size; how can it refer to Brahman? FIRST CHAPTER, THIRD SECTION 1.
3.1-7 (E93-98; T154-162). . ( Answer: It's a bridge in the sense that it binds, not in complete analogy to a bridge over a stream. Objector: But then the jiva is different from the Self, despite your denials. Answer: It is not the purpose of the Upaniṣad to teach the highest truth about the individual self here; rather it concerns the nature of Brahman. 1,
3.8-9 (E98-102; Ti62-169). , Objector: In Chändogya Upaniṣad VII.23-24 we are told that the "Bhüman" ("earth") is that where one sees nothing else, hears and understands nothing else. It is also described as "bliss," "immortality." Answer: The "Bhüman" is Brahman (not prāṇa) since it is something superior to deep sleep and the bliss of deep sleep belongs to prāṇa, and because of the characteristics attributed. 1.
3.10-12 (E102-104; T169-171). The aksara is Brahman (not the syllable), since it supports all things up to the sky (or space) and does so on command of the aksara, that is, the Lord.
3.13 (E104-105; T171-174). . Answer: No. ( The reference is to the Highest Self,) since He is referred to as the object of sight. 1.
3.14-18 (E106-111; T174-182). . Objection: In Chändogya Upaniṣad VIII. Answer: The dahara is Brahman, because of what the passage goes on to say, that is, that the individual selves go into the world of Brahman, this going being an inferential mark that dahara refers to this Brahman world. Objector: Then, since in VIIL3.4 the dahara is spoken of as having risen from his earthly body, it must be the individual self, not Brahman. 1.3.18. The individual self is not meant, because that is impossible. 1.3.19 (£111-115; T183-191). Objection: How can we speak of the "true nature" of Brahman, which is alleged to be unchanging and eternal; how can It have any other form than Its own true one? Answer: True, Brahman cannot lack Its true nature.
3.20-21 (El 16-118; T191-195). . Opponent: In Muniaka Upaniṣad II.2.10 and Kafha Upaniṣad V.15 the shining one mentioned must be some luminous substance and not Brahman. 1.
3.22-23 (El 16-118; T192-195). . Answer: No. 6-12) speaks of the Highest Self as universal light. But what is evident is that nothing can be known to shine except through the functioning of the light of knowledge itself, which lights up all. 1.
3.24-25 (El 18-120; T195-198). . 1.12-13) is not the "self of knowledge" (mjnânâtman) but is the purusa, the Highest Self. 1.
3.26-33 (E120-135; T198-223). Granted, they cannot sacrifice to gods, because they are gods! They can, however, be present at sacrifices made to them, since they are capable of assuming various forms at once. First, words are connected, not with individual things, but with their kinds or species (äkrti); since the gods also fall into species, they constitute no difficulty. Specifically, however, what is the nature of a word that it can "precede" and so "create" the world? Therefore the word must be a unitary meaning, which we grasp in one mental act after having heard the several sounds. Objection: After each kalpa a pralaya or dissolution ensues, after which an entirely new production takes place; how then can the connection between word and thing be eternal, even on your view? Answer: It is like going to sleep; when we wake up there is a new creation, but in the same forms and with the same names as before. Answer: For the gods it is just like the temporary cessation in sleep.
3.34-38 (E135-139; T223-229). .
3.39-43 (E139-144; T229-236). .
4.1-7 (E144-155; T237-252). . Not the gross body, of course, but the subtle body is intended, and it is called "avyakta" because it is the potential state of what will become actualized in the gross state. Answer: Not precisely, for you think that the potential form is independently capable of producing the world, whereas our view is that its capacity is dependent on God (parâmes'vara). But in my (Śaṅkara's) view this "potential form" or subtle body is in fact avidyā, made of māyā, having God as its abode, a great sleep (mahäsupti) in which the transmigrating selves (jiva) wait free of their particular characters. It is also sometimes called "äkä§a" or "aksara". L4.8-Î4 ' (E155-161; T252-263). Svetäsvatara Upaniṣad IV.5 is not a reference to pradhäna.
4.14-15 (El61-165; T263-268). . Objection: It is impossible to prove that the Upaniṣadic texts refer to Brahman as the origin, etc. of the world, because these texts contradict each other. Certain texts (for example, Taittiriya Upaniṣad II. 1; Chändogya Upaniṣad III. 1.
4.16-18 (E165-168; T268-274). .
4.19-22 (E168-174; T274-283). can be; further, the passage concludes "how should one know the knower?" Answer: The context requires that the reference be construed as applying to the Highest Self, not the jxva. Käsakrtsna, however, holds the correct view, which is that the two selves are absolutely nondifferent. It is correct because it is the only view of the three on which liberation results from Self-knowledge alone.
4.23-27 (El74-178; T283-289). Answer: Scriptural passages clearly indicate that Brahman is the material cause as well as the efficient cause; if it were not so we could not know everything by knowing Brahman; the Self could not reflect "Let me be many"; the Self could not transform (parinäma) itself into its own self. Theories that assume the opposite need also to be considered, however. SECOND CHAPTER, FIRST SECTION II.
1.1-2 (E179-182; T290-296). . Objection: Certain traditional texts, called smrti, would have no purpose unless we assume they are intended to tell us that pradhäna is the cause of the world; for example, the Kapilasmrti (i.e., the Sāṃkhya sästra). Answer: But there are other smrtis that teach our doctrine, and your thesis would leave no purpose for them! And we have shown that scripture favors our doctrine. Objection: Kapila and other sages have perfect knowledge and must therefore be considered authoritative. Furthermore, since the various alleged sages contradict each other, one can only decide by appeal to scripture. It might not be the Sämkhyin, there are lots of others. II.
1.3 (E182-184; T296-299). . Objection: In the Upaniṣads we find references to yoga practices, so the smrti that expounds them (the Togasütras) should be accepted as authoritative. II.
1.4-11 (E184-198;T299-317). Opponent answers: No, because Brahman, unlike dharma, is an existing thing (not one to be accomplished), and so other pramänas besides scripture are relevant to it. So, since reasoning is clearly, relevant in this instance, we proceed now to deny your Advaita thesis on the basis of arguments. Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world, because the effect (the world) is entirely different from the cause (Brahman). The world is nonconscious (acetana) and impure (aiuddha) and thus the opposite in character to Brahman, But in the world effects always resemble in character their material causes. Another objector (objecting to the first one): Right you are; the effect must resemble its cause; and since Brahman, a conscious being, is its cause, the world too must be conscious. First objector answers: Well, but you haven't explained the other disparity, concerning impurity. But that is mistaken, since Brahman has no perceptible, and thus no inferential, marks by which it could be perceived or inferred. When the Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad exhorts reasoning as well as hearing it does not mean that Brahman can be grasped by reasoning alone, but that one should use one's head in understanding the implications of scriptural pronouncements. But your view on causation is that the effect pre-exists in the cause, so you are caught in an inconsistency. Therefore your talk of an effect "not existing before its origination" is empty talk about nothing. And finally (3) we would have the untoward consequence that the muktas, the liberated selves, would be reborn again into the world. 2) Again, in deep sleep all distinctions are dissolved into the Self, but because of ignorance the old distinctions reappear as soon as one awakes. And that also explains why (3) the freed selves will not be reborn, since they have no ignorance that will determine future births. If the world cannot arise from Brahman because it has different qualities, the same is true of pradhäna, which lacks sounds, etc., Objection: That cannot stand as a valid refutation of the utility of reasoning, for it is itself an instance of reasoning. No doubt reasoning works well for some things, but liberation is not a matter of perception and therefore cannot be reached by inference; scripture is the only means by which we can arrive at any knowledge of it. The Vedas, however, being eternal, are not subject to this difficulty and can provide the perfectly true knowledge required.
1.12 (El94-195; T317-318). .
1.13 (El95-196; T318-320). . Therefore you should give up the view of Brahman being the material cause of the world. Answer: Your argument is based on the notion that nondifference entails the absence of distinctions. Likewise, enjoyers and their objects are distinct from each other although they are nondifferent from Brahman. II.
1.14-20 (E196-208; T320-343). Objection: It is more plausible to explain the situation as involving identity-in-difference. so Brahman is one qua Brahman but many qua the manifold world. Answer: No, for then both kinds of knowledge would be equally true, since both unity and multiplicity are equally true, and there would be no reason why knowledge of the former should lead uniquely to liberation. Objection: If what you say is true, then the pramänas such as perception, inference, etc., become invalid, since there are in reality no objects for them to grasp. Answer: As long as we are not liberated all these distinctions are accepted as real and the pramänas, injunctions, and distinctions referred to can operate in precisely the way we ordinarily suppose. Objection: But then how can the Vedânta texts, if untrue, tell us the truth about Brahman?.Answer; We sometimes find that unreal causes produce real effects, for example, a man bitten by a fancied snake may die, or a person who bathes in a dream may feel cleansed. Answer: Yes, but the awareness one has of them is quite real. Objection: If Brahman is without modifications then how can that Brahman be described as the Lord, controller of the world, since there is no room for a distinction between controller and controlled? Answer: The Lord's qualities, such as omniscience, omnipotence, etc., Objection: We find things in the world that are distinct, but one depends upon the other, for example, smoke depends on fire. Answer: No, since we sometimes see smoke even after the fire has gone out! 1.17): But scripture sometimes describes the effect as nonexistent prior to its production. Answer: That is not what those texts mean. èamkara: But it doesn't exist yet, and so can't come into any relation! But effects are not like that; therefore they are not nonexistent. Objection: If the effect already exists nobody would exert himself to produce it. Answer: It exists already, but not in the form it is to take as effect, and it is to bring about the cause's assuming the form of the effect that the exertion is directed.
1.21-23.(E208-210; T343-346). . Brahman is not at fault for creating bondage and suffering, since for It, as opposed to the jiva, there is nothing to be achieved or avoided. Objection: But in scriptural statements like "tat tvam asi (that art thou)," Brahman and the self are said to be nondifferent. Are you now denying that? Answer: They are both different and nondifferent, like space and the portion of space enclosed in a jar. II.
1.24-25 (E210-211; T346-349). . Objection: Milk requires heat to become curd. Answer: No. Heat hastens the process, but it becomes sour eventually. Objector (II. Answer: Gods, sages, and others do not require instruments, yet they are conscious. Answer: It applies, since its point was merely to show that not all cases of creation by an intelligent being were precisely like that of the potter. II.l.
26-29 (E212-215; T349-354). . Objection: Either Brahman has parts, or else when It creates It transforms Itself wholly into something entirely different. Our argument is not met. Answer: Your dilemma is not a real one. And anyway, your argument applies equally against you (Sāṃkhyas), since if prakrti produces it must either change totally or in part, and it has no parts. Śaṅkara: But the gunas have no parts, though they are responsible for that part of the world that resembles each of them in nature respectively. 11.1^
30-31 (E215-216; T354-356). .
1.32-33 (E216-217; T356-357). . Objection: Then His acts are merely senseless. Answer: No, for scripture tells us He is omniscient. II.
1.34-36 (E217-219; T357-361). Objection: God gives different selves differing amounts of happiness and suffering and thus treats men unequally. Answer: God is not free in this matter; He is bound to create according to the karmic potentialities of each bound self. Answer: No, it is like the seed and the sprout; samsara is beginningless.
1.37 (E219; T361-362). .
2.1-10 (E220-228; T363-381). . Since it is nonconscious it evolves into varied modifications to effect the purposes of conscious things, namely, purusas. Samkafa: Since we never see nonconscious things modifying themselves to suit the purposes of conscious beings, but rather we see that transformations of nonconscious things into effects such as pots, etc., Thus it is all right to attribute agency to the nonconscious pradhäna. Śaṅkara: True, activity is always observed in nonconscious beings, but only when a conscious being is also present. Sāṃkhya: Since pure consciousness cannot move, it cannot induce activity in another. 11.2.4. Śaṅkara: Hardly, since it doesn't become milk when it is not eaten at all, or is eaten by a bull. Śaṅkara: What benefit, pleasure for the self, or its liberation? But the purusa is already liberated before pradhäna acts! Or i& it the satisfaction of the purusa's longing for liberation? But a purusa can't long for anything, and the pradhäna^ being nonconscious, can't either! The purusa cannot be said to induce activity in prakrti merely by its proximity, since then, it being eternally proximate, prakrti would never cease acting and there would be no liberation. If gunas are said to be like that, that is, unsteady, the result will be that we will be unable to explain the order in the world, since these gunas are nonconscious. Śaṅkara: Your argument rests on the premise that the two properties, being the nature of suffering and being its cause, must have distinct abodes, but this we deny. Fire, although it has different properties such as giving off heat and giving off light, and although it is capable of change, doesn't burn itself up or light itself up, since it is only one thing, not two; likewise with Brahman. Sāṃkhya: But the body is nonconscious; how can it undergo suffering? Śaṅkara: Then liberation will be impossible, since its cause pradhäna) is eternal.
2.11-17 (E228-238; T381-400). But the Vedānta view is that conscious Brahman produces nonconscious world, which violates the principle. There is no reason, therefore, why conscious Brahman should not produce the nonconscious world. Thus here the principle should apply, but since Brahman and the world violate it, your Advaita theory should be rejected. Thus the effect has no "natural" qualities of the kind you allude to, Vaite§ika: The cause of the size of the dyad is not the sizes of the atoms but rather their multiplicity (bahutva), etc. According to the theory this first motion is due to some- thing "unseen" (adrsfa). If they touch at all they must interpenetrate, and thus no increase in size will occur when they combine. Again, the postulation of inherence as the relation connecting the dyad to its two constituent atoms won't do, since it leads to infinite regress. Śaṅkara: But then, contact is also so experienced, but on your theory it requires inherence to connect it to its relata! But none of these is possible. Again, since whatever has qualities such as color, etc., Kanada argues that atoms are permanent because otherwise we should not have the expression "impermanent" in our language; but this does not prove that atoms are permanent, something else, for example, Brahman, will do as well. If they all have the same number of qualities, however, then either we won't be able to touch earth or we will find all sense qualities in all four kinds of substance, contrary to actual experience. Not the first, since your view is that the cloth and the threads occupy different places. Not the second, since if so the two horns of a cow will be ayutasiddha! And surely not the third, since if so qualities and substances will be identical in character. Since the effect does not exist before it is produced (on Vaisesika theory) it cannot be connected to the cause at that time in any fashion. Contact only occurs between entities that have parts, as far as our observation goes; thus it cannot be postulated between atoms, selves, and internal organs. For example, some substancesghee, gold, decompose by melting, a process wherein no parts are separated but rather the substance gradually passes b#ck into an undifferentiated condition.
2.18-27 (E239-246; T400-418). Internals make up the five skandhas. But the Sarvästivädins cannot explain how this aggregating comes about. Answer: Members of this chain can be explained as caused by other members, but our question is about the aggregates that are required in order that avidyā, etc., Śaṅkara: But our question is: what occasions the aggregating, and this you haven't answered. Furthermore, liberation cannot occur or even be desired, since you admit no permanent self to enjoy or desire it. And if they are altogether different, then the pot must be eternal, since it never comes into any connection with origination and destruction. And things cannot arise without causes, since you yourself hold that mind and mental associates arise depending on causal factors (pratyaya) and since without causes operating anything might originate at any time. But the stream cannot stop, since each of its members occasions another. But if the former, destruction is not natural but occasioned, and if the latter, what is the point of the path (being practiced)? As for äkäia, it is not a mere absence but a positive entity. It is to be inferred as the substratum of sounds. Further, all things cannot be momentary, since then we could not account for memory and recognition, which requires that one and the same person sees and later recalls. Śaṅkara: But to grasp the similarity one cognizing subject is required. Otherwise we should not say "this is similar to that" but merely "look, similarity"! But if it were so anything could arise from anything, even from hare's horns. And furthermore, labor would become exceedingly easy, since everyr one has nonentity at his disposal and could produce whatever he needs.
2.28-32 (E247-252; T418-428). . Versus Vijnänaväda. According to Vijnânavâda, means of knowing (pramäna), objects (prameya), and results (phala) are all internal to our cognizing, for there are no external objects. External things must be either atoms or aggregates of atoms, but atoms are too small to be represented, and aggregates, of atoms are either nondifferent from atoms (after all) or else (if they are different) they cannot be composed of atoms. Answer: The variety among the traces (väsanä). Samkard's reply to all this: Since consciousness is of an external object, there must necessarily be such objects. We are not conscious of consciousness but rather of things. In addition, since the buddhist adopts his thesis of extreme momentariness, according to which ideas last no more than a moment, the things that he alleges about ideas will not stand examination. And whereas an idea cannot illuminate itself, not lasting long enough for that, a permanent cognizing Self can. But what is responsible for the disparate contents? But traces cannot operate without a substratum in which to reside, and no such substratum is admissible in your system. But it cannot, since it is momentary, or else you give up your thesis that everything is momentary. Thus we have refuted the first two buddhist viewpoints mentioned above, that is, those of the Sarvästivädins and Vij flânavâdins.
2.33-36 (E252-256; T428-434). . 11.2.33. Contradictory attributes cannot belong to one thing. The upshot of your sevenfold-predication method is that nothing definite is claimed, your categories are neither categorically affirmed nor denied; everything is * indefinite and thus doubtful, and so cannot be made the basis for action with an aim to gain release; no clear advice is forthcoming. But if the latter is the case, it must have parts that it loses or gains to attain the right dimension. In that case the Jains adopt a form of the atomic theory (previously refuted) and must in effect hold that the self is noneternal.
2.37-41 (E256-259; T434-439). Again, since agency requires imperfection (according to Nyäyasütra[lAAS\) God must be imperfect. 11.2.38. It can't be contact, since all three relata are all-pervasive. It can't be any other relation inferred from God's agency, because that is precisely what is in question. Objection: How does the Advaitin relate God to the world, then? Answer: We have no difficulty; for us the relation is one of identity tädätmya). But this cannot be right; prakrti does not have qualities like color, etc., Śaṅkara: The analogy is unconvincing: we infer that the self rules its sense organs because it experiences pain and pleasure resulting from them, but God does not experience pleasure and pain resulting from prakrti. But if God is omniscient, he must know the extent of prakrti and of the jivas. But then their extent must be finite, since it is a matter of experience that everything whose extent is measurable is of finite duration. Thus God is not omniscient.
2.42-45 (E259-261; T439-443). But this disagrees with experience: we never observe that an instrument, like an axe, arises from the agent. And there is no scriptural authority for it either. In that case they are unnecessary. Or are they equal to one another in excellence, but less than the Lord? Then the objection in Sūtra 42 remains in force, since given two things of equivalent attributes one cannot be the cause of the other. SECOND CHAPTER, THIRD SECTION II.
3.1-7 (E262-270; T [volume 2] 3-18.). We have charged other systems with inconsistencies arising from their ways of handling problems about creation. But one may in turn suspect that such inconsistencies infect our own system. The first element to be discussed is äkäta. Chändogya Upaniṣad VI.2.3 says that water, fire, and air were produced, but not äkäsa. II.3.7. Answer: Äkäsa is an effect. Since äkäsa is found distinct from earth, etc., it is an effect. Opponent: Then the Highest Self is an effect, since It is distinct from äkäSa, etc. Answer: We infer that the Self is not distinct from the fact that scripture mentions nothing beyond the Self that It could be an effect of. 11.
3.8 (E270; T18-19). .
3.9 (E271; T19-20). . Opponent: Then Brahman too is an effect! Answer: What could be Its cause? II.
3.10-13 (E271-274;T20-25). .Fire comes from air, water from fire, and earth from water.
3.14-15 (E275-276; T25-28). The order in which the elements are reabsorbed into Brahman is precisely the reverse of that in which they came out (even though scripture does not speak precisely to the question), since experience as well as smrti point to this conclusion.
3.16 (E276-277; T403-404). .
3.17 (E277-279; T29-33). .
3.18 (E280-281; T33-35). . Answer: The self is essentially conscious, as scripture proves. " II.
3.19-32 (E281-289; T35-49). . ( Sūtras 19-28) Opponent: The self is of atomic size, since it goes out and comes into the body, and since scripture alleges it to be infinitesimal. Opponent's answer: It can do so, just as sandal-paste, though applied in one place, gives pleasure over the whole body. The answers the opponent gives above to the questions raised won't do.
3.33-42 (E289-297; T49-61 ). . However (Sūtra 40), the self's agency is adventitious, not natural, to it; it is due to adjuncts. Answer: Since in the case of activity the occasions are connected to the self through the capacity (sakti) to act, they cannot be altogether avoided. Answer: Because scripture teaches that God is a causal agent in all activity we infer that each self's activity is a result, in part, of God's permission, and by the same token we must infer that release is in part a result of God's grace. II.3.42. II.
3.43-53 (E297-304; T61-73). . Because scripture, for example, Chändogya UpaniṣadYlll.l'.1, says they are different. No, because other passages declare their identity. Thus the part-whole relation is appropriate (provided it isn't taken seriously!). Objection: If the selves are parts of God then God must suffer as the selves do in samsara, and those who realize Brahman must suffer more as a result. Answer: No, the selves suffer because they, out of ignorance, identify themselves with the body, etc. Answer: The possibility of such injunctions and prohibitions is contingent upon the Self identifying itself through ignorance with bodies, etc. Objection: Then Vedic injunctions have no purport for one who knows rightly. Answer: No, the injunctions are not purportless, they simply don't apply to such a one, since obligations can only arise with respect to things to be acquired or avoided, and for the realized Self there are no such things. Opponent: These injunctions and prohibitions pertain for anyone who has discriminated the self from the body. Since one who knows rightly has made this discrimination, he is obligated. Answer: No, obligation is, rather, contingent on the self identifying himself with the body. Answer: No, it is the individuality that are connected to bodies, so the difficulty does not arise. Śaṅkara: No, since all selves are equally within each body. Anyway, there cannot be more than one all-pervading self, since we never experience many things occupying the same place. SECOND CHAPTER, FOURTH SECTION II.
4.1-4 (E304-308; T74-79). .
4.5-7 (E308-312; T79-84). .
4.8-13 (E312-317; T84-91). .
4.14-16 (E317-319; T91-93). .
4.17-19 (E319-321; T93-96). .
4.20-22 (E321-323; T96-100). . All gross things are constructed from the three subtle elements, earth, water, fire. THIRD CHAPTER, FIRST SECTION III.
1.1-7 (E324-330; T101-112). This section deals with the mechanics of samsara. These Sūtras consider whether the subtle transmigrating body includes, in addition to sense organs, manas, karma, etc.,
8-11 (E330-335; T112-121). . The opponent argues that the texts tell us that the adrsta (karma) earned in this life has results that are to be entirely experienced in heaven, the fruits of sacrifice, etc., and that therefore nothing is left over to determine rebirth into this world. ULI.
12-21 (E335-339; T121-126). Only those who perform sacrifices go to the lunar heaven; the others go to hell, the abode of Yama, or rather to one of the seven hells ruled over by Yama.
1.22-27 (E339-343; T126-132). . Sūtras 22-23 concern details of the descent of the subtle body from the lunar world to this one, it assumes a subtle form but does not become ähäta, etc., There are embodied selves in plants, but they do not get there by descending from the lunar regions. THIRD CHAPTER, SECOND SECTION III.
2.1-6 (E343-348; T133-141). . The world of our dreams is not real, it is merely rnäyä, since things happen in dreams that cannot happen in reality (that is, in the waking world). Nevertheless these illusory dreams may be prophetic. III.
2.7-9 (E348-353; T141-149). . Answer: In all of these, but essentially in the latter, that is, Brahman. The drop of water dissolves into the water completely, that is, without adjuncts, but the jiva is conditioned by adjuncts even while it is "dissolved" in Brahman in sleep, so the analogy is not apt. III.
2.10 (E353-355; T149-152). . What kind of a state is attained when in a faint? III.
2.11-21 (E355-363; T152-166). These Sūtras state the nature of Brahman, experienced in deep sleep. Objection: Whereas the sun's light is reflected in an entirely different body, the water, for Brahman there is no comparable reflecting medium; thus the analogy suggested won't work. Answer: No analogy is perfect. Brahman, like the reflected sun, appears affected when certain adjuncts change, but neither are really affected, and it is in these features that the analogy has point.
2.22-30 (E363-369; T166-175). . Objection: If a yogi knows Brahman in meditation that must mean that one self, a lower self, knows another self, a higher one. Answer: No, there is no such distinction in reality; it only appears so because of the adjuncts limiting the individual self.
2.31-37 (E369-373; T175-180). .
2.38-41 (E373-375; T180-183). . THIRD CHAPTER, THIRD SECTION III.
3.1-10 (E375-384; T184-201). . It could be any one of four: superimposition adhyâsa), sublation (apaväda), identity (ekatva), or qualification (visesana), and since there is no particular reason to prefer any one of these, we cannot decide. Where different texts have the same essential meaning one should combine together the particular specifications that may only occur in one such text but not the others. III.
3.11-25 (E384-399; T201-225). .
3.26-32 (E399-407; T225-238). . A number of problems are considered concerning texts that specify the details of the liberated self's "path to the Brahma-world." III.
3.33-39 (E407-413; T238-249). .
3.40-52 (E414-423; T249-268). .
3.53-54 (E423-425; T268-272). . Answer: But bodies are found where consciousness is not; so your view cannot stand. III.
3.55-66 (E425-432; T272-284). .
11-17 (E433-439; T285-295). . Thus the passages (in scripture) that appear to say that knowledge has fruits must be taken as arthaväda, praise of instruments supportive of actions with beneficial results. And since it is samnyäsins, who no longer work, who have the knowledge in question, that knowledge can hardly be subservient to action. III.
4.18-20 (E439-442; T295-303). .
4.21-25 (E443-445; T303-306). .
4.26-27 (E445-446; T306-309). .
4.28-31 (E446-448; T3Q9-312). 1.2, which might be thought to relax prohibitions on certain kinds of food for the Brahman-knower, is rather an arthaväda glorifying the food of the "breaths."
4.32-35 (E448-450; T312-315). . Answer: The Vedas enjoin ritual action on all äsramins regardless of their desire or lack of desire for release. III.
4.36-39 (E45Ö-451; T315-317). Yes, says Śaṅkara, since scripture speaks of such cases and smrti does too; for example, a widower, though not belonging to an äsrama, can through praying, fasting, etc.,
4.40-43 (E451-453; T317-320). . These passages concern backsliders. In the first place, no one backslides from sarnnyäsa; the texts do not recognize any such thing. III.
4.44-46 (E453-454; T320-321). .
4.47-49 (E454-456; T322-325). .
4.5 (E456-457; T325-327). Opponent: Yes, what is enjoined is a state in which one can do whatever one likes without incurring sin, just as a samnyäsin can!
4.51 (E457-458; T327-329). Śaṅkara says that unless there is some kind of obstruction the knowledge will arise in this life, but when an obstruction exists the result will arise in a subsequent life.
4.52 (E458-459; T329-330). . Does knowledge always produce liberation as soon and in the same degree? FOURTH CHAPTER, FIRST SECTION I V.l.
1-12 (E459-472; T331-352). . How to meditate is here detailed. One should repeatedly meditate on Brahman as constituting the Self. Objection: Repetition of meditation on, for example, "that art thou" is useless: if one doesn't understand it the first time one isn't going to after countless repetitions. Answer: But we know from experience that that isn't so; people hear something and don't always understand it the first time but eventually come to do so. IV.
1.13-19 (E472-478; T353-363). . Answer: No, since these acts contribute to knowledge, as we have seen. Answer: Acts undertaken to gain some specific good results; these do not contribute toward gaining knowledge of Brahman. Answer: Because there is nothing to produce such a perception, all karma has been exhausted. Objection: But new actions will produce more karma, etc. Answer: There will be no more actions; actions presuppose false awareness (mithyäjnäna), but by this point that has been destroyed by right awareness (samyagjnäna). FOURTH CHAPTER, SECOND SECTION IV.
2.1-21 (E478-489; T364-381). . This section describes what happens to the unrealized self at death. The subtle body endures until liberation and is responsible for the warmth we feel in living bodies, which is absent in dead ones. FOURTH CHAPTER, THIRD SECTION IV.
3.1-16 (E490-503; T382-404). . The description of the progress of the knower of saguna Brahman continues. The stages along the path, associated with various deities, are detailed; the subtle body is guided along by these divinities, eventually reaching saguna Brahman (but not nirguna Brahman), that is, the "Brahma-world" ruled over by Hiranyagarbha. Jaimini's view that the Highest Brahman is thus reached is refuted, one cannot literally "go" to nirguna Brahman. FOURTH CHAPTER, FOURTH SECTION IV.
4.1-22 (E503-513; T405-419). . Liberation is the self's manifesting its own nature; it does not take on any new characteristics but is nondistinct from Brahman. When it is said they have unlimited powers what is meant is not that they share God's power but rather that they never return into embodiment in this world.
Work 3: Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 180–204 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 10,075 words
The Brhadäranyaka is the longest and one of the oldest of the Upaniṣads. Introduction (El-3; Tl-8). Thus the first requisite is that one who hears this Upaniṣad must believe that there is a self that persists through future lives; this is taught in various places throughout the Upaniṣads, including this one (at II.1.16-17). Objection: Knowledge of future embodiments is a matter of perception. Answer: No, since there are different opinions about it, for example, the materialists and buddhists deny it, but nobody quarrels about a matter of perception like a pot. And since the self cannot be perceived in its future state, it cannot be known by inference either. But he naturally wants to remove the ignorance that is responsible for samsara, and it is to explain this that this Upaniṣad exists. Not even the nityakarmans are without their karmic residue, since scripture speaks of all ritual action collectively, showing that it is produced by desire and produces future births in this world, the world of the fathers or of the gods. Since this is the case, only knowledge of Brahman, not any actions, can gain liberation from samsara. 1.
2.1 (E6-10; T15-26). . Objection: The cause of a pot does not exist prior to its production, for the lump of clay is destroyed as the pot is produced. Answer: No, the clay (though not the lump) is the cause. Objection: Nothing persists, we merely notice a similarity between different entities. Objection: Since according to you the effect pre-exists, if it exists at all it must exist prior to its production, so what is to stop its manifesting itself when the sun comes up? Answer: There are two kinds of covering (ävarana): one consists of darkness or something blocking our perception of a jar, the other consists of its parts having some other form, for example, a lump of clay. Answer: Not always; water mixed with milk is concealed by the milk, which occupies the same place as the water. But no one makes a jar that way! Answer: Not necessarily; when one manifests a jar one does it by lighting a lamp. Another argument: God and yogis have infallible knowledge about the future. Answer: No, there cannot be inseparability between an existent and a nonexistent thing.
3.1 (E16-21; T41-53). . Answer: No, for this Upaniṣad deals with knowledge (vidyä). Objection: No, since the scriptures direct us to look on Brahman, for example, as a name, etc., Objection: But in fact there is no Brahman, only a name. Answer: There are texts that make that connection. Opponent: Very well, information causes us to avoid prohibited acts; but it is not the case that knowledge of the Self should cause us to stop following Vedic injunctions. Answer: Why not? Opponent: Perhaps this is so for the (naimittika and kâmya) acts that you are thinking of, but the nityakarmans produce no harmful effects and shouldn't be stopped. Answer: No, they too are enjoined on persons subject to avidyā, passion, and aversion. he cannot act. Objection: Well, he has to eat! Answer: Yes, but that is not like a nityakarman, eating is not supposed to be compulsory; it is irregular, not enjoined at any particular time. Objection: Nevertheless scripture does regulate eating. Answer: It regulates what can be eaten, etc., but these are not injunctions to act or incentives to action, and so they do not impede knowledge. 1.
4.7 (E44-55; Til 1-140). . Objection: If the Self is the universe how can It "enter into" it? Some say it must be, since the text has in fact just said "He... does not know (the Self)," and the next sentence, the one now considered, must therefore enjoin us to meditate for the first time on something hitherto unknown. Śaṅkara: But there is nothing to be done; therefore it is not an initial injunction. Objection: The knowledge gained from hearing this passage isn't sufficient to obliterate awareness of everything other than Brahman. Answer: But he's already gained the knowledge just from hearing it! Objection: The recollection of Self-knowledge is different from the awareness arising from hearing it stated, and it is this recollection that is enjoined. Answer: No, for recollection comes automatically. Objection: Then it is suppression (nirodha) that is enjoined, this being different from the knowledge conveyed in the texts. Suppression is prescribed in another system (viz., Answer: But scripture does not indicate that suppression is a means to liberation; it only indicates Self-knowledge is that. Besides, there is no way of suppressing other than Self-knowledge. since no further effort is required. Objection: Being a mere declaration, the sentences (e.g., "that art thou," etc., Answer: Authority is contingent, not upon the mood of the verb, but on whether or not the passage speaks the truth.
4.10 (E57-68; T145-172). Objection: It is improper to suppose that avidyā conditions Brahman. Answer: No, since otherwise it would not be necessary to know Brahman; if there were no superimposition adhyäropa) of avidyā on Brahman knowledge of unity would not have been enjoined. Answer: It is, for one who knows the truth. Objection: But it is also useless to know the truth. Answer: No, since it removes ignorance. Objection: But, since Brahman is one, removal of ignorance is impossible. Śaṅkara: Since it is evident that knowledge of unity does remove ignorance, it cannot very well be impossible! Objection: It is even impossible that you can say "that is impossible"! Answer: But you see, I just did! Objection: From various scriptural texts, from the authority of various systems of philosophy, for example, of Kanada and Gautama, from the fact that everyone speaks of first seeking and then gaining liberation, and because of the difference between action and knowledge being inappropriate for God, the individual self must be different from God. Answer: Then the transmigrating self is supposed to be liberated by knowing himself, falsely, to be Brahman, and for this scriptural authority is not necessary! Śaṅkara: But then why do the scriptures repeatedly assert the identity of the Self with Brahman? Śaṅkara: But the texts explicitly say "I am Brahman," etc. So the text means that Brahman knew only Itself, eternal consciousness, without the transitory, noneternal consciousness superimposed on It. Because the gods depend on men for ritual support, etc., Objection: If gods can do that, they can also obstruct the good outcome of sacrificing, etc., Objection: Surely it is the stream (samtati) of consciousness that removes avidyā. Śaṅkara: No, since such a stream can contain thoughts of selfpreservation (jivana), etc.
1.20 (El 15-127; T291-318). There is no transcendent Self or Brahman. Objection: Then either the Vedic teachings become useless or else the transcendent Self loses its transcendence, being infected by the frustrations, etc., Thus the difficulty cited can be avoided. On view one, the scripturally affirmed identity between the self and the Self could only be at best figurative, since the Self will be just an aggregate of Its parts. On two, since the whole inheres in its parts anything that affects a part will affect the whole, so that the Supreme Self will become subject to evil. The passages you have in mind, about sparks, are not meant literally but are intended to suggest the unity of the Self. Likewise, they say, the individual self, separated from the Supreme Self like a spark of fire, takes on worldly attributes, but when it learns of its identity with the Supreme Self it loses those attributes. Answer: We have already answered this. A pramäna is what leads to valid knowledge; since the Upaniṣads lead to valid knowledge they are authoritative. Objection: But if Brahman is the only real thing, the passages about action have nothing to apply to, and so they certainly cannot lead to valid knowledge. Answer; But it is evident to perception that injunctive passages are about somethings ^since your argument (that their authority is undermined by absence of a real object) stems from inference it must bow to perception. What they are about are things created out of avidyā, unreal but the topic of these passages nevertheless. Objection: But only those who have correct knowledge (vidya) are capable of (successful) action. Answer: No, quite the contrary; those who have knowledge are incapable of performing actions, as we have shown. Still other pundits, following their own ways of thinking, argue against us that if Brahman is the only real thing perception is contradicted, since we see different sights, hear many sounds, etc., Second, as to inference: we ask them, "who are you who do the inferring?" Suppose they say "we (Naiyâyikas), the experts in logic," and we reply, "but who are you really who call yourselves so?" If you mean that once Brahman has been realized the Upaniṣads and the rest of scripture will have no use, we agree readily; on the other hand, if you mean that before realization the scripture has no use, this will contradict the assumption of anyone who believes in the Self at all, including yourselves, since you believe there are selves 1 II.
3.6 (E134-138; T337-346). . This conditioned self is then the agent, experience^ subject to bondage and liberation^ but the actions and ignorance that bind it are adventitious only to that part of the Highest Self, which is not affected by it anymore than the earth as a whole is affected by a desert covering part of it. Brahman has none of these, so it cannot be described as a cow can be. To be sure, Brahman is sometimes described by expressions such as "knowledge, bliss, Brahman, ātman", etc., but if we wish to describe its true nature it is impossible. Thus we are reduced to "not this, not this," eliminating all positive characteristics that might be thought to apply to it.
III.2 (E169-170; T429-432). . and their objects (atigraha), respectively, desires, odors, names, etc. Objection: Identity is the purpose of Vedic injunctions, but samsara follows automatically from them, just as, when a lamp is lighted to illuminate a certain object everything thereabouts is illuminated alsOc Answer: No, for if the Vedic actions have only identity as their purpose there is no evidence to show that bondage follows automatically. III.
2.13 (El 74-175; T442-446). . Śaṅkara: But how, on that view, could such a disembodied man, lacking any organs, manage to meditate? It must be, rather, that the man retains his organs and body but turns away from the world to meditate on the Supreme Self.
III.3 (E175-180; T447-459). . Answer: No, for liberation has no origin (anärabhya); it is not an effect at all; but the destruction of bondage. Opponent: Yes, action by itself is like that, but our point is that combined with vidyä it can produce something different. Opponent: Well, injunctions to act must be supposed to have an expected outcome (for the action enjoined); in the Visvajit sacrifice, since no other outcome is mentioned, that outcome should be supposed to be liberation; otherwise no one will act. Opponent: Well, it is like knowledge, although liberation is not produced by knowledge it is said to be so produced. Opponent: Then we shall suppose that action has an unseen (adrsta) power to destroy avidyā. Opponent: Our position is that the nityakarmans must produce liberation, since there is nothing else they can be supposed to produce, it having been specifically excluded that they produce the same kinds of results as the other acts (e.g., heaven, children, etc.). III.
4.2 (E184-186; T469-473). . But the higher kind is the very nature of the Witness-Self and has no beginning and no end. Now ordinary vision displays the colors, etc. They think the expression "seer" means that which sees, the agent of the act of seeing. But that interpretation makes the words "of seeing" redundant, and this makes for a faulty reading. III.
5.1 (E187-198; T474-491). . Answer: We have already explained that. Objection: But the Upaniṣads say that the Highest Self is "one without a second" and "there is no difference in It." Answer: Those statements are quite true. But from the standpoint of ordinary vision, since Brahman has not been discriminated from its adjuncts like body and organs, • which were produced from (by?) But those who believe in the highest truth, though they discuss the question in accordance with scriptural passages concerning it, are confident that Brahman is one alone, without a second, free from all experiencings (sarvavyauahära§ünya). Therefore the knower of the Self should not have anything to do with the contents of avidyā, namely, actions, their means, and results. HL9.
28.7 (E222-224; T563-568). . One disputant argues that Brahman is bliss, but since It is consciousness as well It cognizes Its own bliss, and since liberated selves are essentially Brahman they cognize it too. Also if Brahman could cognize Itself It would contradict Brahman's unity. IV.
3.6 (E235-239; T601-608). . The only light that can be inferred, therefore, is that "light" which is the visual organ, which is material. Answer: This theory cannot explain the fact that in our dreams we only see things that we have already seen. Finally, on your view a dead man should be able to see, since he has body and organs. Answer: No, for then one could not know that one is touching the same thing one sees, since the agents of the two sensations would be different. Objector: Then the seer is the manas. Answer: No, since the manas is a content of cognition, like color, etc. and so cannot be the cognizer of contents. IV.
3.7 (E239-248; T609-629). Thus since there are counterexamples to the principle we cannot assume it in general, and no regress results. New objection: There are no external objects like jar or lamp apart from consciousness (vijnäna), since we never find them apart from consciousness. In this respect they are like dream objects, which are universally accepted as nothing but consciousness because they are not perceived apart from dream consciousness. Likewise, since the jar, lamp, etc, are not perceived apart from waking consciousness we draw the analogous conclusion. Thus the previous discussion is beside the point. Śaṅkara: You must admit external objects in some sense, since you suppose that different words like "jar," "lamp/5 and "consciousness" mean different things. The buddhist also objects to our view of a permanent Self ( = consciousness) because of his doctrine of momentariness. And anyway, it is an inadequate analogy. But in the case of recognizing a jar we see that it is the identical jar. Finally, there being no persisting self you cannot talk of consciousness as the highest end of life, since it is extinguished upon death.
3.9 (E249-251; T631-636). . This passage explains the mechanism of dreaming. Dream is said to be the third state5 between this world and the next, in which one experiences the results of past karma and glimpses the results of future actions. IV.
3.22 (E265-266; T669-672). . The arguments of Vaisesikas and other systems are adduced to support this. Śaṅkara: The arguments of other systems, Vaisesika, etc., contradict scripture and thus are fallacious. IV.
3.23 (E266-268; T673-676). The solution Śaṅkara gives is that though the self is eternally conscious, in deep sleep there is no content, because in deep sleep the internal organ, senses, etc.,
3.30 (E269-270; T678-682). . Or again, an atom of earth is said to have smell, but actually it is smell, and the appearance that it has other qualities is due to its contact with other substances that are in turn naturally watery, etc. IV.
4.2 (E279-281; T7O3-7O9). . The discussion here concerns the precise mechanism of death and rebirth. The experiences the karma-conditioned self now undergoes are, as in the case of dreams, dependent on that karma, and it in turn determines the kind of body the self will be reborn into. IV.
4.6 (E285-289; T718-727). Liberation is eternal and therefore must be the inherent nature of the self that is liberated. But one should not conclude that liberation is the production of absence (abhäva) of something, like breaking one's bonds; for there is nothing else but the Self and thus no real bonds to be broken. But they must say what they mean by "manifested." If, however, these properties are said to reside in the self they cannot be experienced, for one does not experience one's own properties. Objection: Liberation must make some difference, or no one would care about it and scripture would become useless. Answer: No, for ignorance must be removed, and both effort and scripture are required for that. Objection: The self that is under the sway of ignorance is surely affected by it, and so there is some difference in that self that differentiates bondage from release.
5.15 (E312-316; T785-796). . The scriptural passages relating to samnyäsa and the other äsramas are inconsistent; thus here we shall discuss the real meaning of the scriptures on this point. Śaṅkara's view, on the other hand, is that samnyäsa is recommended for those who seek liberation, because in that state one can cultivate the kind of virtues required for Self-knowledge, that is, meditation, discrimination, nonattachment, control of the senses. Objection: But the Vedas explicitly say that the injunction to perform the nityakarmans is for life. Answer: Right, it is for life for those unenlightened who are desirous of their fruits. But it does not follow that others must practise rites forever. V.I.I (E318-322; T804-813). By adopting this interpretation both the jnänakända and the karmakända portions of scripture become valid, since they each deal with their respective aspect of Brahman.
Work 4: Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 204–216 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 5,148 words
TAITTIRl YOPANISADBHÄSYA Because Sureśvara comments on this work its ascription to &amkara is rather straightforward. Thus to be established in one5s own Self, when ignorance has ceased, is to attain the Highest. Objection: Liberation consists in being established in one's Self without effort, and it arises from the nonarising of any further kärnya and pratisiddha (prohibited ) acts, from the cessation of experiencing of those that have begun (to ripen), and from the absence of sin (pratyaväya) from performance of the nityakarmans. Or else, liberation comes directly from actions alone, since they are the cause of the unsurpassable state called "heaven.55 Answer: No, for acts are of many sorts, and so all karma cannot become exhausted in the experiencings of any single life; thus a new body will arise because of the remaining karma. Objection: The nityakarmans have the purpose of bringing to an end the good and bad fruits of that karma which has not yet begun to ripen. Answer: No5 for it is stated that not doing (required acts) produces sin. Furthermore, desires, which cause karma, cannot cease (entirely) unless there is knowledge. Objection: But actions together with knowledge (vidya) can produce an eternal thing, just as posterior absence (pradhvamsäbhäva) of pot is produced by destroying the pot but is never afterward capable of being destroyed. Answer: No, for liberation (unlike posterior nonexistence) is a positive thing (bhäva). Objection: Well, the subject of knowledge and actions (the Self) is eternal, so Its liberation is eternal. or because it takes one near Brahman, or because the highest good is nearby in it. And so this book is also called "upanisad," since it is meant for that purpose.
1 (E350-358; T293-294). First opponent: Liberation comes from actions alone, since according to smrti a man who knows the Vedas thoroughly is prepared for adhikära) action. Answer: No, since liberation is eternal, and every effect of action is well known in the world to be noneternal. Objection: When kämya- and pratisiddha- actions no longer arise, and when the actions already performed are consumed by experiencing (their fruits), then from the eternal performance of the nityakarmans, since sin cannot come from them, liberation accrues without dependence on knowledge. Answer: No; as was explained in the introduction (see section 2 above) the residual karma of past actions may still produce new births, etc. Second opponent: So liberation must result from action assisted by knowledge. Answer: No, since anything produced by action is noneternal. Opponent: The Chändogya Upaniṣad (VIII. Answer: Scripture cannot create something that does not exist, even a hundred passages cannot make something that has an origin into something eternal. Objection: This contradicts scriptural texts concerning the paths (gati) that are followed by those departing the body, as well as the power (aiivarya) they attain, etc. Answer: No, those texts relate only to Brahman as effect (käryahrahman). Objection: If actions are false then the Vedas surely would not enjoin them! Objection: Then there can only be one stage of life, householdership, since actions are enjoined for householders only. Answer: Certainly not. Objector: Since the Vedas enjoin such difficult actions as the agnihotra sacrifice, etc., Answer: No, for even the householder's actions may be easier due to other acts performed in previous lives. Objection: Well, if that is true, that actions produce the knowledge leading to liberation, then there is no need for any other kind of effort like, for example, studying the Upaniṣads, etc. Answer: No, for there is no rule that knowledge arises merely from removal of the obstructions to it; it is not precluded that the grace of God, asceticism, or meditation may be required in addition for gaining the knowledge in question. CHAPTER TWO: THE BLISS OF BRAHMAN (BRAHMAVALLI)
1. (E355-362; T298-318). Objection: As it will be said that Brahman is the Self of all, and all-pervading, it follows It cannot be attained. Answer: That is no fault, for the attainment or nonattainment of Brahman depends on Its being seen or not. Objection: Indication of the meaning of a noun by specifying differentiating features is appropriate only when the differentia stand in contrast to other possible qualifications; for example, a lotus may be singled out by the qualification "blue" but only because "blue" contrasts with "red" and other possible qualities that might qualify other nouns of that class. Answer: No, for the adjectives used here have a defining, though not a qualifying, function. Objection: Since it is said (e.g., in Chândogya Upaniṣad VII.24.1) that one does not know anything else (but Brahman) it follows that the Self is knowable. Answer: No, that sentence too is a definition; it says that Brahman is (by definition) that in which one does not see anything else, that is, It is that in which that kind of action, seeing other things, does not occur at all. And since there are now such differences in one's Self, knowledge (vijnäna) is impossible in It. Objection: The one Self can be both knower and known. Answer: No, since the Self has no parts it cannot simultaneously be both knower and known. Objection: You say that the purpose of this sentence "Brahman is truth, etc." Answer: No, for our sentence is a definition and there is no point to a definition of nonentities. Objection: If Brahman is the cognizer, the agent of cognition, then it follows that It is capable of having desires, that It is impermanent, and that It is dependent. Answer: No, the consciousness that is the very nature of the Self and inseparable from It is referred to here in only a secondary sense (upacära) as an effect. But Brahman is unending both spatially and temporally. But Brahman is not differentiated in this way, and so has unendingness in the third sense as well. Because Brahman is the cause of everything. Objection: In this latter respect Brahman is limited by being dependent on Its own effects. Answer: No, for those "effects" are unreal anrta).
II.5 (E366-368; T332-338). . Furthermore, the Self cannot obtain Itself, since It is never divorced from It. Thus it is appropriate that the self of bliss (änandamaya) should be the inmost sheath. 14.
II.6 (E368-374; T338-355). . 15. Answer: No, for Brahman is the cause of äkäfa, etc. Answer: No, for Brahman is capable of desires. Opponent: Then Brahman must have wants, as we do! Answer: No, for Brahman is independent, that is, Brahman's desires do not impel Him to activity as ours do us. Answer: They are nondiiferent from It. Answer: Through manifestation of name-and-form residing in itself. 22- First opponent: On grounds of the grammar of the text He must have entered it in His own form. Second opponent: That's not right, for if Brahman is a cause like clay, Its effects are nondifferent from It, and so It cannot enter into Its effects any more than clay can enter into a pot already made. First opponent: But the clay may enter into a pot made of clay in some other guise, say as dust; likewise Brahman can enter into the world as, say, name-and-form. Second opponent: No, for Brahman is single, unlike clay; something made up of many parts can enter in "another form," but not as a single entity. First opponent: Perhaps, then, Brahman enters as the hand enters the mouth. Second opponent: No, for there's no empty space that is not already Brahman. First opponent: Then let's just say that one effect of Brahman, the jiva, enters into another effect, name-and-form. Second opponent: No. First opponent: Then the entry may be in the sense of becoming reflected (pratibimbatva), as the sun is reflected in water. Second opponent: No, for Brahman is not limited and has no features.
8.5 (E379-382; T370-382). . 25. Is the attainer different from the Highest Self? 26. Objection: Rather, the situation may be like the information offered to someone who is asking his way, one seeks information about the village he wants to get to, but it doesn't follow that he is that village! Objection: The path is knowledge of Brahman coupled with performance of previously enjoined actions. Answer: No, for it has already been shown that liberation is eternal, and the present texts (about the Self entering) agree with that. Objection: But we do not thus grasp absence-of-duality-ingeneral. Answer: Yes we do, in deep sleep and in samadhù 29. Objection: Duality exists, since we perceive it in the waking and dream states. Answer: No, since those states are the results of ignorance; when ignorance ceases, perception of duality in waking and dream experiences cease. Answer: No, for there it is natural. The nature of a substance (dravya) is unchangeable (avikriya) because it does not depend on any other thing. Change is not natural, since it is dependent. Objection: Both knowledge and ignorance are properties of the Self. Answer: No, because they are perceived, like colors, etc., as states of the internal organ (antahkarana).
Work 5: Upadeśasāhasrī
Potter, printed pp. 217–254 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 15,335 words
UPADEaASÄHASRl For the most careful scholarship on this work we are indebted to Sengaku Mayeda, who has examined it exhaustively.27 Since it is a prakarana or topical treatise rather than a commentary, and since so many such treatises traditionally ascribed to Śaṅkara are likely to be spurious, the authenticity of this one is especially worthy of close attention. The upshot is overwhelmingly in favor of Śaṅkara's authorship. Only the metrical sections are quoted by the authors Mayeda studies, and one might therefore question whether the prose part has as much claim to authenticity. Numbering of passages follows Jagadananda's work. PART I (PROSE) CHAPTER ONE: TREATISE ON INSTRUCTIONS FOR TEACHERS 1.
1.1 (ET1). .
1.2 (ET2). The means of liberation, namely, knowledge (jnäna), needs to be repeatedly explained to a pure Brahmin pupil who is without desire for anything noneternal, who has abandoned desire for sons, wealth, and for this world or the next, who has taken up the life of a wandering monk (paramahamsa parivräjaka), who has control over his mind and senses, who has qualities such as compassion, etc.,
1.3 (ET2-3). .
1.4-5 (ET4). . as long as the means are not incompatible with knowledge. The teacher should also encourage the development of virtues such as modesty, etc. 1.
1.6 (ET5). . His only purpose is to help others attain knowledge of Brahman. He should begin by teaching those scriptural texts dealing with the identity of Self and Brahman. 1.
1.7-8 (ET6-7). .
1.9-11 (ET7). . Now, if the pupil has grasped those marks and wishes to achieve liberation, the teacher should ask him "Who are you?" 1.
1.12-13 (ET8-9). If the pupil should then say '\But I am not the body; I enter into and leave bodies beginninglessly and so am bound into an endless cycle of births and deaths.
1.14-17 (ET9-10). . "
1.18 (ET11-12). . When the pupil has remembered the definition of the Self that he was taught (1.1.7-8), the teacher should summarize the truth about that Self. 1.
1.19-20 (ET 12-13). The name-and-form first took the name and form of äkäsa; this name-and-form rose from the Highest Self like dirty foam from clear water. In this order each preceding element entered each succeeding one, and so the five gross elements came into existence.
1.21 (ET 13-14). . Thus the body, which is subject to these changes of name-and-form, is different from the Self. 1.
1.22 (ET 14). .
1.23-24 (ET14-16). .
1.25 (ET16-17). .
1.26-29 (ET17-19). Because the scripture indicates that one who believes in the difference of the two will surely get more samsara, but it also declares that those who realize the identity of Self and Brahman will achieve final release."
1.30-32 (ET19-21 ). . " Scripture bears out that rites, etc., have nothing to do with the Self, and scripture wouldn't have stated thus if it was not intended that such actions should be given up." 1.
1.33 (ET21-22). . But the Highest Self I know to be free from pain and hunger, etc. 1.
1.34 (ET 22-23). We say 'I have a pain in the head, or the chest, or the stomach,' but we don't say 'I have a pain in my Self!"
1.35 (ET23-24). . " Since it is an effect, pain must have a locus, just as cooked rice must be cooked in something. 1.
1.36 (ET24-25). . "
1.37-38 (ET25-28). . "
1.39 (ET28). .
1.40 (ET28-29). .
1.41 (ET29-30). as well as the origination and destruction of things?" since it is just these differences that constitute samsara. Scripture, therefore, roots out avidyā by demonstrating the unity of origination and dissolution, etc."
1.43 (ET31). . "
1.44 (ET31-32). . " CHAPTER TWO: ON KNOWLEDGE OF THE CHANGELESS, NONDUAL SELF 1.
2.45 (ET33-34). If it is natural to me I can have no hope of liberation, since one cannot change his own nature. But if it be accidental, liberation may be achieved by removing the cause."
2.46 (ET34). .
2.47 (ET34). . Pupil: "Then what is the cause, and what will remove it5 and what is my own nature? 1.
2.48 (ET34-35). .
2.49 (ET35). .
2.50 (ET35). .
2.51 (ET35-36). . Pupil: "But I am an agent and an experiencer. This is not due to avidyā, because my awareness cannot have the Self for its object. 1.
2.52 (ET36-37). Teacher: "No, that is not an invariable rule, since we regularly experience the superimposition of other things on the Self.
2.53 (ET37). Pupil: "Then we are acquainted with the Self as the object of our consciousness of egoity, and since we are also evidently acquainted with the body, superimposition is all right because it does satisfy the rule I mentioned.
2.54 (ET38). It is true that we are acquainted with the Self and with the body, but not everyone is aware of them as different from each other.
2.55 (ET38-40). . Now if the Self and the non-Self were superimposed on each other neither would exist. But that is not right; it is the position of the nihilists. So, the body and the Self are not mutually superimposed upon each other. 1.
2.56 (ET40). , Teacher: "No, if it were a relationship of contact the Self would exist for another's sake and would be noneternal.
2.57 (ET40-41). .
2.58-59 (ET41-42). . Teacher: "No, because the Self, like Äfcäfa, is by nature not in contact with anything. So the nihilist position does not come into the situation. 1.
2.60 (ET42). .
2.61 (ET42-43). . Teacher: "There is no problem here. The Self, like äkäea, is permanently known, and the body is superimposed on it." Ï.
2.62 (ET43). .
2.63. (ET43). .
2.64 (ET 43-44). If, however, I am the Self I am quite different from that aggregate, exist for my own sake only am conscious, and am capable of making the superimposition."
2.65 (ET44). .
2.66 (ET44). .
2.67 (ET44). .
2.68 (ET44). .
2.69 (ET45). .
2.70 (ET45). . Pupil: "Yes, I am different from them, since they are objects of my experience, like jars, etc., 1.
2.71 (ET46). . Teacher: "Right! And a nonconscious being by its very nature exists for the sake of another." 1.
2.72 (ET46). .
2.73 (ET46-47). . Now then, since that is the case, were you right when you said what you said at the outset (in 1.2.45)? 1.
2.74 (ET47-49). But I still have doubts about my allegedly changeless nature. Now this knower, the Self, must change, since it entertains these various notions of different colors, (sounds), etc.
2.75 (ET49-50). . But because you are completely aware of the contents of your knowledge it follows that your Self is free from change." 1.
2.76 (ET50). .
2.77 (ET50). The activity of the buddhi, an idea, conies to be called 'knowledge' because it is a reflection of knowledge (proper), just as the word 'cut' means the separation into two of something in only a secondary sense."
2.78 (ET50-5J). .
2.79 (ET51). .
2.80 (ET51). .
2.81 (ET52). .
2.82-84 (ET52-53). . 1.2.75)? occur in my buddhi and result in the reflection of knowledge, since / a m changeless and eternal knowledge!" 1.
2.85 (ET53). .
2.86 (ET53). .
2.87 (ET53). .
2.88 (ET53). . 1.2.89 (ÊT53-54). Since waking and dream are sometimes lacking in us, that is, when we are in deep sleep, it follows that they are not natural to us." 1.
2.90 (ET54-55). .
2.91 (ET55-56). .
2.92 (ET56). .
2.93 (ET56-57). . Teacher: "What you say involves a contradiction. In deep sleep objects of knowledge are absent, but knowledge is not absent. It is self-evident and does not require a pramäna to prove It. 1.
2.94 (ET57-58). .
2.95 (ET58). .
2.96 (ET58). .
2.97 (ET58). .
2.98 (ET59). .
2.99 (ET59-61). . Teacher: "No. If the knower depends on a pramäna to be known, to whom will the desire to know belong? If we postulate another knower who desires to know the first knower, we will land in an infinite regress. 1.
2.100 (ET61). .
2.101 (ET61-62). .
2.102 (ET62-63). .
2.103 (ET63-64). . Teacher: ''Veridical knowledge remains what it is by nature whether or not it is considered as eternal or noneternal. 1.
2.104 (ET64). . No regress results in the case of the carpenter since he is always connected with his body and senses." 1.
2.105 (ET64-66). . Teacher: "Indeed, agency requires the use of instruments, but the taking up of an instrument is itself an action, so it will require still other instruments, ad infinitum. So the Self cannot be an agent at all. 1.
2.106 (ET66). .
2.107 (ET66-67). .
2.108 (ET67-68). . Pupil: "You have said that the Self is the same as that knowledge which is the result of pramänas. But this is a contradiction."
2.109 (ET68-69). . Thus all duality experienced in waking and dream does not exist except as knowledge itself. So there is nothing else except my Self." 1.
2.110 (ET70). .
2.111 (ET70). .
3.112 (ET71). Parisamkhyäna is (a type of meditation) intended for those desiring liberation through destroying the merit and demerit that has been accumulated while trying to not collect any more.
3.113 (ET71-72). . Things are known, sounds, sights, tastes, etc., that are of a completely different kind from the knower. The knôwer is quite different. 1.
3.114-115 (ET72-75). . So what can sound do to me? Pleasant and unpleasant sound can elevate or injure an ignorant man who does not discriminate, but it cannot elevate or harm one who understands." 1.
3.116 (ET75-77). . ( Since this is so, for me, who understands, there is no enemy, friend, or even neutral other. The reason is that nothing other than the Self exists." PART II (VERSE) CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION II.
1.1 (ET79). .
1.2 (ET79-80). .
1.3-5 (ET80-81). .
1.6-7 (ET81). . II. Objection: The obligatory rites (nityakarman) should be practised as long as life lasts, because they cooperate with knowledge in producing liberation, because they are enjoined, and because failure to perform them breeds sin. heaven) but nevertheless depends on something other than itself (viz.,
15 (ET82-84). . Answer: No, for since actions are incompatible with knowledge it cannot depend on them. True knowledge undermines the idea of agency as (understanding the mirage undermines the idea of) water. So one who desires liberation should give up actions.
16-21a (ET84-85). . prevails, the Vedic injunctions remain authoritative. After that, avidyā cannot arise again, since it is not present either in the Self, which is without attributes, or in the non-Self. Scripture supports this. II.1.21b-
24 (ET85-86). . But what other thing can knowledge depend on? can he incur sin. But a man who has Self-knowledge has neither an idea of ego (i.e., of agency) nor any desire for the results of actions. II.
1.25-26 (ET87 ). .
2.1-2 (ET88). . So, reflecting thus, one comes to know the Self clearly. II.
2.3-4 (ET89). . A (right) awareness that follows another always sublates its predecessor. Chändogya UpaniṣadVIAA). CHAPTER THREE: THE SELF IS GOD II.
3.1 (ET90). .
3.2-3 (ET90-91). Why should scripture (i.e., Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad III.8.8) describe something as "not large," etc., Since the Self is so qualified the opposite ideas ("large," etc.) CHAPTER FOUR: KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATURE OF THINGS (TATTVAJ5JÄNA) II.
4.1 (ET92). .
2 (ET92-93). .
4.3-5 (ET93-94). . Answer: (Some acts) produce results by overpowering your knowledge of Brahman through their power of giving rise to bodies, etc. But other kinds of karma are different. CHAPTER FIVE: ERROR OF THE BUDDHI II.
5.1 (ET95). .
5.2-3 (ET95-96). .
5.4 (ET96). .
6.1-2 (ET98). .
7.1-2 (ET101-102). . It is not possible for me to be accepted or rejected; therefore I am the Highest Brahman. 11.
7.3 (ET102). .
7.4 (ET102). .
7.5 (ET102-103). .
7.6 (ET103). .
8.1 (ET104). .
8.2 (ET104-105). .
8.4 (ET105). .
8.5 (ET 105). .
9.1 (ET107). .
9.2 (ET107-108). .
9.4 (ET108). .
9.5 (ET108-109). .
10.4 (ET 112). . Therefore I am just the Fourth (tunya)^ the Seer, and without a second. CHAPTER ELEVEN: WITNESS II.
11.1 (ET116). .
11.5 (ET117). .
11.6 (ET117). .
11.8 (ET118). .
11.9 (ET118). .
11.10 (ET118-119). .
11.11 (ET119). .
12.1 (ET 122). .
12.3 (ET123). .
12.4 (ET123). .
12.6 (ET124). .
12.8 (ET124). .
12.10 (ET125). .
12.14-15 (ET126). . Discrimination is an idea in the buddhi, and since it is something seen it is liable to destruction. 11.
12.19 (ET127). .
13.1-8 (ET128-130). . Likewise, I do not act because I have no life breath (prāṇa). II.
13.9-10 (ET130). .
13.14-17 (ET131-132). .
14.1 (ET136). .
14.2 (ET136). .
14.3-6 (ET136-137). . The internal organ, pervading colors, etc., But the Self witnesses these modifications. 11.
14.15 (ET140). .
14.16 (ET140). .
14.27-28 (ET143-144). .
14.33 (ET145). .
14.40 (ET147). .
14.46 (ET148-149). .
15.1 (ET151). .
15.2 (ET151). .
15.14 (ET155). .
15.21-23 (ET157-158). . If one remembers that all perceptions are but oblations offered to the Self's fire one does not become attached. 11.
15.24-25 (ET158). .
15.41 (ET162). .
15.42 (ET163). .
15.44 (ET163). .
15.45-46 (ET164). .
15.48 (ET 165). .
16.1-2 (ET167). .
16.3-4 (ET168). . These senses are called organs of the buddhi; the speech organ, the hand, etc., The buddhi has as its purpose ascertainment of things. II,
16.5 (ET168). .
16.9 (ET169). .
16.10 (ET 170). .
16.11 (ET170). .
16.19-20 (ET173). Just as the closing and opening of the eye, which.are properties of air (väyu) and not of the eye, are mistaken for properties of the visual organ, which actually has the nature of light, and just as motion, not a property of the manas or the buddhi, is wrongly attributed to them, so the Self is mistaken for an agent because actions occur when the body, the buddhi, the manas, the eye, light, and objects are connected with It.
16.21 (ET173). .
16.23 (ET174). . Objection: Knowledge and its objects are momentary, merely dharmas (streaming) continuously. The ultimate human purpose is to destroy this notion.
16.24 (ET 174-175). .
16.25-26 (ET175). . (
16.27 (ET175-176). .
16.28 (ET176). . Answer: Then the effect depends on a series that is completely different (from the one that exhibits similarity). 11.
16.29 (ET176). .
16.30 (ET177). .
16.31 (ET177). .
16.32 (ET177). .
16.39-41 (ET179). . However, the true nature of the Self is never destroyed. 11.
16.45 (ET181). .
16.46 (ET181). .
16.47 (ET182). .
16.49 (ET182). .
16.51 (ET183). are objects of knowledge, but they cannot be so, since they are qualities of the Knower and the Knower cannot know its own qualities, just as heat cannot be revealed by light.
16.52 (ET183). .
16.53-54 (ET184). . Objection: Knowledge of qualities is just their coinherence in the same self. Answer: No, since pleasure, etc., 11.
16.55 (ET184). . The self is changeless according to you, so pleasure, etc., cannot be qualities of it. Furthermore, since pleasure, etc., 11.
16.56 (ETÎ85). . If knowledge be knowable by a second knowledge an infinite regress will result. 11.
16.57 (ET185). .
16.58-59 (ET185). .
17.1 (ET191). .
17.10 (ET194). .
17.11-12 (ET194-195). So, just as form is constructed as related to words and buddhi, likewise the whole world is constructed (vikalpita) from error and buddhi.
17.13 (ET195). .
17.14-15 (ET 195). .
17.16 (ET 196). .
17.17 (ET196). .
17.18 (ET196). .
17.19 (ET197). .
17.20 (ET197). .
17.22 (ET197-198). .
17.23 (ET198). .
17.24 (ET198). .
17.26 (ET199). .
17.27 (ET199). .
17.29 (ET200). .
17.31 (ET200). .
17.33 (ET201). .
17.34 (ET201). .
17.35 (ET202). . CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: THAT ART THOU The interpretation here follows that of A. J. Alston, That Art Thou (London, 1967) on various points. II.
18.2 (ET128). .
18.9-18 (ET220-223). . Objection: Liberation does not arise when one hears "that art thou"; one must practice meditation (prasamkhyäna) along with reasoning (yukti). Perception, which gives us particular knowledge of objects, can certainly contradict ideas arising from hearing or from inference, since those give us general knowledge of things. Since this result can only be an entity that already exists, that is, the Self, the only appropriate means must be meditation. Therefore, meditation should be practiced in order to realize the Seif by one who is tranquil (sama), etc., 11.
18.19 (ET223-224). .
18.20-21 (ET224). Just as a father superimposes his son's troubles on himself, so the ego is superimposed onto the Self, and the text in question removes the superimposition, after which no later injunction to act is possible (since action requires superimposition ).
18.22-23 (ET224-225). . 11.18.24 (ËT225). Words cannot refer to the Self, since they can only refer to objects. Likewise the ego sense cannot reveal the Self. 11.
18.28 (ET226). .
18.29-31 (ET226-227). .
18.32-33 (ET227-228). . The reflection of the Self in the ego sense is like that, they are different, but are not distinguished. 11.
18.34 (ET228). .
18.35 (ET228-229). .
18.36 (ET229). .
8.37 (ET229). .
18.39 (ET230). . Answer: No, because it is not always seen even when both are present (but wrongly positioned). 11.
18.40 (ET230). .
18.41 (ET231). .
18.42 (ET231). .
18.44 (ET231-232). .
18.45 (ET232). .
18.46 (ET232). .
18.47 (ET232). .
18.48 (ET233). Answer: This opinion arises from misinterpretation of the scriptures and from lack of right knowledge of the Self, as a result of which you identify the Self with the ego.
18.51-52 (ET234). . Objection: On your analysis, in the sentence "he knows," the agent and the action belong to different loci. 11.
18.53-54 (ET234). .
18.59-60 (ET236). Objection: If a word has no primary sense it cannot have a secondary one either. What is the primary sense of "knows" on your view?
18.61-62 (ET236). . Answer: If you accept what seems evident to ignorant people you will end up holding the Lokâyata position, which you don't wish to uphold. 11.
18.63-69 (ET236-238). . Thus we come to speak of the buddhi as the knower. But we know from scripture that knowledge is eternal, so that it cannot be produced by the buddhi or indeed by anything at all. 11.
18.72-73 (ET239). . The buddhists deny the existence of a knower by holding that (ideas ) are self-illuminating and are themselves knowers.
18.74 (ET239-240). .
18.75 (ET240). . Answer: No, since the knowing witness is proximate to everything and so everything will become conscious. 11.
18.76-77 (ET240-241). . But you cannot admit either that the sufferer and striver can understand that he is the Witness, since he is an agent.
18.78 (ET241). .
18.79 (ET241 ). .
18.80 (ET241-242). .
18.81 (ET242). .
18.82 (ET242). And if you think that the relation in question is found explained in scripture, that cannot be, for the three defects explained earlier will apply, and in any case the relation must be grasped in the form "there is a witness of mine" (and not "I am the Witness").
18.83 (ET242). .
18.84 (ET243). .
18.88 (ET244). .
18.89 (ET244). .
18.90 (ET244). .
18.91 (ET245). . A thing known as "mine" or "this" is without doubt part of the "thou" (i.e., not Self). 11.
18.92 (ET245). .
18.93 (ET245). . " Mine" and "this" are qualifiers of the intermediate one (the "I am this" of 11.18.91). 11.
18.94 (ET245-246). .
18.95 (ET246). .
18.96 (ET246-247 ). .
18.99 (ET247-248). .
18.100 (ET247-248). .
18.101 (ET248). .
18.102 (ET248-249). . But even before experiencing it (directly through the text's hearing) the existence of one's Self is admitted. 11.
18.103 (ET249). .
18.105-106 (ET250). . Does "I am Brahman" mean that I am Brahman or something else? But if something else is meant the sentence would be false.
18.107 (ET250). .
18.108 (ET250-251). Since the causes of the "result" (liberation), that is, the activity of the buddhi and its ideas, are not of the nature ofthat "result" (being nonconscious ), it is proper to attribute it to the unchanging (Self), just as a victory won by his army can be properly attributed to the king.
18.109 (ET251). .
18.110 (ET251). .
18.111 (ET251). .
18.112 (ET251-252). .
18.113 (ET252). .
18.115-116 (ET252-253). Objection: In order to know that something is a reflection of the Self we must know that the Self exists independently of the reflection.
18.117 (ET253). .
18.118 (ET253-254). . (
18.119 (ET253-254). This latter (the external object) is the objective (karman) because it is desired, and one who desires it is enjoined to action relating to it.
18.120 (ET254). .
18.121-122 (ET254-255). Consciousness is one in all of them, and the difference stems from the ideas alone, just as a crystal takes on different colors because of the differences in the adjuncts with which it becomes associated.
18.123 (ET255). .
18.124 (ET255). .
18.125 (ET255-256). .
18.126 (ET256). .
18.127 (ET256). .
18.128 (ET256). .
18.129 (ET257). .
18.130 (ET257). .
18.131 (ET257). .
18.132 (ET258). .
18.133 (ET258). .
18.134 (ET258). .
18.135 (ET258). .
18.136 (ET259). .
18.137 (ET259). .
18.138 (ET259). .
18.139 (ET259-260). .
18.140 (ET260). For the agent, instrument, and object of Self-knowledge to be "clear" there will have to be a seer beyond all of them to apprehend this.
18.141-143 (ET260-261). . But since consciousness is the o.nly reality, it is both the act and the agent and object as; well. 11.
18.143-144 (ET261). %'^ÄnswerU If consciousness is destroyed every moment it w ^ require an agent to bring it into existence. buddhist: Consciousness has no properties. 11.
18.145-146 (ET261-262). .
18.147 (ET262). .
18.148 (ET262-263). .
18.149 (ET263). .
18.150 (ET263). .
18.151 (ET263). .
18.152 (ET263-264). .
18.154-155 (ET264). . Is knowing an act? Or does the knower pervade its object? Neither. Assisted by it the buddhi pervades pots, etc.,
18.156 (ET264-265). .
18.157 (ET265). .
18.158 (ET265). .
18.159 (ET265-266). .
18.160 (ET266). .
18.161-162 (ET266). . Rather, the undiscriminating notion that one is in pain, which arises from identification with the body, etc., 11.
18.170 (ET268). .
18.171 (ET269). Likewise, the term "that," set in apposition to "thou," which indicates the inner Self, loses its sense of something not immediately known.
18.173 (ET269). .
18.174-175 (ET270). Likewise, the one whose buddhi has been led astray by desire because his eyes have been bandaged by avidyā needs only to know himself as pure consciousness distinct from everything else.
18.177-178 (ET270-271). , In understanding the meaning of a sentence one must first determine the relationships among the words by positive and negative concomitance (anvayavyatireka), for the meaning of a sentence is a function of our memory of the words that are heard to compose it.
18.179 (ET271). .
18.180-183 (ET271-272). . This method of positive and negative concomitance is only needed for the understanding of the word "thou" as the pure Self. 11.
18.185 (ET273). .
18.186-188 (ET273-274). . Answer: Nevertheless, once the dream is over we believe the suffering not only not to persist but indeed never to have really occurred at all. A persistence (samtäna) of error or suffering is never found.
18.189 (ET274). .
18.194 (ET275-276). .
18.201 (ET278). .
18.202 (ET278). .
18.203 (ET278). .
18.207 (ET279-280). . But then liberation would be treated as impermanent, which would involve a contradiction. 11.
18.208 (ET280). But the opponent accepts their identity too. So if the text is interpreted following his principles it becomes quite unintelligible.
18.209-210 (ET280). If a man once knows he is liberation itself, self-existent and self-evident, then if he should desire to act he is crazy and flouts the scripture.
18.211 (ET281). .
18.212-214 (ET281-282). . Answer: One knows from perception that one is an agent and feels frustrated, and then arise efforts to avoid that state. II.
18.215 (ET282). .
18.216 (ET282). .
18.217 (ET282). .
18.220 (ET283). .
18.221 (ET283-284). .
19.1 (ET288). .
19.2-3 (ET288-289). .
19.4 (ET289). .
19.5 (ET289-290). .
19.15 (ET293). .
19.16-17 (ET294). . Objection: What is called "real" is actually unreal, like a horn on a human's head, because it doesn't serve any purpose.
Work 6: Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 254–269 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 6,554 words
CHÄNDOGYOPANIS ADBHÄSYA The Chändogya Upaniṣad, the second longest and one of the oldest and most authoritative Upaniṣads, belongs to the Säma Veda. 113-334. " BOOK ONE Introduction (El 13-114; Tl-5). Deviating from either of these paths according to one's nature one merely earns further rebirths. Objector: But there are injunctions to act (which undermine this kind of knowledge); these are enjoined on those who know the Vedas, and thus, among others, on those who know the nondual Self. Answer: No, since in the absence of awareness of distinction of agent, experiencer, etc., It follows that actions are only enjoined on those visited by the fault of avidyā, not on the Self-knower. Because worship and meditation, involving a supporting object, are easier to practice they are expounded first (in this Upaniṣad). Indeed, the very first to be expounded are those practices which relate to the elements (anga) of (sacrificial) action, since they are more familiar and overhasty abandonment of action will make any meditation or worship very difficult.
1.10 (El 17-118; T13-15). Answer: Knowledge renders acts more effective; a jeweler, because of his knowledge of jewels, does better in business than the amateur, even though both are qualified to barter; likewise, though both those ignorant of "om" and those knowledgeable are fit to worship, the latter are more likely to succeed.
23.1 (E158-161; T103-115). Thus brahmacärins, householders, and renunciates alike reach heaven by knowledge, restraints (yama), and observances (niyama), so that the second type of person, (2) above (the "wandering ascetic"), includes both ascetics and renunciates. Therefore the view must be that anyone performing the duty of his stage of life and gaining knowledge attains immortality. Answer: No, the injunctions are valid for those who make distinctions, just as dream ideas are valid before waking. Objector: But because discriminating men will not follow the injunctions their validity will be impugned. Answer: No, for the fact that discriminating persons do not wish to perform kämya acts (i.e., acts intended to realize rewards such as wealth, children, etc., Objection: Since you must admit that the wandering mendicant continues to perform actions such as begging, etc., Answer: No, no more than the fact that someone has.killed someone should make a discriminating person want to kill; since he does not recognize anything to be acted upon, the wise man is not urged to perform the agnihotra and other such acts (as are enjoined by scripture). Answer: No, for one who does not recognize diversity will not be motivated by such a fear, since a man does not fear evil accruing from actions he is not entitled to perform. Answer: No, since all the other three stages of life require acceptance of the distinction of owner and owned; the fourth stage is just that involving abandonment of that distinction. Opponent: Since, then, the mendicant has abandoned distinctions he cannot practice observances and restraints, etc. Answer: No, he may deviate from the idea of unity because of hunger, etc., Because someone falls into a well in the dark does not mean he will do so when it is light. Objection: If a householder were to do this he would destroy his sacrificial fire and thus incur sin, this follows from scriptural authority. Answer: No, he does not destroy his fire; it merely comes to an end.
14.1 (E178-179; T151-152). Thus in all the three times it exists undifferentiated from Brahman, for it is never perceived apart from Brahman. See Book Six for an explanation as to how this same Brahman is one and "without a second."
19.1 (E188; T172-173). The Upaniṣad says "In the beginning this was indeed nonexistent; it became existent...." What is meant is not that the universe didn't exist at all before some time t, but rather that its name-and-form were undifferentiated (avyäkrta) before it became differentiated.
10.2 (E226-228; T249-255). . The Upaniṣad here describes the devayäna or way of the gods. The "immortality" that this path leads to is not absolute; however, their rebirth will not be in human form. The path culminates in the heaven called satyaloka. V.
10.3-8 (E228-234; T255-272). . Objection: When a person dies all his karmic residues become operative in determining the next birth. Answer: No. A third type of person is he who is burdened by sinful karmic residues. These do not follow the path of smoke but go directly into grains and then perhaps in food into man, or if not, they jump from one plant to another, but all the time they remain conscious and thus have hellish experiences. Objection: Since those who follow the southern path also are propelled by their karma into new bodies just as these last-mentioned sinful types, they should also have hellish experiences, and then people would stop listening to the scriptures, for it would become clear that performance of ritual acts and acts of service, etc., produce greater unhappiness. Answer: We must distinguish the cases analogously to the difference between climbing a tree and falling down from it. The third kind of person, who has not observed ritual or other kinds of proper action, is reborn over and over as small creatures, insects, etc.
1.4 (E245; T293-294). . Objection: How is it that when the cause, the lump of clay, is known, the effect, which is a different thing, is also known? Answer: Because the effect is not different from its cause. VI.
2.1 (E246-247; T295-299). Answer: Because, although now this Being is qualified by nameand-form, in the beginning It had no name-and-form. in the case of the production of pots. Objection: But the buddhists also hold that prior to its birth the universe was absence of Being, and that this absence was "without duality." Answer: True, but it is not a correct view if what is meant is that there was only absence of positive things, since one who says this must be denying his own existence. Objector: The person who says this exists after his birth but not before. Answer: No, for there is no proof that there was absence of Being prior to origination; so the notion that in the beginning there was Nonbeing is a misconception (kalpanâ). Objection: For a word to be meaningful it must pick out the form (äkrti) of a thing, and a sentence made up of meaningless words is itself meaningless. Answer: There is no fault here.
2.2 (E248-249; T299-3Q4). . Answer: What is this sarrivrti? Answer: Our argument (about sarrivrti) applies equally to the parts, either they are positive or negative, and so forth. Objection: There is no proof for your theory either, since there is no instance of a jar being produced from another jar. Answer: Right, no entity is produced from another entity; rather, production is when one and the same entity takes on a different form. Objection: Your Being is held to be single, indivisible, without parts,, inactive, etc. Answer: The parts are imagined (parikalpita) by our buddhi, just as the snake, etc., VI.
2.4 (E250-251; T306-309). . Objection: Fire, water, etc., Answer: The sense is figurative; it is meant that Being did the thinking and producing. Answer: No, since we only know about Being from verbal (i.e., scriptural) authority. Answer: No, since we shall be told soon that this Being is the Self. Answer: No, for we are taught that liberation comes to one who identifies his Self with Being. Answer: The whole present treatment is governed by the statement that Being is that by the knowledge of which everything is known, which clearly indicates the nondifference of everything else and Being. VI.
3.2 (E252-253; T311-313). . Objection: It cannot be correct to say that Being, which is not subject to transmigration, which is omniscient, should, while It is fully in control of Itself (svatantra), wish to subject Itself to embodiment and the resulting experiences. Answer: True, it would not be correct to say that Being does this in Its unmodified form. Objection: If jivätman is merely a reflection it must be untruthfully obtained (mrsaiva präpta), and so must its peregrinations in this and other worlds. Answer: There is no fault; it is truthfully experienced insofar as it has the nature of Being. VI.
4.1-4 (E253-255; T315-318). . Now, by the same token, since the whole universe has been triplicated, universeness, and so the idea of a universe, will disappear on discrimination, and all that remains will be the three "divinities" fire, water, and food, but since Being made each of these triplicate in the beginning (according to VI.3.4) fireness, waterness, and foodness will likewise disappear along with the respective notions, and all that will be left is Being, everything else being mere modifications of words. VI.
8.1 (E260-262; T328-331). In dreaming, the self clearly has not gone into its own Self, so that cannot be the sleep referred to. Answer: By inference from the experience of fatigue. After many experiences in the waking state a man's organs become tired and they are temporarily absorbed into prāṇa, which alone lies awake and the resulting state of deep sleep is termed "going to one's own."
VI.13 (E270-271; T348-350). For example, they may become absorbed into Being in deep sleep but not recognize that fact, just as the salt may disappear from sight but still remain as testified to by taste.
VI.14 (E271-273; T351-356). . Objection: Being merged into Being does not directly follow on liberation, for the remaining karma that has begun to operate must still be burnt off by further actions. But these will in turn breed more karma, which in turn will generate rebirth, and so on, with the result that even one who knows the truth about Being and the Self will not escape samsara. Answer: Two kinds of karmic residue must be distinguished. VI.
15.2 (E274; T357-358). . and thus cannot progress through times and places as this account would require. âvetaketu naturally wants to know why the wise man is not reborn like the ignorant one. VI.
16 (E275-277; T358-365). . Answer: Its point was to eliminate the misconceptions that the Self is the agent or enjoy er and to teach that the jivätman is the entity that is referred to by the word "thou" in "That thouart, Svetaketu" (the repeated conclusions of many passages in this chapter), the entity that is supposed to hear and study the truth. Objection: What "that thou art" means is that the thing denoted by "thou" has Being just as the sun, internal organ, etc., Answer: No, this assertion has a different form. In the passages about the sun, etc., Objection: "That thou art" is figurative just like "you are a lion" said of a hero. Answer: A figurative expression, being false, cannot be properly said to bring absorption into Being. VIII. Introduction (E299; T413-414).
5.4 (E310-311; T437-440). . But if they only exist in the mind this conflicts with other Puränic statements to the effect that oceans, etc., Answer: Well, they can't very well go in their gross forms, since they're too big for that. Questioner: But those dream objects are unreal, and the Vedas say that "his desires are real." Therefore there are mutual causal relations between external and mental things. But even though the mental are just external, and the external just mental, they are not unreal with respect to one's own self. Questioner: But objects perceived in dreams become unreal upon waking. Śaṅkara: True, but the unreality is relative, in relation to waking, not in dream itself. VIII.
12.1 (E324-328; T467-477). . Objection: If pleasure does not touch the pure Self then in deep sleep a person must become annihilated. Answer: We are talking of the pleasure produced by meritorious acts from past lives, it is this that is absent in deep sleep. Answer: Frustrations are contained within the Self, to be sure; they are constructions born of avidyā just like the snake in the rope.
12.3 (E329-330; T478-481). . Objection: If so It cannot be omniscient. Objection: We were told that abundance (i.e., Brahman, the true Self) does not see another, hear another, etc., This is an inconsistency. But since desired objects have no existence apart from the Self, It does not "see" them.
Work 7: Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 270–277 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 3,344 words
AITAREYOPANISADBHÄSYA The Aitareya Brähmana of the Rg Veda is one of the oldest of the Brâhmanas. A portion of the second of these is known as the Aitareya or Bahvrcä Upaniṣad, or sometimes as Ätmasatka since it has six sections. INTRODUCTION
1 (ET 1-3). . On the other hand, the Highest Brahman is declared in (other) scriptural passages to be free from hunger, etc.
2 (ET4-9). . Opponent: Yes, knowledge of the Self does lead to liberation. If one objects that passages enjoining samnyäsa will be contradicted, the opponent answers that these passages are meant either to praise knowledge of the Self or to apply to those who are for some physical reason unable to perform actions.
3 (ET10-14). . Objection: One engages in ritual works merely because scriptures enjoin it. Answer: No, since Self-knowledge involves the conviction that injunctions no longer carry any force. Objector: The scripture itself enjoins Jböth action and knowledge for the same individual. Answer: That would mean that the scripture would enjoin inconsistent things, since (as was argued ) action presupposes lack of Selfknowledge and Self-knowledge presupposes lack of action.
4 (ET14-16). . Opponent: The knower of the Self would not by himself desire the results of actions, but scripture generates such desires. Answer: No. Opponent: Scripture isn't engaged in supplying the means to Selfknowledge.
5. (ET 16-21). . Opponent: We are advised (by the Bhagavadgitä) that for the knower of the Self "no purpose is served by perform- ing some deed or not performing it" Bhagavadgltä III. Thus renunciation (tyäga) is no more appropriate for the Self-knower than action is. Answer: That is not the point. Opponent: Very well! Since it is a natural thing, it cannot be the subject of scriptural injunctions.
6 (ET21-27). . Opponent: The scriptures enjoin certain ways in which an ascetic should accept food, bathe, etc. Answer: Such a person is not subject to the command of the scripture, although persons who are not yet realized are so subject. Nevertheless the samnyäsin will continue to act in a disciplined way, but only because he has acquired the habit of doing so and has no motive for departing from that habit. Objection: Why cannot attainment of the divine state within samsara be a subsidiary result angaphala)? Answer: Because the two are quite incompatible.
7 (ET 27-31). . Objection: Unenlightened persons, since they have not fulfilled their obligations, cannot enter samnyäsa. Answer: No. Answer: No, since obligations would bind persons in all the stages of life, which would be undesirable.
8 (ET 31-34). . CHAPTER ONE The Upaniṣad speaks of the fact that first there was only the Self and nothing else.
9 (ET 35-46). . Opponent: Doesn't the wording "at first there was only the Self" suggest that now there are other things besides? Answer: No. Opponent: How can an agent create without any materials? Answer: Again, it is like water and foam. CHAPTER TWO The Upaniṣad continues: The presiding deities thus created fell into the great ocean and, developing hunger and thirst, requested sustenance. Hunger and thirst were also allotted a place with the deities in the human body.
10 (ET 47-55). The "great ocean" is samsara, says Śaṅkara: it is filled with suffering born of ignorance and desire, endlessly surging with desire but still holding on its bosom the ship of wisdom sailing toward liberation. Śaṅkara extracts from this suggestion a proof that the combined path of knowledge and works is not adequate. The Lord ( = the Self) instilled hunger and thirst into the purusa initially and so the deities suffered these pangs also. The gods love secrecy!
11 (ET 56-72). ET 72-76) Objection: Since the Self is all-pervading it makes no sense to speak of Him entering a body through a split in the skull. Answer: No, the passage is meant to explain the nature of the Self; everything else in it is arthaväda, not to be taken literally; or better, it is taught by the Lord in order that the nature of the Self can be more easily comprehended. ( ET 76-82) Objection: You have spoken of one Self, but there are in fact three: the individual self (jiva), the Lord (iivara) and the purusa of the Upaniṣads; so how can you maintain Advaita (nondualism)? Answer: How do you know of the existence of the jiva? Objection: But whatever is known is known through the manas. Śaṅkara: But what knows the manas? And that self (the Self) cannot be an object of inference. ( ET 83-97) Objection: But scripture says the Self is to be known as both hearer and thinker. Answer: Sometimes the Self hears, and other times He thinks. There is no contradiction in that. Śaṅkara: So you contend, but scripture can't mean that, since it tells us that the Self is neither hearer nor thinker. This text means that the Self is not something that has these traits; rather, Its hearing, etc., Objection: Then we should be conscious of everything at once! Furthermore, the kind of consciousness that requires the sense organs depends on the second sort, the witness-consciousness, since it provides (as it were) the light that illuminates all, whether dream or waking state objects. Objection: If all this is so, then how can the jiva know the Self? Answer: Only by scripture's telling him he is nothing else. Let the women return!)
12 (ET 98-110). . The jiva, having ' peregrinated to the lunar spheres, comes down with the rain and enters into food, and is thus ingested into the father's body and into his semen. CHAPTER FIVE The Upaniṣad says: Which self of the two is the one we adore? By this Präjna-Self one obtains the supreme bliss of immortality.
13 (ET 111-127). . The one that came by the feet provided the organs by which we grasp things; but the one that came by the head is that by which we are aware of not only the organs but their functions and objects. CHAPTER SIX Concluding invocation.
Work 8: Īśopaniṣadbhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 278–280 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 868 words
ISOPANISADBHÄSYA The Isa Upaniṣad is sometimes called Samhitä Upaniṣad^ presumably since it occurs in the mantra or samhitä portion of the White Tajurveda. It is a short Upaniṣad, only eighteen verses long, but probably among the oldest. This is appropriate, for the Self is not an agent nor can it in any way become involved in action, since action requires attributing qualities to the Self that it does not really have. Thus the point of this Upaniṣad is to reveal the true nature of the Self and thus to remove ignorance.
1 (El-2; T4-6). .
2 (E2-3; T6-8). . Because Self-knowledge and action are mutually incompatible, as was shown in the introduction.
3 (E3; T8-9). .
4 (E3-4; T9-12). . The answer is that some adjectives describe the Self in its unconditioned state, others describe It in its conditioned states.
6-7 (E5; T13-14). . Again, sorrow and delusion do not affect one who knows the Self.
8 (E5-7; T15-18). The point of insisting that action and knowledge are incompatible is in part to recommend to the nonknower of the Self both knowledge and works, as we find in Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad 1.5.16, for example, that by vidyä one attains the world of the gods, thus this vidyä, that is, meditation and worship, has its own result and should be practiced in addition to ritual acts.
9-11 (E7; T18-21). By construing "auidyä" in these verses as meaning karma, and "vidyä" as meaning meditation, and taking it that each of the two have their distinct outcomes, that is, progression of the subtle body to the world of the fathers pitrloka) as the outcome of ritual action, progression to the world of the gods (devaloka) as the outcome of meditation on and worship of the gods, these three verses become intelligible.
12-14 (E8-9; T21-24). That is the highest state attainable through human and divine methods (i.e., by action or worship); beyond all this is the liberation attainable by Self-knowledge.
15-17 (E9-10; T25-28). .
18 (E10-11; T28-31). . The verse finishes the prayer. Answer: As we have said, Self-knowledge and action are opposed in means and end and cannot be combined. Answer: No, since once knowledge arises action ceases altogether.
Work 9: Kaṭhopaniṣadbhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 280–281 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 478 words
KATHOPANISADBHÄS YA The Katha, one of the best known of the Upaniṣads, is probably among the dozen or so "earliest." It tells the story of Näciketas' trip to the netherworld and his reception by Yama, who eventually teaches Näciketas the truth about liberation. Introduction (E36-37; T97-100). CHAPTER ONE, SECTION TWO, OR SECOND VALLl
1 (E45-46; T128-129). . One cannot follow both paths. The wise man follows the former, the unintelligent one the latter.
8 (E48; T137-139). . Why? so there is no end to reasoning. CHAPTER TWO, SECTION THREE, OR SIXTH VALLl
1 (E7O-71; T207-210). . Śaṅkara: The tree symbolizes the world; the root is Visnu, that is, Brahman. The world is like a tree because it is cut down. Its branches, heaven, hell, the beastly and ghostly states, are below its root.
4 (E71; T212). .
Work 10: Kenopaniṣatpadabhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 281–284 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 1,298 words
K ENOPANISADBHÄS YA There are in fact two commentaries on the Kena Upaniṣad ascribed to Śaṅkara, one on the words (pada), the other on the sentences ivakya). Its name is taken from the first word of the first verse, "te<2," "by whom?" 35-94. It is shown again that knowledge cannot be combined with action. Let us suppose that someone committed to knowing Brahman approaches a teacher who understands Brahman and that the following discussion ensues.
1.1 (E79-80; T39-42). . The implication is that the internal organ, etc., Since they do so it is appropriate to ask who or what impels them to do so.
1.2 (E80-82; T42-47). . Śaṅkara: But in this case no description of the required x can be given except by reference to the activities of the ears, etc. serve, and that is the x the teacher speaks of here. Objection: "The ear of the ear" makes no sense, as an ear does not need another ear any more than a light needs another light.
1.3.(E82; T48-49). . That it is not altogether impossible is suggested by the very next stanza, which invokes scripture to teach about Brahman.
1.4 (E82-83; T49-52). . But since Brahman is nothing different from one's Self, Brahman is not something to be obtained, and that is what is meant by saying that Brahman is above what is not known. PART TWO
11.1 (E85-87; T58-62). . Pupil: I think (Brahman) is known. Rather they probably comprehend only certain aspects of Him. Objection: Since a thing is known when one comprehends its essential nature, and since the essential nature of Brahman is consciousness, one knows Brahman well when he knows that It is consciousness. Answer: That is true. And the teacher asked: "Why?." Said the pupil: "Listen!"
11.2 (E87; T62-64). . "
11.3 (E87-88; T64-66). .
11.4 (E88-90; T66-71). . Objection: No, the Self is really known when we understand that It is the agent in the act of knowing, just as one knows the wind when one understands that which moves the branches of a tree. Answer: Then you would interpret the Self as a substance possessing the power of knowing, not consciousness itself. Thus on your view knowledge comes and goes, modifying the self when present. Answer: Then Brahman, the Self, is mere substance without consciousness and this contradicts scripture.
Work 11: Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 284–289 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 1,862 words
Ranade explains "Mundaka Upaniṣad" etymologically as "an 'Upanishad addressed to Shavelings.5 "37 Max Müller explains that "Mundaka, in its commonest acceptation, is used as a term of reproach for buddhist mendicants, who are called 'Shavelings,5 in opposition to the Brahmins, who dress their hair carefully, and often display by its peculiar arrangement either their family or their rank "38 Ranade calls the Mundaka an emotional work in contrast with the Katha, with which he thinks it is roughly contemporaneous.
3-6 (E500-502; T84-91). . An objector complains: This i'higher knowledge," since it is outside the Rg Veda, etc., how can it be "higher" and the means of liberation? Answer: No,.the point being made is that knowledge of the immutable is conveyed only by the Upaniṣads and that knowledge is the ' 'higher", it does not refer to the collection of words that are found in the Upaniṣads. But by the word "Veda" a collection of words is always meant. FIRST MUNDAKA, SECOND PART Introduction (E504; T95-96). So the text first speaks of the lower knowledge, since eradication of it requires first our understanding that it is there.
11 (E508; T106-108). . Answer: No; the Upaniṣad will subsequently explain that liberation takes place right here and involves no journeying. The "freedom from passion" mentioned here is a dependent variety since it involves duality.
12 (E508-509; T109-111). . The Brahmin is uniquely qualified for Brahman-knowledge after renunciation. So he should become detached and seek out a teacher. SECOND MUNDAKA, FIRST PART Introduction (E510; T113). This is what, being known, leads to all else being known, the subject of the higher knowledge of Brahman.
1 (E510; Tl 13-114). . disappear, and äkäsa is held to be the cause in both such eventuations.
2 (E510-511; T115-117 ). Śaṅkara explains that the lower of these two is the unmanifested, or māyā, which is the adjunct of Brahman appearing as name-and-iorm, which is itself higher than the evolved world of modifications.
3 (E511-512; Til7-119). . Question: How can it do that, since it lacks life-breath, etc. Answer: If like the Self the life-breath, etc., But they do not exist in their own form prior to origination. Therefore the Self is without life-breath, etc., just as Devadatta is without a son prior to a son's being born. SECOND MUI^DAKA, SECOND PART Introduction (E515; T128). THIRD MWDAKA, FIRST PART Introduction (E521; T143).
1-2 (E521-522; T143-147). . God, unlike the individual self, remains the eternal Witness. But when he sees the other (bird), that is, God, and appreciates His glory, then the individual self becomes free of sorrow (vitasoka). Śaṅkara explains that this will happen if through accumulation of good karma he finds a kindly person who teaches him yoga.
4 (E522-523; T148-151). and takes to activities that are spiritual, Śaṅkara takes occasion to show that the text does not imply that knowledge of Brahman and action are to be practised together.
6 (E524; T153). . THIRD MUNDAKA, SECOND PART
3 (E527-528; T161-162). .
4 (E528; T162-163). .
5 (E528; T164). . What happens when such a one "enters Brahman"?
6 (E529; T165-166). .
7 (E529-530; T167-168). The karma that has not yet begun to operate, along with the self made of consciousness (vijnänamaya), all become unified in Brahman when the limiting adjunct is removed.
9 (E530-531; T169-170). . Objection: Everyone knows that there are many obstacles to achievement of the highest goal.
Work 12: Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 289–294 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 2,000 words
PRAaNOPANISADBHÄSYA Like the Mundaka this work belongs to the Atharva Veda; indeed, on Śaṅkara's interpretation it is parasitic upon the Mundaka. However, it is in prose rather than verse. 393-423. " 407-506. FIRST QUESTION Introduction (E393; T407-408). the Munclaka Upaniṣad? ).
1.16 (E398; T424-425). Śaṅkara explains that the higher way, or northern path, which is pure like the prāṇa or sun and not tainted with passion like the heaven of the moon, is followed by those who are without guile, in contrast to householders for whom crookedness is unavoidable because they are involved in many contradictory purposes characterizing worldly dealings (vyavahära).
IV.5 (E408-410; T456-461). Objection: The internal organ is an instrument (karana) of the one who experiences, that is, the self. Answer: There is no fault here. Objection: If the Self is conditioned by the internal organ during sleep Its self-illuminatingness will be sublated! Answer: You misunderstand the purport of scripture. Objection: But scripture tells us, for example, "in this (dream) state the Self is self-illuminating" (Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad IV.3.9), and on your view the statement is meaningless. Answer: Your idea is that the intent is that in sleep the Self is unconditioned, but of course there It is still associated with the nerves and heart.
VI.2 (E416-418; T482-491). Objection: Consciousness is not felt in deep sleep and so it changes like its objects. Answer: No, since knowledge illuminates its objects like light, its absence cannot be inferred in sleep any more than one can infer the absence of light from the absence of anything to be lighted up. Objection: The nihilist holds that there is no knowledge where there is no object. Answer: Then he should explain how he can know that that knowledge is absent without knowing something! Objection: The object is different from knowledge, but knowledge is not different from its object. Objection: Since there is no awareness (dariana) when there is no object, knowledge must be absent if there is no object present. Answer: No, since the nihilists admit the existence of knowledge in deep sleep. Answer: No, since the difference (between knowledge and objects of knowledge) is established. Answer: No, we don't accept that knowledge knows itself. Answer: That affects only the one who makes the wrong assumption. Answer: No, for the body, constituted by prāṇa, etc., Answer: But the seed it contains is not the same seed that produced the tree on which that mango grew. Answer: No, since on our view the creative agency is manifested through the presence or absence of adjuncts consisting of name-andform by means of ignorance. Sāṃkhya opponent: It is the property of mere consciousness (cinmätra), so that purusa can change internally as its experiences differ but does not become transformed into something different. Answer: That is a merely verbal distinction. Answer: That repudiates the Sāṃkhya theory that pradhäna acts for the benefit of purusa, since between two enjoyers there is no dominance and subordination, just as two lights cannot illuminate each other. Answer: Then purusa is not an enjoyer, only being reflected; nothing has affected it. Answer: No, since the question cannot arise.
Work 13: Bhagavadgītābhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 294–308 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 6,293 words
BHAG AVADGlTÄBHÄS YA We move now to works whose ascription to Śaṅkara has been questioned, beginning with the commentary on the famous epic poem, the Bhagavadgitä, most beloved of all classical literature to Indians far and wide. First, as to Śaṅkara's authorship of the work. The Bhagavadgitäbhäsya passes this test, Ingalls claims. Mayeda has examined the question of authenticity using Hacker's criteria and has concluded that there is no reason, on those criteria, to reject Śaṅkara's authorship.42 However, this is largely a matter of lack of evidence against, rather than positive evidence for. A second strand in discussions of this work concern Śaṅkara's success in interpreting the meaning of the Gitä. Introduction (El-2; Tl-6). When dharma gave way to adharma Visnu incarnated himself as Krsna and came on earth and taught Arjuna without any purpose of His own but merely to help people, whom He expected to heed His teachings. Śaṅkara finds that, despite previous commentaries, the meaning of the Gitä is difficult, and he proposes therefore to give a brief commentary (vivarana) on it. When practised in a spirit of devotion to God (tivara), without concern for results, it produces purity of mind sattvaêuddhi), and thus indirectly conduces also toward the supreme state.
11.10 (E8-12; T22-29). . Gitä 11.33, 11.47, IV. 15 are cited as examples of texts favoring this interpretation. Śaṅkara: No. Again, one might start an agnihotra, say, intending to get to heaven, but part way through attain Self-knowledge, though he continues the ritual it is no longer an action in the relevant sense. 15, III.20) that seem to counsel action, but these are easily explained: either they suggest that Janaka and the rest of the ancients acted even though they had knowledge, in which case their "acts" were merely for the edification of others and were not interested ones; or if they did not have Self-knowledge then their actions conduced to purity of mind and thus indirectly to the attainment of Self-knowledge.
11.16 (E14-15; T34-37). Objection: Then nothing at all exists! Answer: Not so. changes every moment and so shows those things to be unreal. Objection: When we have been conscious of a pot and it disappears, we fail to be conscious of pot, but we also fail to be conscious of existence, so it is equally unreal. Answer: You are still conscious of existence, only it is now resident in another qualificand, that is, the Self. Answer: Certainly not.
11.21 (E18-21; T43-48). . Objection: Knowledge too is meant for the unenlightened, since there would be no point in imparting it to one already knowing it. Objection: No one can know the Self as nonagent, immutable, etc., Objection: That passage does not indicate renunciation of all acts, since it teaches renouncing actions "by thought,'* so it does not teach renunciation of acts of speech and of the body, only of mental acts. Answer: No, since acts of speech and of the body depend on activity of the mind.
11.25 (E23; T51). . "
11.69 (E38-39; T77-79). . The duty of the enlightened man is to renounce. Objection: There is no impelling pramäna (pravartaka pramäna) to indicate that activity (of renunciation). Answer: There need be none. Introduction (E41-44; T82-89). But some (viz., This is inconsistent. But how can any sensible person accept such an ad hoc explanation? That would be too hard on him! Perhaps, then, the idea is that only householders, not samnyâsins-, can attain liberation, since the other äframas have nityakarmans to perform? Objection: Performance of nityakarmans is required, since omitting them will breed sin. Answer: No, since sin only occurs for those äframas prior to the fourth, the samriyäsin, stage; no one supposes that the samnyäsin who omits the worship of the sacred fire incurs sin as does the brahmacärin. Anyway, sin cannot arise from mere omission of action, for something cannot come out of nothing.
IV.11-14 (E64-66; T123-127). . These stanzas explain God's attitude toward man's deserts. Objection: Since You created the four castes You must be noneternal and bound by Your effects! Answer: No, it is only from the standpoint of māyā: in reality I am no agent and thus unbound.
IV.18 (E67-70; T128-134). . " Objector: But we never see action as anything else than action, so it is not a case of erroneous knowing. Answer: It is like the illusion we have, on board a ship, that the trees on the shore are moving when in fact they are stationary. Likewise, inaction, failure to act or cessation of activity, is also falsely attributed to one's Self; since the Self is unable to act It is likewise unable to cease acting. But this interpretation is wrong. For Krsna has just told us (IV.
IV.21 (E7L-72; T136-138). Objection: The question is irrelevant since Arjuna has already been told that pravrtti and nivrtti are required of distinct classes of people. Answer: Yes, from your point of view it is irrelevant, but from Arjuna's point of view it makes excellent sense, since he is asking which of the two he should follow, and both have been enjoined. Question: Are both samnyäsa and yoga quite impossible for one who knows the Self? Introduction (E97-99; T179-182). Objection: Why not continue to practice both? Answer: Because VI.3 divides yogins into two classes and advises action for only one of them. Answer: No, since the passage explicitly identifies the second class as persons who have attained to yoga. Opponent: Those actions, performed by the householder, have been offered to the Lord and therefore bring about no results other than liberation; failure in them surely leads to ruin. Answer: The description of dhyänayoga in VI. Opponent: But VI. Answer: That verse merely praises abandonment of expectation of fruits (phaläkämksäsamnyäsa), which is an external aid (hahiranga) to dhyänayoga.
XIII.2 (E189-197; T318-335). Answer: Both God and the individual selves appear to be samsärins subject to bondage due to adjuncts produced by avidyā. Objection: The analogy fails, since although pillar and man are both objects of consciousness and can be mistaken for one another, the body and consciousness are not both objects of consciousness. Answer: No, for then the knower would have all the attributes of the known and would, for example, become unconscious! Answer: No, since avidyā is produced out of tamas, from whence it gets its veiling capacity; it disappears upon illumination. Objection: Well, then, if there is neither samsara nor samsärin scripture serves no purpose. Answer: Yes, it has no purpose for the liberated self; but for those saddled with avidyā it has a purpose to serve. Answer: The Self cannot really have different states. Objection: Nevertheless a man, even though he knows the Self, may still think himself enjoined. Answer: No, he can only think so prior to Self-knowledge, which regularly follows observation of scriptural injunctions but does not precede it. Answer: For those who know about the Self through scripture but who do not yet directly know the Self in its essential nature. Answer: No, since very few attain Self-knowledge, and ignorant men do not necessarily emulate the wise. Answer: Then they are not really learned. Opponent: Whose is this avidyâ? ( Answer: Whoever sees it. Opponent: And who is that? Opponent: No, it is not like that; the cows and their owner are both objects of perception, but avidyâ and its owner are not both objects of perception. Answer: Well, apparently you know who the owner is! Opponent: If the Self cognizes avidyâ It is then tainted by it.
XIII.5-6 (E198-199; T337-339). . A variety of Särnkhya elements are distinguished in stanza 5, and certain psychological attributes in stanza 6. XIII.
12 (E202-203; T344-349). , The verse describes Brahman as "not said to be either existent nor nonexistent" (na sattannäsaducyate). Answer: No. Answer: Nor is it nonexistent, since it is not a content of cognition. Objection: Scripture is itself contradictory when it says this, as in other places. Answer: No, the other places you have in mind may be mere arthaväda passages of praise.
XIII.23 (E210-211; T362-365). . Answer: Deeds performed without desire and egotism are without karmic results, as the Lord has been saying. Opponent: All right, but that still leaves the results of previous acts to be worked off. XVIII.
48 (E276-278; T477-482). . Now the Sāṃkhya and buddhist philosophers cannot, because of their metaphysical views, allow that entire renunciation of actions is possible, so they should recommend without qualification giving up suadharma, and thus they would advise counter to the advice given here by the Lord. VaUesika: But our metaphysical theory does not have this difficulty. Sarnkara: This view is mistaken, since it allows that the nonexistent becomes existent, and the existent becomes nonexistent, which contradicts what Krsna has said (e.g., in 11.16). But then cannot an absence, like a hare's horn, come into existence, being a nonexistent just like your double atom prior to production? And if it can, why can it not relate to an absence? XVIII.
50 (E279-281; T484-489). . Objection: How is knowledge of the Self possible? Answer: Its form is extreme purity, extreme clarity, and extreme subtlety. Objection: The buddhi cannot grasp the Self since it is formless; therefore Self-knowledge is impossible. Answer: It is impossible for those not properly prepared; for those who have been properly prepared, it is impossible to see anything but the Self. So it is easy to have Self-knowledge. XVIII.
66 (E288-293; T499-516). . Objector: Liberation is gained by action only, since it (liberation) is eternal. Counter objection: But the results of past karma have not necessarily been worked off at the end of one's life; some have not at all started to work themselves out yet. Objectors reply: Either one works those effects out precisely in performing the nityakarmans, or else the nityakarman destroys past sins. but what you have to show is that they could constitute the working out of those results of past karma that have not started working themselves out yet. So one should infer that nityakarmans produce karmic effects quite as much as kämyakarmans, because they are alike in the relevant respects. Objection: It is not true that all actions involve confusion by avidyā. as the self in order to act, but this notion is not avidyā, it is merely figurative (gauna). avidyā, that is, false knowledge, occurs when we mistake a post for a man, etc, but here when we say "the body is the agent-self," etc., To say "Devadatta is a lion55 does not produce a lion, but merely extols Devadatta5s fierceness, etc. Objection: Scripture speaks this way about the self, so it must be really efficacious. Since it is evident to anyone that the notion of " I " applied to the body, etc., A hundred scriptural passages might say that fire is cold, but they would not make fire cold; rather, we should interpret the texts in some alternative manner. Objection: If actions require auidyä, then when avidyā ceases scripture, which enjoins acts, will be false. Answer: No, for it conveys true knowledge about the Self, about Brahman. Objection: If scripture concerning acts is no authority the same scripture concerning Self-knowledge is no authority either. Answer: No, since nothing can remove true Self-knowledge. Samsara itself, then, being a product of avidyâ, it is right to say that it ceases upon true knowledge.
Work 14: Māṇḍūkyopaniṣadbhāṣya and Gauḍapādakārikābhāṣya
Potter, printed pp. 308–317 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 3,502 words
MÄNDÜKYOPANISADBHÄSYA with GAUDAPÄDAKÄRIKÄBHÄSYA or ÄGAMAaÄSTRAVIVARAl^A A number of scholars have doubted that this commentary is the work of the author of the Brahmasūtrabhäsya, beginning at least with Jacobi,45 and including such stalwarts as Suryanarayana Sastri,46 Belvalkar,47 and de Smet.48 Others have suggested that if this is the master's work it is flawed by youthful ineptness. Vetter,52 Hacker,53 and Mayeda54 all utilize Hacker's criteria. Hacker also finds in this commentary "two elements of a pre-illusionistic Vedānta tradition. "55 The idea is found in other places in Sarnkara's corpus as well, Hacker argues. Most of them turn on this author's apparently inadequate knowledge of buddhism, as contrasted with the thorough understanding displayed by the author of the Brahmas ütrabhäsy a. Mayeda thinks that the author of this commentary intentionally misinterprets buddhist terms so as to give Advaita readings to the passages on which he comments, but that he needed to know buddhism to do that. the väkya commentary on the Kena?) COMMENTARY ON MÄ^DÜKYA UPANISAD 1-6 Introduction (E424-425; T2-3). The first prakarana (i.e., Book One) explains the word "aum" as conducive to Self-knowledge and deals with scripture. The second prakarana shows the unreality of duality on the analogy of the rope-snake. The third shows the reality of nonduality by reasoning. The fourth prakarana adduces and refutes those systems that hold views conflicting with Advaita.
1 (E425-426; T3-5). . Now how can "aum" help achieve Selfknowledge? Thus aum is the Self, being the word for Self.
2 (E426; T5-6). .
3 (E426-427; T6-8). Question: Since the point is to describe the inner Self (pratyagätman) why has the text wandered into describing it in terms of external things? Answer: The whole universe, both inner and outer, is described in these passages, the difference being merely verbal.
4 (E427; T9-10). .
5 (E427-428; T10-12). .
6 (E428; T12). .
1-5 (E429-431; T13-17). .
2. kārikās 6-9 (E431-432; T17-19). . The first part of kārikā 7 ("creation through expansion of the self") is explained by Śaṅkara as meaning that some hold that God flows (srsfi) into creation. COMMENTARY ON MÄNDÜKYOPANISAD 7
3 (E432-434; T20-25). . The text deals with the "fourth" (turiya), the fourth part oî"aum." It is the Self Itself. The fourth is not mere absence either, though it can only be described by negative terms. COMMENTARY ON GAUDAPÄDAKÄRIKÄS 10-18 4. kārikā
11 (E435; T27). . " Vüva and taijasa can be both causes and effects." kārikā
12 (E435; T27). . "
8-11 (E437-438; T30-33). .
23 (E439; T34). . COMMENTARY ON MÄNPÜKYOPANISAD
12 (E439-440; T34-35). .
6. kārikās 1-3 (E441-442; T37-39). . That is, since an elephant can be seen in a dream but obviously cannot really be inside the body, it must be unreal. 7. kārikā
4 (E442; T40). . E443-444; T40-43). Objection: The argument is incorrect, for things seen in the waking state, like food and drink, are used to assuage hunger and thirst, whereas dream objects do not do so. Answer: No! kārikā 8. Śaṅkara understands this stanza as answering an objector who argues that the example in the above inference, that is, things seen in dream, is fallacious because "unestablished" (asiddka). 9.
13 (E445; T44). .
32 (E449-450; T51-54). . " Objection: If so, scripture should teach the absence of duality, not nonduality, for they are opposed. Answer: No, since a snake, despite its opposition to the rope, nevertheless seems to exist there. Answer: All duality is merely superimposed by avidyā on the Self through judgments like "I am happy," "this is mine," etc. Objector: Then since the Self's nature is evident, what role is there for scripture? the characterlessness of the pure Self. kārikā
36 (E451; T56). . "
37 (E451-452; T57). .
1 (E452-453; T58-59). .
2 (E453; T60). .
5 (E454-455; T62-64). Objection by the Sâmkhya): But you believe (wrongly) that there is only one Self and so cannot maintain the above thesis. Answer: We do believe there is only one Self. Answer: But you do not believe that prakrti and purusa are related in an inseparable manner; indeed, the purusas are viewed as ever free, and it is only the buddhis, aspects of prakrti, that are subject to bondage or liberation. The Vaisesikas, to be sure, do maintain that desire, etc., Anyway, qualities (guna) such as desire cannot be inseparably related to a substance such as a self, since qualities are evanescent, whereas the self is permanent.
7 (E456; T65). .
18 (E460-461; T73). Śaṅkara says that there is no conflict between the Advaitin and the dualist, any more than there is conflict between a man seated on an elephant and a madman on the ground who thinks he is on another elephant and riding against him.
42 (E439; T89). .
44 (E439; T90). .
1 (E471; T92-93 ). . This book is intended to show the mutual inconsistencies of the other systems and thus demonstrate their falsity.
3 (E472; T94-95). .
9 (E473; T96-97). .
10 (E473; T97). .
19 (E475; T100-101 ). .
20 (E476; T103-104). Actually the fallacy has more to do with an example (drftänta) that allegedly supports the inference but does not really do so, since it is not evident that the series of seeds and sprouts is itself beginningless, for seeds require causes; so do sprouts, and as for the series, since it is a thing (or considered as one) it too requires a cause, and so forth.
22 (E476-477; T103-104). For example, the following: if* is by its own nature existent, it can never become existent, and if it is both existent and nonexistent by nature nothing will be produced since its contradictory nature precludes that.
25 (E478; T105-106). . Thus the "cause" is "no cause," as the stanza puts it. kārikā
28 (E479; T107-108). This section, proving the illusoriness of external objects, consists of Vijfiänaväda arguments. But in this stanza those arguments are turned against the Vijnânavädin's conclusion.
41 (E482; T113). .
83 (E491; T128). .
87-88 (E492-493; T130-131). .
90 (E493-494; T132). . But none are real things. kārikā
99 (E496; T136). .
Work 15: Dakṣiṇāmūrtistotra
Potter, printed pp. 317–318 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 533 words
DAKSINÄMÜRTISTOTRA This brief hymn stotra) is held traditionally to have been commented on by Sureśvara in the Mänasolläsa.
1 (ET 5). The hymn is addressed to the south-facing Lord (daksinämürti), incarnate in the guru, who by māyā as in a dream sees the universe, which exists within Him like a city in a mirror, as manifested outside, but who when awake sees only His own, nondual Self.
2 (ET 7). Respect is paid to the south-facing Lord who, like a magician or a yogi, makes manifest the universe by His own will, the universe, which is in the beginning undifferentiated like a sprout in its seed, but which becomes differentiated into spatial and temporal states when imagined under the influence of māyā.
3 (ET 9-10). To that south-facing Lord whose light, the nature of existence, illuminates objects that are as if nonexistent, who causes those who resort to Him to understand (the Self) directly through the Vedic text "that art thou," on the direct understanding of whom there will be no returning to this ocean of transmigration.
4 (ET 11-12). To that south-facing Lord whose consciousness moves out through the visual and other organs like the light of a great lamp set in the belly of a pot with many holes, so that the whole universe shines because He shines in the awareness "I know."
5 (ET 13-Î4). .
6 (ET 15-16). .
7 (ET 17). .
8 (ET 19). .
9 (ET 20-21). .
10 (ET 22-23). , By hearing, reflecting, and meditating on the universe's being completely Self, and by reciting it, one will naturally attain Lordship (iivaratva) along with the supreme splendor of the universal Self, and will achieve unimpeded.
Work 16: Pañcīkaraṇa
Potter, printed pp. 318–320 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 521 words
Belvalkar believes this small treatise is properly ascribed to Śaṅkara, arguing on the ground of a traditional line of commentaries on it beginning with Sureśvara.
1 (ET 1-2). . Xms *s the gross body of the Self. These three (viräj, jägarita, and viéva) are together represented by the letter a in "aum"
2 (ET 2-3). .
3 (ET 3-4). . The three (subtle body, dream state, and taijasa) are represented by u in ciaum."
4 (ET 4-5). . This is the causal body of the Self. 5 ( ET 5-6). The Self conceived as these two (viz., deep sleep and the causal body or nonknowledge) is called "prâjna." The three (viz., nonknowledge, deep sleep, and präjna) are represented by the letter m in iCaum"
6 (ET 6-7). . I am the highest bliss, one without a second, the inner consciousness. This remaining in a state of nondifference is what is called "samädhi." 7 ( ET 8-9). ( APAROKSÄNUBHÜTI
Work 17: Aparokṣānubhūti
Potter, printed pp. 320–323 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 1,297 words
Belvalkar is inclined to regard this work as having "a fairly satisfactory claim to Śaṅkara's authorship" since it is ' 'honored by many commentaries."
2 (ET 39). .
3 (ET 39). .
4 (ET 40 ). .
5 (ET 40 ). .
6 (ET 40). .
7 (ET 40-41). .
8 (ET 41). .
9 (ET 41 ). .
10 (ET 41-42). .
11 (ET 42). .
12-16 (ET 42-43). .
17-21 (ET 44-45). .
22-40 (ET 45-51 ). .
41 (ET 51). .
42 (ET 51 ). .
43-46 (ET 52-53 ). .
47-55 (ET 53-55). .
56-86 (ET 56-65). . (63) waves of water, vessels of copper; (77) yellow seen by a jaundiced man; (80) big things seem small when far away; (81) small things seem big when close up; (84) apparent movement of the moon when clouds are moving; (85) motions perceived by one in a faint.
87-89 (ET 65-66). .
90 (ET 66). .
91 (ET 66-67). .
92 (ET 67). .
93 (ET 67). .
98 (ET 69). .
100-103 (ET 70-71). Here is a fifteen-step process of meditation leading to liberation, consisting of (1) forbearance (yama), (2) observance (niyama), (3) renunciation (tyäga), (4) silence (mauna), (5) place deia), (6) time (käla), (7) posture (äsana), (8) subduing the root (mülabandha), (9) equilibrium of the body (dehasämya), (10) fixed vision (drksthiti), (11) breath control (pränäyäma), (12) withdrawal of the senses (pratyähära), (13) attention (dhäranä), (14) contemplation (dhyäna), (15) samädhi,
107-109 (ET 72-73). . "
110 (ET 73). . * '
111 (ET 73). . "
112-113 (ET 74). . "
114 (ET 74). . "
115 (ET 75). .
116-117 (ET 75). .
118-120 (ET 76). .
124-126 (ET 77-78). Then one is a siddha and king of yogis (yogiräj), though the real nature of samädhi cannot be reached by word or thought.
127-128 (ET 78-79). .
129 (ET 79). .
130-134 (ET 79-80). They become identical with eternal Brahman, as âaunaka, âuka, and others have, whereas the others, clever in their talk and swayed by passion, merely fight about words and transmigrate over and over.
135-142 (ET 81-83). .
143-144 (ET 83-84). But those whose internal organ is ripe will easily and quickly reach perfection by practising the above yoga alone with faith in their teacher and in God.
Work 18: Ātmabodha
Potter, printed pp. 323–324 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 556 words
ÄTMABODHA This is a very popular short treatise that has been commented on by a number of Advaita luminaries.
1 (ET3). .
2 (ET 4-6). .
3 (ET 9-10). .
5 (ET 14-15). .
6-8 (ET 16-19). .
9 (ET 20). .
11 (ET 23). .
12-14 (ET 24-29). .
15-16 (ET 31-36). .
17 (ET 40). .
25 (ET 54). .
42 (ET 81-82). .
43-44 (ET 83-85). . The Self always exists but seems not to because of avidyā.
49-53 (ET 93-102). . Knowing everything he can move about like a deluded person but unattached. When the adjuncts are (eventually) destroyed the sage (muni) merges into Visnu.
58 (ET 107). .
59 (ET 108-109). .
63 (ET 114-115). .
Work 19: Śataślokī
Potter, printed pp. 324–325 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 342 words
The &ataèloki, consisting of one hundred stanzas, is "remarkable for the easy familiarity with which it marshalls forth Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts in support of Advaitic conclusions".65 Belvalkar regards it as probably Śaṅkara's.
1-2 (ET 85-86). .
3 (ET 86-87). .
4-13 (ET 87-93). .
14 (ET 93-94). .
14-21 (ET 93-99). .
22-25 (ET 99-102). .
26-32 (ET 102-106). .
33-38 (ET 107-111). .
42 (ET 113). . Practice is of two kinds, bodily, including postures., etc., and the other, equivalent to the discipline of knowledge, which involves abstention (uparati).
43-46 (ET 114-116). .
47-49 (ET 117-118). .
50-54 (ET 119-122). .
75-82 (ET 136-141). .
83-86 (ET 141-144). .
87-90 (ET 144-147). .
91-101 (ET 147-154). .
Work 20: Ātmajñānopadeśavidhi / Bālabodhinī
Potter, printed pp. 326–328 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 1,036 words
ÄTMAjSÄNOPADEaAVIDHI or PRAKARANAor BÄLABODHINI or ÄTMAVIDYOPADESA Belvalkar classes this as a work which is "usually, but not convincingly, supposed to belong to Śaṅkara's authorship.
1.2 (ET 2). .
1.3-6 (ET 2-5). .
1.7-9 (ET 7-8). .
1.10 (ET 8). .
1.11 (ET 8). .
1.12-14 (ET 8-10). .
1.15 (ET 8-10). . Objection: prāṇa appears to be without consciousness in deep sleep because the sense organs have temporarily stopped functioning, not because it is not conscious.
1.16-17 (ET 11-12). When the results of that karma haye been exhausted the jiva draws in all the organs of object consciousness (visayavijnäna) produced from connection with its adjunct, buddhi, and then experiences dream or deep sleep.
1.18-20 (ET 13-14). .
21 (ET 15). .
1.22-24 (ET 15-16). .
1.25 (ET 17). .
II.2 (ET 20-21). .
II.3-7 (ET 21-25). . Objection: The Self cannot be properly called a "seer," for the act of seeing involves subject, object, desire, or aversion.
II.8 (ET 25). .
II.9-11 (ET 25-27). . Answer: As for the last point, a relation between them (Self and buddhi) is possible since they are both subtle, transparent (svaccha), and partless.
11.12 (ET 27-29). . So only the ignorant impute agency to the Self, agency in an act of knowing; It does not know in that way.
11.13-18 (ET 30-32). .
11.19 (ET 32-33). .
11.20 (ET 32-33). .
11.21-22 (ET 33-34). .
1-9 (ET 35-45). .
IV.1-6 (ET 46-48). . The Self is thus not these states but the fourth (turiya), consciousness only.
IV.8 (ET 49-51). .
9 (ET 49-51). .
10 (ET 52-53). . Who would be the pramätr, the one who uses the pramäna? Objection: The Self is proved by scripture (ägama). Answer: No, not even by it.
Work 21: Ātmanātmaviveka
Potter, printed pp. 328–331 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 1,267 words
ĀTMANÄTMAVIVEKA The ātmanätmaviveka is another spurious work, not specifically mentioned by Belvalkar or Hacker. " 405-414. "
1-2 (E405; T34). .
3-10 (E405-406; T34-35). . Ajnäna is not produced by anything, being the beginningless mixture of sat and asat. This nonknowledge will not cease until the unity of the Self with Brahman leads to cessation of avidyā.
11 (E406; T35-36). .
12 (E406; T36). . Who are ready for such discussion? and desire for liberation. as one has against vomited food, and this should extend to the higher spheres from heaven to the Brahmaloka.
12-16 (E406-407; T37). .
17-18 (E407-408; T37). . Uparati is refraining from actions prescribed in scripture. considers things capable of producing impressions (väsanä) but finding faults in them returns to the samädhi involved in listening, etc. Sraddhä is faith in the guru and in the Vedantic sentences.
18-20 (E408; T37-38). .
21 (E408; T38). .
22 (E408; T38). .
23 (E408-409; T38-39). .
24 (E409-410; T39-40). Each organ is explained. Väc (the action organ of "speech" ) is explained as something other than speech but in which speech is located and which itself occurs in eight places, that is, breast, throat, head, upper and lower lips, palate, tongue, and the muscle that binds the lower jaw to the tongue. Their functions are (respectively?) the.same") and vyäna circulates within the body.
25-28 (E410-411; T41). . These prāṇas have five more upavâyus, that is, näga (vomiting), kürma (opening the eyes), krkara (appetite), devadatta (yawning), and dhananjaya (digestion or nourishment). Collectively all this is called the subtle body (lingafarira; the etymology is explained).
29-31 (E411-412; T41-42). . All three bodies, constituting the not-Self, are impermanent (anrta), nonconscious (jada), and by nature frustrating (duhkhätmaka). The three states (of which the Self is witness ) are waking, dream, and dreamless sleep.
37 (E412-413; T43-44). . The five sheaths are named. The third sheath is manomaya, which makes the Self appear to perceive, doubt, suffer, etc., because it consists of the five organs of sense combined with the internal organ.
37-38 (E413; T44). . The vijnänamaya sheath is the five sense organs combined with the buddhi. thus showing the Self, which lacks desires, enjoyments, pleasure, and joy, as having these experiences.
39-41 (E413-414; T44-45). .
Work 22: Tattvabodha
Potter, printed pp. 331–333 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 540 words
TATTVABODHA This work is regarded as spurious by Belvalkar.69 "ET" refers to the edition and translation by L. Simha (Sialkot, 1877).
1 (ET 1 ). .
2-9 (ET 1-3). .
10-28 (ET 3-9). .
29-33 (ET 9-11). Quintuplication is explained as (1) dividing the tamasic nature of each element into two; (2) dividing one of the two halves into four equal parts; (3) combining the undivided half of each element with oneeighth of each one of the other four elements.
34 (ET 11). .
35 (ET 12). .
36 (ET 12). .
37-39 (ET 12-13). Answer: Because the literal meaning (väcyärtha) of "thou" involves the conception of a gross and/or subtle body, but its secondary or implied meaning (laksyärtha) is of pure consciousness, free from limitations.
40 (ET 13). .
41-46 (ET 14-15). . Three kinds of karma are explained. In addition, those who worship, serve, and praise a knower get -his meritorious karma, whereas those who blame or hate him and do him injury get his bad ägamin karma.
47 (ET 15). .
Work 23: Daśaślokī
Potter, printed pp. 333–334 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 414 words
The Basas*loki is a hymn attributed to Śaṅkara.
1 (ET 1). .
2 (ET 6-7). . The one remaining, isolate, bliss, that I am.
3 (ET 9-10). .
4 (ET 12-13). .
5 (ET 17-18). .
6 (ET 19). .
7 (ET 21). . (
8 (ET 23). .
9 (ET 26). .
10 (ET 28). . (
Work 24: Vākyavṛtti
Potter, printed pp. 334–335 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 567 words
VÄKYAVRTTI Traditionally ascribed to Sarnkara, this is a work dealing with the interpretation of "that art thou" and making use of the form of teacher-pupil exchange so tellingly utilized by Śaṅkara in the Upadeiasähasri.
1-2 (ET 2-3). .
3-4 (ET 3-4). .
5-6 (ET 5-6). .
7 (ET 6-7). .
8 (ET 7). .
9 (ET 7-8). .
10-27 (ET 8-19). You must understand that the Seif is not the body but the Witness of the nature of reality, consciousness, and bliss. No more are you the sense organs, the internal organ, the huddhi or prāṇa.
28-36 (ET 20-25). .
37-48 (ET 26-34). . Now as to the meaning of the whole sentence "that art thou." This meaning is not to be understood as relational sarnsarga) or qualificationai viH$ia)> but rather as partless (akhan^a) single essence (rasa) only. The two words mean precisely the same thing. Thus one can make sense of the sentence.
49-53 (ET 35-38). When karma not yet arisen (anärabdha) is thus destroyed, one yet remains, because of prärabdha karma, liberated in life (jivanmukta) for some time, until he comes to isolation (kaivalya), from which there is no return, which is the highest abode of Visnu.
Work 25: Vivekacūḍāmaṇi
Potter, printed pp. 335–339 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 1,421 words
VIVEKACÜDÄMANI This is a sizable work, extremely popular among Advaita adepts. Ingalls argues that it is not genuine Śaṅkara since it propounds theories not found in Śaṅkara's unquestioned works. Śaṅkara may liken the two to each other, but he is careful to distinguish them.
1 (ET 1). .
2-13 (ET 2-6). Three things require God's grace, a human birth, desire for liberation, and the case of a perfected person. Only Self-knowledge can yield liberation. Actions cannot do so; at best they can yield purity of citta.
14-27 (ET 6-10). .
28-30 (ET 10-11). . If they remain languid, however, the various practices are merely appearances.
31-32 (ET 11-12). .
32-40 (ET 11-15). .
41-47 (ET 15-18). .
48-49 (ET 18-19). .
50-68 (ET 19-25). .
69-70 (ET 25-26). . This leads to the supreme nirvikalpa state, that is, jivanmukti*
71 -92 (ET 26-34 ). .
93-107 (ET 34-39). .
108-123 (ET 40-46). Saltua, finally, is clear as water but in conjunction with the others conduces to transmigration until it is purified. The properties of pure sattva are peace, bliss, selfrealization, etc. Another name for avidyā is the undifferentiated (avyakta), the causal body, whose special state is deep sleep.
124-135 (ET 46-51). .
136-168 (ET 52-66). .
169-171 (ET 67-68). .
172-183 (ET 68-73). .
184-191 (ET 73-76). . It is also called the jiva. It is a limitation of the Highest Self, which shines within and appears to act and experience through that limitation.
192-193 (ET 76-77). .
194-211 (ET 77-84). . Teacher: Good question! But it is not the Highest Self either, since it changes, is a modification of prakrti, is the effect of past acts. So all five sheaths must be eliminated by reasoning on the basis of scripture.
212 (ET 84). .
213-240 (ET 85-95). Now the Upaniṣads assure us that all the things in the universe are effects whose cause is Brahman; therefore since effects are identical with their causes, it follows that everything is Brahman, and since the Self is Brahman, that the Self is the one positive, real thing, the only existent, the only consciousness, the only bliss.
241-249 (ET 96-100). .
250-264 (ET 100-106). .
265-267 (ET 106-107). .
268-444 (ET 108-172). .
445-463 (ET 172-179). . Scripture speaks of prärabdhakarman only to answer ignorant questions about how the body continues to exist after Self-realization, but one cannot infer the reality of the body of the Self-knower from that.
464-580 (ET 179-223). .
Work 26: Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṃgraha
Potter, printed pp. 339–343 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 1,772 words
Belvalkar finds this work "nongenuine.
1-4 (El; Tl-2). .
5-15 (El-3; T2-3). . The proof of this identity provides the relevance. And its purpose is liberation.
16-47 (E3-7; T3-10). .
48-49 (E7-14; T10-17). .
95-103 (E24-25; T17-19). . 3) When the internal organ abandons objects and devotes itself to scripture, that is the other (third ) peace, which is sattva mixed (with other qualities).
104-150 (E15-21; T19-27). .
151-209 (E21-29; T27-38). . Renunciation (uparati) is the abandoning of all actions. The paths of action and of karma are incompatible.
210-217 (E29-30; T38-40 ). Faith in the guru and in the Upaniṣads leads to liberation. The guru, being one with God, is also trustworthy.
218-225 (E30-31; T40-41). .
226-296 (E32-43; T41-53). . Desire for liberation (mumuksutva) has four forms. ( desires to leave his family. ( First I shall enjoy the world." ( A brief dialogue between an aspirant and his guru is provided.
297-309 (E43-45; T53-55). . avidyā is its cause; it neither is nor is not but is anirväcya. Its collective aspect, dominated by sattva, is known as māyā.
310-315 (E45; T55-56). .
316-326. (E46-47; T56-58). . Thus the distributive aspect is inferior to the collective one. Präjna is blissful in nature, as everyone knows upon waking up; since bliss is common to all, there is no real difference between God and präjna, the collective and distributive aspects of avidyā, at that stage.
330-333 (E47-48; T59-60). .
338-341 (E48-49; T60-61). .
342-349 (E49-50; T61-63). . The buddhi is the agent, and the manas is its instrument. The self that through delusion identifies with them is subject to transmigration.
350-354 (E50-51; T63-64). .
355-374 (E51-54; T64-68). .
375-408 (E54-58; T68-73). . These are explained. How the gross elements arise from their subtle origins is explained.
409-416 (E59; T74-75). .
416-429 (E59-61; T75-77). .
430-433 (E62; T78). .
434-456 (E62-65; T78-82). .
457-509 (E65-73; T83-94). .
510-519 (E73-74; T94-95 ). .
520-580 (E75-82; T95-108). Refutation of false views about the nature of the Self, (1) that one's son is one's Self (i.e., that one's welfare lies in one's children); (2) that the senses are the Self; (3) that prāṇa is the Self; (4) that the internal organ (manas) is the Self; (5) that knowledge and ignorance are both properties of the Self; (6) that the Self is void (sünya).
581-611 (E82-87; T108-114). . Refutation of sünyaväda. ( 3) No proof is required of the Self, It is instinctively known to all.
612-631 (E87-90; Tl 15-119). .
632-634 (E90-91; T119). .
635-672 (E51-56; T120-126). . Teacher: Because people do not know the nature of their Self and so suppose that the sources of pleasure lie in external objects. But it is clear also that it is not an intrinsic property of the manas either, since it does not always accompany activities of that organ.
673-699 (E96-100; T126-132). .
700-792 (E100-113; T132-150). . "
793-794 (El 14; T150-151). .
795-818 (E114-117; T151-156). . And the question of samädhi comes up in connection with this meditation.
819-898 (El 17-129; T156-171). . and one's Self until one merges all objects of knowledge into Self-consciousness. The former proceeds through meditation on the words of scripture.
899-921 (E129-132; T171-176). .
922-923 (El33; T176). .
924-937 (E133-135; T176-179). .
938-1006 (E135-144; Tl 79-191). . Teacher: There are seven stages of knowledge (jnänabhümi): (1) the desire to know; (2) inquiry vicarana) \ (3) attenuation of mental attachment (?) ( This is jivanmukti. ADVAITAPANCARATNA or ÄTMAPAfiCAKA
Work 27: Advaitapañcaratna / Ātmapañcaka
Potter, printed pp. 343–344 · Study by K. Raghavan Pillai · Source 428 words
Belvalkar does not notice this work. 241-242, which is also found in Prabuddha Bharata 56 (1951), pp. 301-305.
1 (E4; T241). . This must be done at appropriate times. Perform the action enjoined by the Veda properly. Endeavor toward the realization of the Self. Leave the home.
2 (E9; T241). . Intensify your devotion to the all-powerful God. Seek after the one and imperishable Brahman. Listen to the declarations of the Upaniṣads.
3 (E15; T241). . Accept logic that is not antagonistic to the scripture.) Constantly dwell on the idea "I am Brahman." Give up arguing with the wise.
4 (E20; T241). Do not try to procure tasty food. Be neither kind nor cruel to people. Do not speak futile words (i.e., words that do not contribute towards liberation).
5 (E23; T242). Understand the omnipresent Self and see this phenomenal world as sublated by the true knowledge of Brahman. And then stay firmly established solely in Brahman.
Work 28: Vākyaśudhā / Dṛgdṛśyaviveka
Potter, printed pp. 344 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 67 words
It is however printed in Minor Works of Śaṅkara (H. R. Bhagavat, ed.), and comprises forty-six verses.
Work 29: Upadeśapañcaka
Potter, printed pp. 344 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 13 words
UPADEâAPAftCAKA This work is comprised of five stanzas beginning with "Vedo nityam adhiyatäm."
Work 30: Māyāpañcaka
Potter, printed pp. 344–345 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 35 words
MĀYĀPANCAKA This consists of five stanzas describing māyā as "skilled in associating the dissociate" (Pisharoti's translation of aghafitaghatanapatiyasi mâyâ), that is, as that which maintains an apparent connection between things that are really unconnected.
Work 31: Laghuvākyavṛtti
Potter, printed pp. 345 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 18 words
Eighteen verses on Advaita themes.
Work 32: Commentaries on Other Upaniṣads
Potter, printed pp. 345 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 33 words
There are commentaries on various Upaniṣads, notably the Svetäêvatara, Nrsirrihottaratäpaniya, and Kausitaki Upani$ads, which appear to be erroneously ascribed to Śaṅkara.
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Maṇḍana Miśra
The Brahmasiddhi examines the role of sentences, reasoning, injunction, and realization through four large divisions.
The power and limitation of injunction remain live issues for Maṇḍana.
Brahman and language → Reason → Injunction → Meditation → Realization
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Brahmakāṇḍa | Self and language: Text as means of knowledge |
| Tarkakāṇḍa | Reasoning and difference: Testing rivals |
| Niyogakāṇḍa | Injunction and practice: Can knowledge be commanded? |
| Siddhi | Attainment: Nature of realization |
Maṇḍana Miśra: historical introduction
Potter, printed pp. 346–347 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 684 words
Traditionally, Mandana Misra was supposed to be both the pupil and the brother-in-law of Kumärila. Thus, Thrasher concludes, Mandana must have lived around A.D. 660-720.3
Tradition also makes Mandana a contemporary of Śaṅkara. that something unreal can lead to a real result; that the jiva really is Brahman, but appears to be divided from it by false knowledge and by limiting adjuncts...."4 One might retort that this suggests that Śaṅkara got his ideas from Mandana. Prima facie, I do not find this very plausible...."5
Rather, Thrasher is inclined to accept Advaita tradition, which makes Mandana and Śaṅkara contemporaries, Mandana perhaps the older of the two.
the Brahmasiddhi. Kuppuswami Sastri and Vetter have noted at least one of these (32.13-34.23).6
Advaita tradition goes further still, in that it identifies Mandana with Śaṅkara's pupil Sureśvara. This has given rise to lengthy scholarly debate, which still goes on. There is plenty of reason to conclude that Sureśvara knows of Mandana's work.
Others, however, most recently R. Balasubramaniam,13 have pointed to the close similarity in thought and style between Brahmasiddhi 1.28-31 and Sambandhavärttika 342-350 and 377-436. Thrasher has also discussed the issues raised by this and concludes that in the Brahmasiddhi Mandana accepts both theories, applying them to explain different things.14 If he is right, it suggests that Mandana was not an Advaitin when he wrote the Vibhramaviveka.
Work 33: Brahmasiddhi
Potter, printed pp. 347–419 · Study by Allen W. Thrasher · Source 31,548 words
"E" refers to the edition by S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Madras Government Oriental Series 4 (Madras: Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Î937). (
1 (El). . If it is not, one cannot grasp its connection with the word that names it, and if therefore it is not the object of a word (padärtha), it cannot be the topic vis ay a) of a sentence (väkya). Besides, the Upaniṣadic texts have no reference to action (pravrtti) or to abstention from action nivrtti), and therefore are not an end of man purusärtha) (and consequently, it would appear, not a.pramäna). (
1.2 (El-2). . ( Discussion of "bliss") Objection: Brahman cannot be of the nature of bliss because, if It were, the activity of a person desiring liberation would be derived from a passion (räga) for bliss. But activity based on passion is the seed of samsara and so cannot result in liberation. Answer: No, bliss (or pleasure) is not merely the cessation of frustration. Also, there is a difference of degree in pleasures, but none in the cessation of frustration.
1.3 (E2-3). . Objection: Pleasure is produced by the removal of a desire (käma), which (if unfulfilled) is frustrating. Answer: No, we observe that people indifferent to a thing still may enjoy it when it is experienced. For enjoyment does not necessarily extinguish desire. In addition, sometimes the enjoyment of desired objects produces not pleasure, but frustration. This is how the word "bliss" should be taken where it occurs in the Upaniṣads with reference to Brahman, because) something for which the Vedic word Jsabda) is the only pramäna should be understood in accordance with the word.
1.4 (E3-). . Passion is an insistence (abhiniveia) of nonexistent qualities (guna) projected by avidyā. If all desire were forbidden by scripture, no activity would be possible, including activity for liberation.
1.5 (E3-4). . Objection: If bliss is the experienceable in Brahman, then there will be the duality of agent (kartr) and object (karman) of action, and consequently also of action (kriyä) and means (karana). But if it is not experienceable, it is as good as nonexistent, and cannot be an end of man (purusärtha). It is experienceable as being self-luminous (svaprakäsaka).
1.6 (E4-6). . Opponent: Properties (dharma) are of two sorts, positive (bhävarüpa) and negative (abhävarüpa). Thus there would be duality. Therefore, the word "bliss" in reference to Brahman means only the absence of pain, just as scripture calls Brahman "not coarse, not fine, not long", etc. ( This is so by limitation (avaccheda) of its bliss. Bliss is experienced (anubhava) in deep sleep, as we know from our reflection paramarra) upon waking that we slept well, and from scripture.
1.7 (E6). . ( Answer: No. Scripture clearly teaches the real nonexistence of all diversity, and that diversity is based on māyā. We can only attribute to scripture the employment of secondary usage when there is a reason for it, and there is none visible here. Besides, scripture emphasizes the point by repetition.
1.8 (E7-8). . Besides, imagined differences can produce real effects, death from an imaginary snakebite, illumination from a reflected sun. Answer to (3) and (4): The seer (draft?) The various suggested alternatives do not stand examination. Therefore the seer transforms (parinäma) itself into, or appears (vivartana) in this or that way.
1.9 (E8-9). . ( But we say that the thing to be removed is beginningless avidyā. For all doctrines believe there is a beginningless avidyā to be destroyed. It is just for this reason that it is called avidyā, māyā, "false appearance." Not being absolutely real, it can be destroyed; thus providing something to be removed. Likewise, it does not introduce a second thing different from Brahman.
1.11 (E10-11). Not to Brahman, because Brahman is knowledge (vidyä) itself and therefore is void of false imagination (kalpanä-eünya). Nor are painters cruel or unjust because of the difference between intact and mutilated people in paintings. Anyway, rewards differ in accordance with works. Brahman does not cease to be a Lord (i.e., It does not become dependent) in doing so, because a Lord who gives different rewards in accordance with different service is still a Lord. It can nevertheless be destroyed, because, first, the texts that teach the means to its destruction would otherwise be purposeless, and second, other beginningless things can be destroyed, as (on the NyäyaVaisesika view) the beginningiess black color of atoms of earth is destroyed by baking a pot. Knowledge (vidyä), though eternal in Brahman, is adventitious in the jivas. If avidyā belonged to Brahman, Brahman would be the transmigrant, and when it was released all would be released at once, which is absurd.
1.13 (El2-14). . Thus we may interpret lêâ Upaniṣad 11: "Grossing over death by avidyā, by vidyä one obtains immortality." Therefore the highest light alone appears in this or that way, only bound up with avidyā. Objection: Hearing, reflection, and meditation based on difference, which is unreal, are also unreal, and so how can they exist, and to what effect? ( Answer: Unreal things may have real effects. Objection: In their own form these things are real, not void. But in your doctrine the means to the knowledge of Brahman are unreal in their own form. Answer: In the examples, the things are unreal in the form in which they communicate (pratipädika). Moreover, the means to the knowledge of Brahman are not unreal in their own form, because their own form is Brahman. Therefore Brahman itself, as bound up with avidyā, is the means for obtaining Brahman.
1.14 (E14-15). . Objection: The stream is neither absolutely unreal nor absolutely real; it is real by imagination (kalpanä). Answer: Then it is something imagined that transmigrates and is released, and the transmigration and release of something imagined must themselves be imaginary. Why don't you agree with this when we say it? If it doesn't, it is nonexistent, because it has no effect, which on your theory means it is powerless and therefore nonexistent. But if this moment is nonexistent, the previous moment is nonexistent by the same reasoning, and so on back ad infinitum.
1.15 (E15-16). . For this state (of abiding in its ownform) may fitly be called "Brahman," because itis "great" (brhati). Moreover, it is illogical to say that in liberation the self is cognition but does not cognize anything, because the verb "cognize" requires an object. Answer: To this the verse says "cognition." Scripture says that the Self is cognition. Objection: People are observed to desire their own destruction, because it may end various frustrations. Answer: This does happen in those for whom every pleasure has been extinguished by grievous illness. But transmigrating beings are not in this situation, because they experience manifold pleasures. But for us, who hold that liberation is the highest and unadulterated bliss, liberation is an unequivocal (ekäntika) end of man.
1.16 (E16-18). The omkära, according to scripture, is present in all speech (väc), and speech is the Self of everything, because of scriptural authority to that effect, and also because of logic. We know this last point from the following considerations:
1.17 (El8-19). But in the case of an inference from two marks, for example, "Since, even though it is upright, a crow settles on it, it is a post (and not a man)," one apprehends a third thing from two things that mutually delimit each other (parasparavyavacchinna). So verbal cognition and inference are not parallel. ( Therefore even babies have cognitions tinctured by the form of words, as they participate in the impressions (bhävana) of words in former births. ( Other objects should be considered to be the same because they belong to the same class tatsämänyät, i.e., they also are the objects of words). Therefore they are a mere intuition (pratibhä) conducive to activity or abstention from activity. ( ii) Sentence meaning (väkyärtha). Therefore sentence meaning as a separate thing or complex whole is unreal. ) ( In all these the reality that is speech (väg-tattva> iabda-tattva) appears in this or that way (tathä tathä vivartate) because no cognition can be without a support. So, since every object of cognition is accompanied by the form of speech, everything is a modification of speech, as pots of clay, or an appearance (vivaria) 9 as reflections of the moon in rippling water.
1.18 (E19). . ( If It changed in part (ekadeêa) It would have to have parts and would be neither eternal nor one.
1.19 (E19-20). Gloss on the word "not everything" (asarvam) in verse 1:] Objection:16 Brahman is identical with everything (sarvätmatä brahmanafi). Answer: To this we respond, "not everything." Therefore Brahman is not identical with the diversity of the world (prapanca), but the diversity is simply the display (viläsita), the play (kridita) of avidyā.
1.20 (E20). Everything has positive reality (rüpa) through the positive reality of Brahman and is not simply void (Jtinya). avidyā is therefore apprehension (of the object) otherwise than as it is (anyathärthagrahana) and the superimposition (adhyäsa) of a nonexistent form [avidyamänarüpa) on it. Scripture also teaches that Brahman has positive reality.
1.21 (E20-22). . [ Gloss on the word "fearless" (abhaya) in verse 1:] Objection: Some (Càrvâkas, probably) say that there is no pleasure unmixed with frustration, and that pleasure only remains pleasure so long as it belongs to a person who is frustrated. Answer: We have already shown that pleasure is not merely the cessation of frustration. There is no fear that is adventitious, because there is no second thing other than Brahman. ( How could this distinction arise again? Scripture calls deep sleep the attainment of Brahman because projection is absent. 1.22, introduction to verse
2 (E22-23). . Objection: What is the pramäna for Brahman? Not perception (pratyaksa), because its object (visaya) is difference (or "different individual things," bheda). Not inference, because that is preceded by perception. Not comparison (upamäna), because the object of comparison is a similarity (sädrsya), which is based on difference. Therefore difference exists. ) Negation (abhäva) cannot be a pramäna for a positive entity like Brahman. Neither can it be a pramäna for the nonexistence of diversity, because it is impossible so long as perception, etc., An entity in which all distinction (avaccheda) is dissolved cannot be the object (gocara) of apprehension, because every apprehension proceeds by the distinction (vyavaccheda) "It is this way, it is not that way.55
1.23 (E23). Answer: Verse 2: "The sages say that It comes into currency (prasiddhi) from tradition (ämnaya), and that It is described via the dissolution of the diversity (prapanca) of difference (bheda)."
1.24 (E23-25). . The intent of the understanding is an already existent fact. Moreover, there can be no injunction of anything here as a means to an end, because the birth of a son is already accomplished, and the resulting pleasure requires no further activity to produce pleasure once one knows of it. For, other pramänas, such as perception, may enter into activity or abstention, but they aim at or fulfill themselves in paryavasita) nothing but accomplished facts.
1.25. (E25). . Objection: Activity and abstention are intended by the speaker (which is not the case in perception and other non-linguisticpramänas). Answer: The fact of being the meaning of a word arises not from the intention of the speaker, but from the capacity of the word.
1.26 (E25-26). . It cannot be the first, because if they aimed at only their own objects there would be no understanding of the object of a sentence, and so the employment of words would be purposeless. Therefore they do aim at some union with other objects. But since the use of words and their understanding is explicable merely by this (by some sort of union with other objects, whether they be something to be done or not), there is no pramäna18 for any particular union (i.e., for union with a thing to be done). Thus verse 2 says, "By the dissolution of the diversity of difference. "
1.27 (E26). But it is precisely through the cessation of particulars that Brahman is described, as the entity gold is known through the abandonment of its particular configurations such as a lump, a necklace, etc.
1.28 (E26-28). For example, the injunction "One who desires heaven should sacrifice," because it implies the existence of a self after death, dissolves the notion that the body is the self. by prohibiting them or directing toward other activities, respectively. Thus they are accessory upayogin) to qualification (adhikära) for knowledge of the Self, because one who is not pacified and self-controlled is incapable of that knowledge. ( According to Änandapürna, this is the position of Brahmadatta.) ( d) Works and knowledge are connected by "severality of connection" samyogaprthaktva). This is part of Manolana's own position.) ( The usual Mïmâmsâ position. ) ( g) Knowledge and works are unconnected and contradictory, (Śaṅkara or Sureśvara, probably. )
1.29 (E28-30). . Therefore the êastra (of the Vedānta) will be useless. Objection: Injunctions of works enter into qualification for knowledge by their effects, such as heaven, just as instructions to go to villages along the way enter into the instruction to go to the city, which is the goal desired. Answer: No, for in the example getting to the villages is not an object of desire, whereas the fruits of works are objects of desire, so there is no need to suppose another object, namely liberation. But that is not the intent of his words; we learn that that was his intent from some other pramäna. But there is no other pramäna than language for the objects of Vedic injunctions; so we must accept the ends that are mentioned as the real ends, heaven, etc., for injunctions to works, liberation for the injunction to knowledge. will not be the end of the injunctions to works.20 Prohibitions may contribute to knowledge by preventing works based on passion, but injunctions of works do not do so. 1-13). Moreover, this will render absurd the opponent's own position that Vedic works contradict worldly works because they have the same end.
1.30 (E30). . Response to (b): The obtaining of desires does not destroy desire but increases it. It is not enjoyment but repeated meditation that sees the faults of sense objects, that destroys desire. Rather, if we were to look for an implied meaning, it would have to be that the Veda intends that knot of desire be firm (because no one without desire would be moved to act by this injunction). ( But this is absurd.)
1.31 (E30-31). . 15.1). There being no reason to believe that this statement has a meaning other than the literal one, it is not a mere supplementary statement (arthaväda), and on the basis of it, it is clear that there are separate qualifications for knowledge and for works (because they have separate fruits).
1.32 (E31-32). . Objection: The statement "He does not return again" is in the present tense (not in the optative, and therefore not an injunction). Answer: No, because the Person (purusa) described in the Upaniṣads is other than the one that is an agent and enjoyer. Sabda only teaches what other pramänas can't.) This one, the jiva, is indeed one with the supreme Self. But to the jiva, and to him alone,*3 belongs the form of agent and enjoyer that is bound up with avidyā and ascertained by perception.
1.33 (E32). Response to (g): From the supposition that knowledge and works are contradictory, having as their spheres the nonduality and duality respectively, there would result the nonproduction of knowledge, because the division of pramäna, object and agent of knowledge is contradictory to the apprehension of nonduality.
1.34 (E32-34). Opponent:24' Works are useless in the knowledge of Brahman, because Brahman is not something that must be accomplished (sädhya), and as scripture says (Mundlaka Upaniṣad 1.2.12), "That which is not made is not (obtained) by what is done (krta)." Opponent: Erroneous cognition, being caused (nimitta) by nonapprehension, ceases when its cause ceases. Therefore the cessation of error is something to be accomplished by knowledge. Opponent: Persons in whom right cognition with regard to motherof-pearl has been produced after a previous error do not make a separate effort for the removal of error, nor do they need any accessory. Objector: Works are causes of bondage. Opponent: When knowledge cleansed of all particulars (visesa) has arisen, the worldly usage (vyavahära) of the division of works and fruits is impossible. Opponent: No, doubt and error, which are the blemishes of cognition, are impossible in knowledge that has arisen from a pramäna. Opponent: What is the distinctive feature on account of which this other knowledge is sought? Opponent: This is not so, because once the thing to be known is known, nothing else is necessary. Opponent: But a pramäna is necessary for establishing its object (not for establishing an object already established by another pramäna). It cannot be necessary for establishing it a second time, because that could be done by the first pramäna. But this special pleasure results also from the vision (darsana) produced by the first pramäna. Therefore perception is of more practical utility.) Opponent: In this case it is not another pramäna that is necessary, but some cause of bringing the object known closer. Opponent: Then the object of perception is not arrived at by language (and so it can't help to make it better known). Therefore he who does participate in these properties has not arrived at the identity of Brahman and the Self.
1.35 (E35-36). . For their cessation something additional (to verbal knowledge) is necessary. does so by destroying impurities (kalusa) that get in the way of the highest good (êreyas); for the purpose of obligatory rites (nityakarman) is the washing away (ksaya) of sins.26 Objection: False appearances may continue, but certitude comes from thepramäna, and practical activity vyavahära) conforms to reality (tattva) and to certitude (nikaya). The appearances continue, but not any activity, including meditation or sacrifice and other works.) Answer: Even after the vision of reality has arisen certitude may have a false object, if the trace already produced by false vision is strong and a strong trace of true vision has not been implanted. Therefore repetition of the vision of reality makes for the subjugation or elimination of the stronger trace produced by the repetition of beginningless false vision. Thus scripture says "He is to be thought about, to be meditated upon" Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad II.4.5) and prescribes means such as celibacy, sacrifice, and other things. Objection: Knowledge of reality comes from tradition when it is assisted by celibacy and other means. ( Answer: No, for apprehension arises from language by itself. Thus even one who knows with certitude that Brahman is the Self needs the means for the cessation of error. The employment of means does not make liberation an effect (kärya).
1.36 (E36). Manu 6.35, which seems to teach that one must have discharged the three debts before entering upon knowledge, actually teaches that one who in fact has taken up householdership but considers that by the knowledge of the Self everything he needs to do is accomplished (krta-krtya-tä) and therefore neglects the discharge of the three debts incurs a sin that prevents the rise of knowledge, by not doing what is enjoined.
1.37 (E36). . Acceptance of (e): Or else, works are a perfection (samskära), because smrti says that knowledge arises in one who is perfected: "And also the work of the äsramas, because they are enjoined" (Brahmasūtra III.4.32).
1.38 (E36-37). . Objection: The means for producing knowledge are obvious (drsta)> such things as quietude, self-control, etc., Answer: What you say is true. But knowledge is manifested quicker by these special means, and slower without them. ( Thus Brahmasūtra III.4.26 says: "There is dependence on all (means), because of scripture, like the horse."
1.39 (E37). Objection: Knowledge is the very form of Brahman, not something different from It. But Brahman is eternal and not an effect. Answer: A piece of rock crystal whose form has been concealed by an adjunct (upädhana^upädhi) "requires" the removal of the adjunct for the sake of the manifestation of its own form, but the form of the crystal was not removed by the presence of the adjunct, nor was it produced as an effect by the adjunct's removal. So the form of the Self "requires" (means). ( Objection: (The example of the crystal is not parallel to the knowledge of the Self.) But cognition is an effect, and different from the crystal (unlike the knowledge that is identical with Brahman). Answer: (In fact, it is the form of the crystal that requires the removal of the adjunct, for the following reasons:) Cognition is not aimed at for its own sake, but for establishing the nature of the object.
1.40 (E37). .
1.41 (E37-38). . But you cannot prove that a thing that has no particulars of necessity does not exist, because there are particulars (such as atoms) that have no further particulars.29 CHAPTER TWO: ON REASONING (TARKAKÄISFDA) II.
1 (E39-44). Opponent: Vedic tradition (ägama) is against perception, which presents us with the mutual difference of things; therefore it cannot be a pramäna for nonduality. Answer: Verse 1: Perception does not negate, but merely affirms; therefore it cannot deny oneness. Objection 1: Neither Vedic tradition nor perception, etc., Therefore there is no need to attempt to remove apparent conflicts between them as you are proposing to do. Objection 2: If there is a conflict, tradition is the weaker, because it is dependent on perception for its existence. Therefore in a conflict perception is the stronger of the two. Objection 5: Perception is stronger than language, because the Vedic language is self-contradictory, but perception is not. Objection 6: Perception is stronger than Vedic tradition because tradition is experienced later in the individual's life, and because before one understands the meaning of a verbal communication one must first apprehend the world through perception. The knowledge of nonduality depends on that of duality and follows it in time, but sublates it. Perception is a pramäna with respect to practical life, but not in giving final truth. Response to objections 2 and 6: Language is not dependent on perception for its being a means of knowledge, but for its being established, that is, for being heard. For injunctions to works do not teach duality as a truth, but merely assume a duality already experienced.
II.2 (E44-45). . Only on the acceptance of (1) will there be no contradiction between perception and the Vedas. Verse 2: Alternatives (2), (3a) and (3b) are impossible because one must have posited some definite positive thing before one can negate. Here a problem arises: how are we to explain how we negate things that we don't believe exist?
II.3 (E45-46). . Besides, perception illuminates objects that are proximate, and therefore it cannot in addition illuminate nonproximate objects such as the negandum.
4 (E46-47). . For example, the perception that something is blue excludes that it is yellow, but it does not exclude that it is sweet, which may or may not be true, that it is made up of invisible atoms, etc.) 11.5, including verse
5 (E47-48). . Difference cannot be the essence (rüpa, svabhäva) of anything, as the buddhists say it is. For difference is one single thing, but it resides in two things as differentiating them from each other. In addition, if difference is the essence of things, nothing can be one, and therefore no wholes can exist, because wholes are made up of unitary parts. 11.6, including verse
6a (E48-50). . Answer: No, relation is created by human thought, which relates one already established thing to another already established thing for a specific purpose. Difference cannot be the essence of a thing for the additional reason that difference is understood as being relative to something else, and therefore extrinsic to the thing. 11.7, including verses 6b-
7a (E50-52). . Words of relation, such as "father/son" or "short/long," are indeed relative, but not the objects themselves. Objection: We can tell there is a difference of things from the difference of their effects, because otherwise there is no property that distinguishes seeing an effect and not seeing it. Answer: We ourselves admit such a distinguishing property, but as an object of imagination or construction (kalpanävifaya). It cannot really exist, because it can neither be identical with the object it resides in, nor different.
II.8 (E52-54). . The simultaneous presence of contradictory purposeful actions is not a proof of difference. Not the impossibility of their occurring together in the same locus, because that is precisely what needs to be proven. Moreover, since in absolutely nonexistent things like sky flowers both of any set of contradictory actions are absent, they would both be present, because each is simply the absence of the other. Neither is contradiction the relationship of destroyer and destroyed, because the destroyer must come into being before it can destroy something, and until it does destroy it it is coexistent with the destroyed. Secondly, it cannot be the fact that a certain thing can be produced from one thing and not from others, because "otherness" is exactly what needs to proven. We do not know the reality of difference from the distinctions of application to purposeful actions, for example, the application of milk to producing curds and not of sand, because we see that the same thing may be applied to different purposeful actions when accompanied by certain accessories. But we may with equal justice say that the difference of application is brought about by an imagined difference of objects. II.9, including verses 8b-
9a (E54-56). . But then isn't it easier to assume one thing, Brahman, and say that It has the capacity, incomprehensible by logic, to produce many diverse effects, which in turn have fixed distinctions among themselves and always produce only certain effects and not others?
11.10 (E56-57). . Objection: One cause does not, in fact, have several effects, because the difference of effects is based on a difference of powers iakti), which are the real, direct causes. abhäva). Ahhäva only acts with reference to some particular locus of negation and some particular negandum, thus "This is not that," or "That is not in this." But this assumes difference, which is what abhäva as a separate pramäna is posited to establish, so there is the logical fault of "mutual dependence." But this again assumes the difference of objects. We do, in fact, see a single form in things conceived of as different, because perception, etc., Thus every pramäna apprehends the common form Being (sat). Therefore, neither difference nor even the cognition of difference exists ultimately, but only empirically (vyavahära). 3) the particulars (vitesa) alone are the real things, nondifference is imagined on the basis of them and having them as its reference (the buddhist view); (4) nondifference alone is ultimately real, and difference is imagined because of beginningless avidyā, having nondifference as the basis and reference of the imagination (Mandana's own view). 11.14, including verses 12b-
13a (E60-61). . If we did really apprehend universal and particular as different, everyone would agree on this doctrine, but they don't; rather, everyone apprehends them as identical. The representation of two things as one is self-contradictory.
11.15 (E61-62). . Objection: Inherence can conceal the difference of two things, as the conjunction of fire and iron conceals their difference. 11.16, including verse
17 (E62-64). . But the content of thought and that of verbal usage are the same. Therefore thought also is not a sure guide to reality, and the thought of difference is not a proof of its reality. Avidyâ is this defect which accounts for the apprehension of difference, and it resides in the individual.
11.17 (E64). . Response to position (2): To say that the thing is one but comprises two elements, the continuous (avyäurtta) universal and the discontinuous (vyävrtta) particular, is self-contradictory and therefore impossible.
19 (E64-65). . 11.19, including verse
20 (E65-66). .
21 (E66-87). . Answer: This "component part" may be the thing itself, and then it will be different from the particular. Objection: The part is neither the thing itself nor another thing nor not a thing at all, because nonexistent things like sky lotuses cannot be portions of anything. ( He implicitly denies that the "indescribability" of the relationship means that it is purely imagined.) Answer: But since the other portion, the particular portion, does not carry over, the thing itself doesn't carry over. 11.21, including verse
22 (E67-68). If you say that the particular does not carry over, then only difference will be real, as we proved before. There is no way to avoid the alternatives of absolute difference and absolute nondifference. 11.22, including verse
23 (E68). . A portion isolated out of a thing is merely imaginary, because the object is mixed extra) on this account, and the portion is not mixed (and therefore not the object and therefore not real. It is important to note that *'thing," vastu, has the double meaning of both "object" and also "reality.") 11.23, including verse
24 (E68-69). . But in fact there is a fixed distinction among them. But if nothing is absolute, the nonabsoluteness itself is not absolute, and therefore you cannot say that nondifference is not absolute, and so you cannot avoid the confusion of reactions.
26 (E69-70). . For difference is relative and can't be apprehended without first apprehending some second thing as different from the first. But this in turn depends on previously having apprehended difference. Therefore difference cannot be apprehended. But if it is not apprehended, it cannot be the basis for the imagination of nondifference. 11.26, including verse
27 (E7O-71). Moreover, it is self-contradictory to say that the first perception grasps the object along with its particulars, but that the particulars, not yet being linked with words, are not noticed.
28 (E71). . Therefore either the universal or the particular must be false. The particulars, silver and shell, on the other hand, are not constant. Objection: It is in the manas alone that error resides. Therefore the different sensory cognitions are not errors, and they establish difference. 11.28, including verse
29 (E71-72). . Objection (a buddhist): Entities have mutually exclusive individual marks vyävrttasvalaksana). Therefore reciprocal nonexistence is either their essence or an attribute of them. Answer: Reciprocal nonexistence cannot be the essence of things, because if one thing first exists independently, another whose form is its nonexistence may also exist, but if everything is by essence reciprocal nonexistence, nothing at all can exist, because everything's existence is dependent on everything else. 11.29, including verses
30-31 (E72). . Therefore difference is false. Similarly, the difference of the universe (pis'va) is penetrated by the nondifference expressed by "this," "that," "object," "thing." 11.30, including verse
32 (E72-73). c) It can't be from the fact that perception is not final knowledge (nikaya, here used as equal to savikalpa jnäna). But then how can it belong to them as the same in all of them? Objection: It may have as its basis beginningless traces (samskära), rather than being dependent on any particular feature residing in the object. Answer: But then there would be no restriction as to what things appeared nondifferent from each other. Therefore you must assume certain real capacities in things by nature different from each other, which capacities produce the idea of nondifference. 11.31, including verse
33 (E73). . 2) Those who teach a mixed object must say that both usages (of difference and nondifference) are according to appearance only, since the thing itself is mixed and its nature does not carry over, as was said above. ( So it is just as reasonable for us to assume that the usage of nondifference is in accordance with reality and that of difference with appearance. 1 ) Refutation of verbal knowledge of the Self as the object of an injunction 111.2, including verse
1 (E74-75). .
2 (E75-76). .
3-4 (E76). . The end of an injunction is activity, posterior to the hearing of the injunction, but the understanding of the injunction is simultaneous with hearing it. 111.5, including verses
5-7 (E76-77). . Answer: No, because according to the Mimämsäsütras the meaning of words should be taken to be the same in the Veda as in secular language, unless proven otherwise. 111.6, including verses
8-9 (E77-78). . Objection: An injunction is necessary to know that Self-knowledge is a human good (purusärtha). Answer: No, injunctions inform us of future results, but the result of knowledge, that is, the pervasion of the object by the knower, its becoming clear to him, occurs immediately. can be unending, effects that are positive can't. 111.7, including verses
10-12 (E78-79). Objection: Even though there may be no fruit of the knowledge of Brahman subsequent to that very knowledge, an injunction is still necessary for the texts about Brahman to be authoritative (pramäna).
13-14 (E79). .
15-16a (E79-80). . Perception and inference are independent pramänas, even though their object also is something already existent. 111.10, including verses 16b-
17a (E80-81). . Objection: With regard to already existent things, which can be known both by language and by other pramänas, there is a suspicion that one of those other pramänas may contradict language. Being dependent, it is not an independent pramäna by itself. 111.11, including verses 17b-
18 (E81). . 111.12, including verses
19-20 (E81-82). . III. 13, including verse
21 (E82). Objection: Human commands are preceded by a desire to communicate the desire of ends and means, which desire, being a thought of a person, does not exist in the nonpersonal Veda.
22-23 (E82). . Answer: No, because words have the same meanings in the Veda and in secular language. III.15, including verses
24-27a (E82-83). . Objection: Commands can only be known from the Veda, whereas applications can be known from other pramänas. For, you have just assumed that the application of means to ends may be known both by the pramäna language and by other pramänas. The Buddha is an example. ( III. 16, including verses 27b-
28 (E83-84). . Therefore the sole cause whether or not language is dependent as a pramäna is whether it is personal or nonpersonal. Objection: But then, for the Veda to be a finally authoritative pramäna we must prove that any other pramäna for the things it communicates is impossible, and so the Veda's being a pramäna is dependent on the absence of any other such pramäna. Answer: Even if it depends on the absence of another pramäna, it is not dependent on another pramäna. Now, another pramäna might be possible for these already existent things, and might contradict Vedic language. 17, including verse
29 (E84-85). .
30-32 (E85-86). Answer: No, because a pramäna may be in contact with an object in any one of the three times, past, present, and future, and so its existence may give the ideas "was," "is," and "will be," not just the idea "is" alone.
33-34a (E86-87). . Answer: No, because there are objects knowable only by inference, never at any time by perception. 111.20, including verses 34b-
35a (E87). . Answer: No, because once avidyā is absorbed Brahman may also be known by direct vision (säksätkära). 111.21, including verses 35b-
36a (E87). .
38 (E87-88). . Is that which constitutes Being (a) being connected with & present pramäna, or (b) being connected with any pramäna? 111.23, including verse
39 (E88-89). . Objection: Then it is capability (yogyatva) of being joined with a pramäna that constitutes Being.
111.24 (E89-91). Being" thus has one meaning, not three separate ones. Objection: The single all-inclusive thing necessary is being susceptible to a pramäna, or else capacity for purposeful action (arthakriyä). Answer: Then there is no need for a number of properties to define being, and the two things you suggest may be merely indicatory marks (upalaksana) of Being, which isa single property common to all things that are. But in fact the single thing that is Being is neither (1) the pramäna, nor (2) purposeful action. ( It is not (a) the pramäna as qualifier, because as explained in III. The single unitary thing that is Being (2) cannot be purposeful action. If it is the pramäna itself that is the effect, the idea "it is" would come not from the pramäna by itself, but from something else (i.e., the subsequent second-degree apperception of the pramäna). Moreover, every object is qualified by being as qualifier (viiesana), and the object cannot be qualified by its supposed efficaciousness (arthakriyä), namely, pramäna, because they aren't simultaneous. If having an effect is not a qualifier but an indicatory sign of being, it would again result that what is past exists. ( Reprise and summary of previous argument on being, with no new material. ) Therefore Being (sattä) equals the nature of object (s), and it is one. 111.25, including verse
40 (E91). Objection: But a definition of "capability" (yogyatva) (to be joined with a pramäna, i.e., of being) other than "having the nature of object," is possible, namely, the existence of a cause of a pramäna (pramäna-hetu-sadbhäva).
41 (E91-92). .
42-43a (E92). . This is not (1) simply the knowledge of other things present, because we can perceive other things even where there are thorns and before looking at the spot of ground.
44a (E92-93). . 111.29, including verses 44b-
46 (E93). . If (2) it is isolated in conjunction with a qualifier, the only possible qualifier would be the absence of thorns (which is against your hypothesis). 111.30, including verses 46b-
47a (E93-94). .
51a (E94). Answer: No, because this nonexistence is present even when there is no awareness, as in deep sleep, and so in deep sleep we would have the idea of the nonexistence of the whole universe.
53a (E94-95). . And, because.this is the only pramäna for Brahman, it is independent of any other. 111.33, including verses 53b-
58 (E95-96). . It is indeed dependent, on the speaker's knowledge, as far as the object goes, because the hearer does not think "This object is thus," but "This person has such-and-such knowledge." An example would be the words of the Buddha. But a qualified person's speech is rejected neither in respect to its being a pramäna nor in respect to its object. Thus, even if.the object of the texts of the Upaniṣads can be known by another pramäna, they are still a pramäna. 111.34, including verses
59-64 (E96-98). . Therefore being is not the faët of being knowable by a pramana. Objection: We have the idea of a universal when we recollect (auamarSa) a form previously seen, as when seeing one cow we recall another and think, "This is the same." 111.35, including verses
65-67a (E98). . Nor do we have this cognition with reference to a jug and a cup, which nonetheless share the universal clay. 111.36, including verses 67b-
68a (E98-99). . " Since the idea of being and the idea of a pramäna are not simultaneous, they are not connected (as qualified and qualifier). 111.37, including verses 68b-
69a (E99). . But now Mandana says, against III. 111.38, including verses 69b-
70a (E99-100). Still, even if there is in fact no connection of words into a sentence without an action, there is no problem in getting the indicative sentences of the Veda to communicate Brahman without reference to an injunction, because certain sentences in the Upaniṣads communicate the existence of Brahman as cause of the world by stating the origination of the world from It, 111.39, including verses 70b-
73a (El00-102). . Objection: In secular language the connection of the meanings of words is dependent on another pramäna (i.e., it is the knowledge gained from another pramäna that is expressed in the sentence); where there is conflict with other pramänas, in nonsense sentences, there is no connection of word meanings. But in Vedic language, whose objects other pramänas can't arrive at, the connection of word meanings depends on an injunction. Answer: No. ( 4) We understand the speech of a liar, although there is no other pramäna for the meaning he communicates, since it is untrue. ( Otherwise there would be no difference between meaningless and false sentences. ( 111.40, including verses 73b-
78a (E102-103). . There is no need to introduce a similar presumption of the connectedness of the meanings of words from the fact that otherwise the injunctive word would be useless. 111.41, including verses 78b-
80a (El04). Objection: The connection of the injunctive word and its object is learned by a child not from the word directly, but is inferred to be in the minds of others by observing the use of it by an older person and the action of another person brought about by its use.
85a. (E104-110). Answer: If it is inferred, language is not the sole pramäna for it. Therefore inference and language are like the seed and the sprout; neither is first. Objection: We know the existence of the nonsecular cause of activity by two successive inferences, first, the inference of some cause of activity or another, and then, second, an inference from the absence of everyday secular causes of activity to the Vedic cause of activity's being of another, nonsecular, sort. Answer: Then the nonsecular cause is also known by inference, and not just by language. Objection: It is the power (§aktiy sämarthya) of the word that is the connection of the word. Therefore language is the sole pramäna for that, in the case of Vedic injunction, at least.] Answer: If we infer the idea of a nonsecular cause of activity from the behavior of others, we also can thereby infer, at the time we first learn the use of a word, the cause of activity itself, because it qualifies the idea, or else we remember it as something previously known by another pramäna. Objection: We can infer only the existence of the idea of the object, not that this idea is pramäna or memory (and so we can't infer the object itself). Answer: No, because an idea must fall into one of five sorts of cognition, memory, pramäna^ doubt, error, and conceptual construction (vikalpa). In addition, the child's own knowledge is not purely verbal, but inferential, and therefore he knows the cause of activity by a pramäna other than language. Objection: The child's knowledge of the object of the injunctive word is not pramäna unless it is from a verbal communication free from defects. Therefore the child's knowledge does depend on the word, though indirectly through the speaker's valid cognition. Answer: No, because the definition of verbal knowledge is knowledge from a word (and this the child does not yet have of that • particular word). One person cannot know by means of another's knowledge. Objection: But if the cause of activity (pravrtti-hetu), being a cause of welfare, is known by a pramäna other than language, yet, in the case of Vedic injunction, cannot be known by any pramäna other than Vedic language, the Veda will cease to be a pramäna with respect to it. Answer: No, something apprehensible by more than one pramäna may, in certain special circumstances, be apprehensible by only one pramäna. Therefore worldly and Vedic injunctive language have the same meaning.) 111.43, including verses 85b-
87a (El 10). . Answer: No, because the same problem as before (cf. IIL40) would arise: words depend on our knowledge of their connection with their objects, and that depends on our knowing the objects. So pramänas other than language must enable us to know the object of injunction. 111.44, including verses 87b-
91a (El 11-112). . What is the object of the injunctive word, we ask. ( 1) Not Vedic action, such as sacrifice itself, because that is known by language such as "he sacrifices." ( 111.45, including verses 91b-
95 (El 12-113). . Answer: In the case of the Upaniṣads, the injunctive word would be "one should understand it as being of this sort." 111.46, including verses
96-100 (El 13.-115). . Answer: No, an originative injunction tells the proper form of a rite and the general fact of its being a means to a human good (purusärtha), and thus creates the expectation (äkämksä) of a particular human good that the injunction of eligibility supplies. Discussion of (2) (in III. I), the suggestion that it is immediate manifestation (säksätkära) that is enjoined: 111.47, including verses
101-105a (El 15-118). . Objection: The reality of the Self is not the object of verbal knowledge, because the language that is a. pramäna is in the form of sentences, and the object of a sentence consists in the conjunction of diverse objects of words, whereas in the Self there is no duality. Answer: The awareness of the reality of the Self, being nondual and without differentiations (avaccheda), is one's abiding in one's own form, which is unsurpassable bliss in which all sorrow and other evils are extinguished, and so an end of man. But, precisely because it is an end, it cannot be enjoined, because only means are enjoined, not ends. They are enjoined because otherwise we wouldn't know they produced some particular desirable thing. Now, one acts because of desire for something, a desire that arises spontaneously without need for an injunction. Objection: It resides in the object, but comes from prescription. Answer: Still, the word can't be a pramäna for the action's being something that has to be done, because that still resides in the object, whereas the word directly denotes prescription, which is not in the object. Conversely, the other person has not fulfilled the prescription in this case, since it was not given to him, although he has effected its object.
111.48 (El 18-119). . Objection: There can be the enjoinment of the knowledge of the nondual Self, because it is a means, of gaining liberation. IIL49, including verses 105b-
106 (El 19-123). . Answer: If liberation is defined as the prior nonexistence of the body, organs, and buddhi, we reply that nonexistences cannot be results. No, because Brahman is omnipresent and also is not different from him who would attain it. ( No, for the same reasons as in (1), and also because nonseparation is the mixture of the parts of one thing with the parts of another, and Brahman is partless. ( No, because the effect is at all times the cause. 4) Attaining Brahman is transformation (parinäma) into Brahman's form. Moreover, scripture speaks of none but Brahman emanating the world. ( Therefore, liberation is not an effect.
111.50 (E123-128). . ( Consideration of certain Vedic passages that imply the reality of difference and therefore apparently support the alternative definitions [1-4] in the preceding section.) Re (1): Those passages of scripture that speak of a "path" are talking about gradual liberation in stages (kramamukti) in which an individual goes first to the world of Brahma, who is an. For Brahman cannot have a special place to which one might go. Re (part of) (4): The scriptural passages that teach the emanation of the world from Brahman as its cause do not aim to teach causality in the literal (yathäeabda), primary (jnukhya) sense, which would imply duality, but to teach the identity of all things with their cause, Brahman. It is just a construction (vikalpa). Re another part of) (4): The scriptural statements about the Lordship that is reached by the knower refer not to liberation but to a result of the knowledge of the Brahman with qualities (saguna). are not literal, but are for meditation.
111.51 (El28-129). Objection: Granted that liberation itself is not something to be accomplished (and therefore not the object of an injunction), still, the exhaustion (ksaya) of the causes of bondage, that is, past works, is something that may be accomplished, as it is accomplished by penances (prâyaêcitta), and this exhaustion is necessary for liberation.
107-108a (E129-130). . Answer: The knowledge of the Self, immediately and by itself, dissolves (pravilaya) the usage of avidyā (avidyāvyavahära), and thereby all works, because they are projected by avidyā.
111.53 (E130-134). . Objection to (1) of the previous paragraph: But then it is illogical for the Bhagavadgïtâ (11.54 ff.) Objection to (2): If all works are exhausted it is impossible there be any delay. Answer in favor of (1): The Gïtà refers to an aspirant at a particular stage, not to a perfected person. Answer in favor of (2): The separation from the body follows not immediately, but upon the exhaustion of works that have already begun to bear their fruit [ärabdhakärya). Therefore some people obtain liberation immediately upon knowledge, others after some delay. In a similar manner a potter's wheel keeps spinning after the potter has ceased moving it, because of the samskära of motion. But the mere fact that it continues does not mean that it continues long. Likewise, the body eventually ceases once the Self is known. Consequently nothing further, such as enjoyment, is needed for liberation but knowledge.
III.54 (E134). . Objection: If the bondage that continues after the knowledge of the truth is merely apparent, why are meditation and the like necessary even after knowledge of the truth has arisen from language? Answer: Verbal knowledge, which is indirect, and the appearance of diversity, which is directly experienced, are not mutually exclusive. Therefore the knowledge must be continuously repeated, and this repetition is meditation.
114a (E134-136). . ( Reply to the first objection in 111.47) Brahman is indeed the object of verbal knowledge. You yourself, opponent, say that the knowledge of Brahman is the object of injunction. But one cannot prescribe what is not known, and Brahman is known from no other source than language. The essence of a thing is not something that can be enjoined, because it is not something that can be performed, an action, but something already existent. Therefore Brahman is not established by the injunction to apprehend It, 111.56, including verses 114b-
115a (E136). Objection: No cognition has an erroneous object, because a cognition that did not imitate the form of its object would have no object at all.
123 (E137-138). . Answer: No, it is the present fragment of mother of pearl that we consider silver and direct our action toward, not remembered silver. One cannot superimpose anything (including things remembered) on something that is not in contact with a sense organ. 111.58, including verses
124-129a (E138-140). . But (1) is obviously not the case in your model of error, and, if one accepts (2), all memory of one thing while one is looking at another thing with common traits would produce error. Objection: Error occurs where only one thing is remembered, but doubt where more than one thing is remembered. Answer: No. ( 111.59, including verses 129b-
131 (El40). . Therefore errors arise from specific defects in the sense organs. 111.60, including verses
132-139a (E140-142). Objection: The thing remembered is discriminated from the thing being perceived by its own cognition (i.e., by memory itself), but sometimes one does not apprehend the distinguishing properties (viiesa) in it. ( Answer: Still, this doesn't explain how there can be error when two things are remembered. Also, in memory one may indeed apprehend the distinguishing traits. Objection: In memory the difference of place and time of the thing remembered from the present object of perception is grasped, but in error it is not grasped. Objection: In error one doesn't discriminate the thing remembered from the thing present because of the fact that one does not apprehend that one is remembering, whereas in memory one is conscious that one is remembering and so one discriminates then. Therefore error is not a mere failure to grasp the difference of time and place. ) The discrimination (of memory from perception) "I am remembering" is therefore something in addition to memory. III.61, including verses 139b-
149a (E142-144). . But nonapprehension is an absence (abhäva), which does not raise any possibility. Later he may see the object clearly, and apprehend the distinction, but this is not the sublation of an error. Objection: A combination of the nonapprehension of the distinction and the consciousness of proximity in time (of the thing remembered) makes the thing in contact with the eye appear as silver or vice versa. Answer: This is just our position of erroneous cognition, which is precisely the appearance of something as that which it is not. It is the latter that is denied. 111.62, including verses 149b-
151 (E144-145). . A defense of the self-validity [svatah-prämänya of cognition, against 111.56].) A pramäna! s being a pramäna. If this viewpoint is not accepted, you must test your own knowledge of invariable concomitance to see if it itself is invariably concomitant, and thus you begin an infinite regress. Therefore the form of cognition by itself establishes its own validity. 111.63, including verses
152-157a (E145-146). . ( On our theory the defects are more powerful than on yours, because they produce not only failure to apprehend, as in your theory, but also error. So the theory of false cognition is preferable. 111.64, including verses 157b-
161a (E146-147). . Moreover, to either theory it could be objected that, if erroneous cognition lacks an objective support, even pramäna may lack it. 111.65, including verses 161b-
165a (El47-148). Objection: Although the intent of an injunction is action, an injunction of knowledge may establish the nature of a thing, just as, although the injunction of sprinkling the rice intends an action, nonetheless the injunction is for the sake of the substance rice.
171a (E148-151). . Answer: An injunction of knowledge makes an object appear, but it may appear with its own form or with the form of something else, as we have shown. Objection: But there are two sorts of avidyā, that which "covers" (äcchädika) the light and that which "projects" (viksepika). Answer: No, projective avidyā is more necessary to be destroyed, because it produces all suffering, whereas dissolution is praised in scripture many times as bliss, because it is the end of various sufferings. Covering avidyā equals nonapprehension; projective avidyā equals false apprehension. Objection: But you can divide these two not in that manner, but as nonapprehension and imperfect apprehension. ( Answer: No, imperfect apprehension is still knowledge (jnäna, here apparently meaning not just "awareness" but "valid cognition"), rather than avidyā. Answer: An injunction must serve an end of man, but apprehending a thing as it is and otherwise than it is may both serve ends of man. Apprehending the Self as free from sin, etc.,
173 (E151-152). . Vedic language may enjoin cognition of it under a certain form, but the injunction does not tell us if that form is the true one. 111.68, including verses
174-179 (E152-153). . One cannot even enjoin knowledge as a means to that experience, because the experience is a visible fruit of the knowledge, and one wanting the fruit acts for the means, knowledge, spontaneously, without an injunction. 111.69, including verses
180-183 (E153-155). . Refutation of (3) of III.l, the possibility of an injunction of the continuous repetition of the knowledge obtained from Vedic language. It is, however, possible that such a stream of cognitions may be enjoined after the form is known from an indicative sentence. But there is still no need for an injunction, because the visible fruit of the first knowledge and that of its repetition is the same, direct vision (säksätkärana), and one does not need an injunction to act for either knowledge. Repeated practice of knowledge may produce greater clarity of knowledge in everyday life. Chändogya Upaniṣad III. 1, including verse
1 (El56). . Objection: The sentences of the Upaniṣads cannot be a pramäna for an otherwise unknown object such as Brahman. This in turn dépends on a previous knowledge of the object. The object must therefore be known by another pramäna. IV.2, including verse
2 (E156-157). Answer: We see in secular usage that a sentence communicates a hitherto unknown particular form by communicating an already known class characteristic conjoined with a collection of already known qualities, which collection is not shared by other things. IV.3, including verses
3-4 (El57). . The new thing the Upaniṣads communicate is the nonexistence of diversity. Therefore it is a new truth for which tradition (ägama) is the only pramäna. IV.4, including verses
5-11 (El57-159). Objection: A sentence that does not produce activity for an end of man, but merely communicates something already existent, is not a pramäna. Answer: The fruit of a pramäna is not necessarily something that is an end of man, because a pramâna may sometimes produce indifference. Objection: The pramänas are ends of man insofar as they are helpful for getting accomplished things that are useful toward ends of man. Objection: The pramänas are accessories to activity with respect to the objects they give knowledge of. ( Answer: This is true in the case of the Upaniṣads also, because once one knows Brahman one acts to make it directly seen (säksätkärana).
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Sureśvara
Sureśvara develops the argument that scriptural understanding differs from ritual production, while some traditional attributions remain uncertain.
A commentary can extend a teacher’s argument while challenging rival explanations of how it works.
Sentence meaning → Rejection of duality → Critique of injunction → Self-knowledge → Liberation
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Bṛhadāraṇyaka Vārttika | Massive source exegesis: Meaning and liberation |
| Naiṣkarmyasiddhi | Knowledge versus action: Direct realization |
| Mānasollāsa | Śaiva-inflected commentary: Traditional attribution disputed |
Sureśvara: historical introduction
Potter, printed pp. 420 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 210 words
We know little about Sureśvara on the basis of firm historical evidence. Finally, there is the question of which of the pifhas Sureśvara was given charge of. One tradition associates him specifically with the matha at Srngeri, Śaṅkara's birthplace. Manuscripts of works titled Sväräjyasiddhi and KäHmokfavicära also bear his name.
Work 34: Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika
Potter, printed pp. 420–520 · Study by S. Subrahmanya Sastri · Source 43,705 words
This is one of the longest works of Indian philosophy, running to some 11,151 stanzas, "half the length of the Râmâyàna" says Mahadevan.1 It begins with an introduction, referred to as Sambandhavärttika, whose purpose is "to set forth the relation sambandha) between the two sections of the Vedas.., through a criticism of the position taken by the Mïmâmsakas and the other Vedäntins. volume 16, 1892-1894). " The summary is by S. Subrahmanya Sastri as revised by K. H. Potter.
1 (ET 1-6). 1-9.
2 (ET 6-11). It is clear, therefore, that the class of persons who are eligible for Vedantic study is entirely distinct from the class of those who are enjoined to perform ritual acts.
3 (ET 11-15). Objection: Nothing can be obtained except through actions. Just as heaven, etc., Liberation, however, is eternal, it is Brahman itself and not the result of any action.
4 (ET 16-18). 26-31. Answer: No. Scripture need not enjoin liberation, but it merely wakes a person up to the realization of his actual nature.
5 (ET 20-28). 32-45. Objection: Yes, but it is only by actions that one can wake up to the natural state of his self. Actions lead to liberation as follows: one shuns prohibited (nisiddha) and optional (kämya) actions and performs the required rituals (nityakarman). Mimämsäsütra IV.3.1).
6 (ET 28-31). 46-50. Answer: No. But didn't the Self have that nature all along? If not, it couldn't be the Self's nature, since it would depend on causes.
7 (ET 31-39). 51-69. Objection: Actions are required in order to remove the sources of bondage arising from sensory contact. Answer: What is supposed to be the cause of that contact? Objection: The Self is potentially an agent and an enjoyer, but it is the actualization of the results of these traits that constitutes bondage. Answer: Is this "potentiality" essentially connected with its results or not?
8 (ET 40-57). But even the most careful person will find it impossible to accomplish this, at least, it will be very difficult, and thus no one will follow your path. Opponent: Nevertheless, that is the path, no matter how difficult. Ritual acts may purify the agent and ready him for Self-knowledge, but one who knows the truth of the Veda will realize that action is futile. A person may even be born free from desire because of previous (yogic) practice; he is eligible for Selfknowledge immediately. Thus the Self-knowledge that we contend leads to liberation is not the knowledge of that self which is the agent in sacrificial actions, etc., Objection: In order that a sacrificer can even make sense of his ritual actions he must know that his self is capable of transmigrating into future bodies; so self-knowledge is subsidiary to action.
9 (ET 58-64). 108-121. Answer: That transmigrating self is only known by one who is ignorant of the truth, for its nature involves relation with something that is not a self, that is, bodies.
10 (ET 65-72). Thus scriptural sentences that speak of the result of that knowledge cannot be taken as explanatory (arthaväda) and subsidiary to injunctions to act. Action is an obstacle to liberation, not its means. The seeker of liberation, being nonattached, will avoid action; the Self-knower, recognizing no differences cannot act.
11 (ET 73-83). 140b-161a. Objection: Agency, etc., Objection (from a materialist): There is no liberation, since the self is constantly changing in its experiences from moment to moment. Answer: The Self is eternal and not constantly changing. Thus there is no possibility of prior absence prägabhäva) in the Self, as there is in a composite material thing. which are therefore not Its attributes. Thus it must be ignorance that is the cause.
12 (ET 83-89). 161b-174a. Objection: If what you say is true the karmakända is invalid; but if so, everyone must lose faith in scripture, including the Vedānta. Answer: No. Answer: No. Objection: Reality has the nature of difference-cum-nondifference (bhedäbheda), so there is no problem. Answer: One thing cannot possess a self-contradictory nature.
13 (ET 88-96). 174b- 188a. Objection: Is the world samara) different from Brahman or nondifferent? Answer: Ignorance is imputed prakalpyate) to Brahman by the ignorant jiva; from Brahman's point of view ignorance doesn't exist. Answer: Merely being commonly known is not a valid reason to assume the existence of something. Indeed, all of ordinary experience is false.
14 (ET 97-111). 188b-217. Objection: But ordinary perception is immediate, whereas the Self-knowledge gained from scripture is not. Answer: What do you mean by "not immediate"? You argued earlier (section 5 above) that since scripture, etc., And scripture, etc., Objection: The Vedas do not teach Self-knowledge in texts such as "The knower of the Self is free from sorrow." Answer: Why do you resort to secondary meaning (laksanä) when it is inappropriate? Objection: All of what you say is sheer imagination. Answer: You may legitimately raise such a doubt if you satisfy the conditions for eligibility for knowledge, hear a sentence like "that art thou," and do not realize Self-knowledge.
1.5. (ET 111-115). 218-226.
16. (ET 116-126). 227-246. Objection: Without something to be accomplished (kärya) there can be no eligibility (adhikära) for knowledge. [ Thus, since a kärya requires an act (kriyä), action leads to liberation.] Answer: Do you mean that kärya is required to establish eligibility for acquiring the means to knowledge, or for knowledge itself? Since the means to knowledge, that is, hearing the great sentences of scripture, results from the prior abandonment of actions, the first alternative is inapplicable. Thus there is no question of injunction here. Liberation cannot be any of these, since it is not brought about at all.
17. (ET 126-135). 247-267. Objection: If the only obstacle to release were indeed ignorance (moha) you would be correct. Answer: Even on those construals of the transmigrating self liberation still is not produced by action, since the real Self already exists; rather, liberation is revealed through the destruction of the binding ignorance. Such "liberation" does not involve action in any case.
18 (ET 135-145). 268-288. Other Mîmârnsâ passages are likewise interpreted to show that the Upaniṣads are not subsidiary to injunctions. Answer: That rule only applies to cases where a single sentence meaning is possible. Objection: But you yourself argue that the karmakända is subsidiary to the jnänakänia! Answer: Yes, but that doesn't mean they have, the same subject matter. Objection: Since the beginning and end of the Vedas agree the whole Veda must have one subject matter. Answer: No one could possibly follow all the injunctions found in the Vedas in one lifetime! Thus no one will be eligible for release!
19 (ET 145-150). 289-298. Objection: Where does this knowledge come from? Answer: From the removal of bondage. Objection: That bondage is either past, present, or future. Answer: One may have studied the Veda and understood its meaning, yet not be liberated because of a present obstacle; the Chändogya Upaniṣad gives as analogy the case of the man who walks over buried treasure without knowing it.
20 (ET 150-155). 299-308, Objection: Liberation is eternal pleasure atyantikasukha), so of course it is desired. In scripture the term "heaven" is used synonymously with "liberation." Answer: No. In any case, scripture (Mundaka Upaniṣad 1.2.7, 1.2.12; Chändogya Upaniṣad V.10.7) shows that one does not get liberation through action.
21 (ET 156-158). 309-312. Objection: It would be quite rash to abandon acting, since scripture enjoins ritual acts.
22 (ET 158-168). 313-331. Objection: If that is true, why doesn't Śaṅkara say so directly? Answer: Śaṅkara is proving that the Vedānta is valid. Objection: No, optional acts are expressly condemned in scripture as being "transitory" [Muniaka Upaniṣad 1.2.7), etc. Answer: True, but they are enjoined. The condemnation is not of the act as such, but of attachment to the fruits of such an act.
23 (ET 168-176). 332-342a. 4) Nor can it be inferred from context (prakarana), since as we have said the contact governing knowledge is entirely different from that governing action. ( 5 and 6) It cannot be shown on the basis of name (näma) or sequence (krama) either, since they operate only when inferential connection (linga) operates, and as we have seen it does not operate here.
24 (ET 176-183). 342b-356a. Objection (by a kämavilayavädin): We agree that action is subsidiary to knowledge; it is so just because as long as desires hold sway there can be no Self-knowledge. Answer: No. Prajäpati has no more nor less reality than a worm, since reality is without particularizations.
25 (ET 183-195). 356b-377a. Answer: It can't be that neither are subsidiary; as has been indicated, the two kinds of texts have entirely distinct subject matters and thus cannot function together to yield a common meaning, and they produce distinct kinds of results (liberation for knowledge, heaven for ritual action). Self-knowledge precludes action.
26. (ET 195-211). 377b-410a. Objection (by a. prapancavilqyavädin): The karmakäncla is subsidiary to the jnänakäna'a, since the karmakäncla teaches the means by which all differences found in the world are dissolved laya\ vilqya). In this way all the karmakäncla texts prepare one for Selfknowledge by dissolving actions based on attachment. But nonexistence cannot be the result striven after. But one can have true knowledge even while the world exists, and when it is dissolved, as in deep sleep, there is no Self-knowledge. which are the means to liberation, and thus liberation, as well as heaven, will become accidental, and the scripture will lose its point. Objection: Both känias have liberation as their intent; heaven is not an accidental result but is an intermediate step on the way to liberation, just as one. Answer: No, the analogy is not apt, since one does not desire to reach the village by which one reaches the town, but one does desire to gain heaven.
27 (ET 211-221). 410b-427. Objection: But injunctions must be subsidiary to the texts on knowledge, since they help one become eligible for Self-knowledge. Answer: No. But how can (positive) injunctions destroy attachment? Answer: Again, your analogy is inapt, The samgrahani rite may get you your village in the future, whereas service should get it for you in this life; thus they do not have the same result, and the one does not necessarily cause you to turn away from the other.
28 (ET 222-228). 428-440a. Answer: That would have to be proved by recourse to the six kinds of proof (see above, section 22), but none of them suffice. Answer: Yes, one must know the agent-self, but one need not (and cannot) know the real Self. Answer: No.
29 (ET 228-236). 440b-455a. must be known through pramänas other than scripture. Thus it is release from them that constitutes liberation, and nothing else. Again, only something yet-tobe-experienced can be an aim of human activity. Therefore scripture is not a valid pramäna of the Self, both the jnänakända and the karmakända are auxiliary to the injunction to eliminate obstruction.
30 (ET 236-248). 455b-478a. Answer: That is not right. Furthermore, since väs:.näs are endless it isn't possible to suppress them. If not, how could meditation bhävanä) destroy them, since meditation is itself destroyed by frustration (dnhkha), etc. Scripture gives us knowledge of the Self not by a direct meaning-relation with its words, but rather by denying such a relation. and yet those states do not constitute liberation. The Self is not to be established by pramänas, since all things are established only by the Self (i.e., consciousness), so It doesn't depend on anything else. Thus it is clear that the Upaniṣads speak of It too.
31 (ET 248-286). 478b-542a. Objection (by the Niyogavâdin): Only what is to be done (kärya) can be the meaning of scripture, and so scripture cannot concern the Self. Counterobjection: Other pramänas can grasp what-is-to-be-done (kärya). Thus desires, anger, etc., It is therefore the injunctive force indicating what is to be done that is what prompts us to activity. The Niyogavädin shows how even indicative verbs have an injunctive sense or force, and thus that obligation is a pervasive feature of our language. The injunction "one who desires heaven should sacrifice" is exhaustively analyzed.
32 (ET 287-301 ). 542b-569a. Answer: The Vedānta texts produce the modifications (vrtti) of awareness in which the Self is reflected. The Self is self-evident. Objection: If so the Vedantic texts have no use. Answer: Their function is to dispel the ignorance that veils the Self. Objection: Since the Vedantic texts are not injunctive, like mantras and arthavädas, they cannot be pramänas. Answer: Mantras and arthavädas are subsidiary to injunctions, so it is clear why they don't constitute independent pramänas.
33 (ET 301-315). Not by another pramäna, since this would involve mutual dependence. But they cannot conflict with the scriptural (Vedānta) testimony, since consciousness is the locus of all awareness of any kind. For example, "Be happy! Objection: "This road is infested with robbers" surely is intended by its speaker as enjoining the hearer against traveling the road. Especially you (Mïmàmsakas) should accept that, since according to you scripture has no speaker! And since a speaker may intend all sorts of things, his words would then have to mean all sorts of things. The case is analogous to the other pramänas: one who desires to avoid snakes turns away when he sees a snake, but the seeing is not the turning away.
34 (ET 315-324). What is your theory of meaning? ( Or (3) does word meaning depend on the words' connections with other words? ( Objection: But one needs to know the future result in order to connect the injunction with sacrifice. Answer: That is, I gather, one must know the future result before one knows anything. Answer: Then the obligation of "sacrifice" can equally well be known without dependence on any other knowledge. Objection: But sacrificing is onerous, and one needs to have a future result indicated in order to be motivated to sacrifice. Answer: Merely indicating a future result is not enough; the future result must be connected with sacrificing by an appropriate syntactical indication (e.g., an injunctive verb ending); but then, since the niyoga depends on the verb ending and the verb ending depends (according to you) on the niyoga, there will be (the fault of) mutual dependence. Objection: But niyoga precisely is the obligatoriness* Answer: Then it can't have obligatoriness! Only what is not now existing can be obligatory, but according to you niyoga exists now.
35 (ET 325-331). Answer: Well, if one desires something spoken of in what he hears, he will naturally act. Indeed, what is niyoga? It is not (4) the result (phala), since niyoga is not what is desired. Objection: Niyoga is what is accomplished when sacrifice is carried out. Answer: Not if niyoga is eternal, as I gather you claim. Objection: Niyoga is the expected future result (kärya) that functions to produce the ultimate human purpose (viz., Answer: Is this niyoga always present, or is it produced by human activity and then produces heaven, etc.? If the former, since niyoga is always present, heaven, etc., So niyoga is not identical with kärya.
36 (ET 332-342). However, we agree that sacrifice, etc., Objection: Even when sacrifice, etc., Answer: True, but the same difficulty obtains oh your own view, since even if niyoga were what is expressed by injunctions the results are not always seen to occur immediately thereafter. Objection: But sacrifice, etc. ( Answer: No, not all acts have immediate results; consider service to the king. On your view niyoga is interposed between the sacrifice and its result (heaven), whereas on ours it is not; so ours is simpler and thus better. But then no sacrifice could fail to generate heaven immediately; and no other relation seems possible on your view.
37 (ET 343-364). Objection: What is enjoined is activity designed to verify the interpretation of the text. Answer: Is the interpretation to be based on the text or on something else? Objection: The injunction is required to remove a meaning not intended. Answer: No, since words of all sorts, Vedic or otherwise, don't require an injunction in order that they be properly understood. Answer: But sentences about Brahman are not restatements. Objection: But if we know x by one pramäna, where x is previously unknown, and then subsequently know it by another, the earlier pramäna is valid since its content was unknown. Answer: This "unknownness" of a thing, how do you propose to establish its presence? Not by a pramäna, since ex hypothesi the pramäna removes the unknownness! And it surely can't establish itself.
38 (ET 364-371). 693-705. Objection: But niyoga (unlike Brahman, apparently, according to your admission) is only known through verbal testimony as pramäna', thus verbal testimony is an independent pramäna specifically in regard to niyoga. Answer: Precisely; so Vedantic statements are not dependent on other pramänas, since they are not about things about which we have knowledge by other pramänas. Answer: A verb, to be sure, but not any particular kind of verb; declarative statements have verbs.
39 (ET 371-379). 706-719. Objection: But niyoga is something to be established (sädhya), not already established (siddha) like Brahman; so your analogy fails against me. Answer: Either niyoga gets established by action or it doesn't.
40 (ET 379-397). 720-755. Objection: But scriptural texts cannot constitute the pramäna unless something is adduced to explain how the several word meanings in a Vedic sentence conspire to yield a sentence meaning. Answer: Why so? Perhaps a verb must be postulated, but why an injunctive one? Answer: Do you mean that the meaning of an injunction will be known even if we do not understand the words? Objector: Yes. Answer: Then each sentence means something entirely different from any other, unrelated in any way, which is absurd. '' Answer: The niyoga in this case is inferred from the father's acts, so it is not gotten from verbal testimony alone.
41 (ET 398-401). 756-761. Objection: There are two kinds of injunction, originative (utpattividhi) and injunction as to eligibility adhikäravidhi). In the karmakända we find originative injunctions such as "Sacrifice!," in the jnänakända such as "The Self is to be seen." Answer: But Self-knowledge cannot lie within the scope of either.
42 (ET 401-420). Objection (by a Prasamkhyänavädin ): What is enjoined is not Self-knowledge but the means to that through reflection (manana) and meditation (dhyäna) with their auxiliaries (such as calmness, etc.), more specifically through that effort called continued meditation (prasamkhyäna). Thus the assertive statements give mediate (paroksa) knowledge that has to be made immediate through continued meditation. This subsidiary injunction is not the only such aid, reasoning (yukti) likewise assists; but neither scriptural injunctions nor logic alone can produce immediate awareness of reality. He will not arrive at immediate knowledge without continued meditation. Now just as the words ''sacrifice" and "viêvajit" have their own meanings, no doubt, but do not function as pramäna unless one supplies "svargakäma" scriptural assertions and reasoning, while no doubt preserving their natural meaning, do not produce valid knowledge until associated with continued meditation.
43 (ET 421-438). 791-819. Answer: What is this continued meditation supposed to accomplish? Nor can continued meditation remove the mediateness from the Witness-Self, since it is never mediate. Continued meditation cannot effect the release of the Self, since It is always liberated. Objection: Reasoning is not a distinct pramäna from the others, but rather a part of a pramäna, the other parts of which are verbal testimony, meditation and the Self. Together, they make known the unity of the Self. Answer: But none of them is then the pramäna, since it is the pramäna that reveals the truth. can provide, or else reasoning would be merely a restatement of what scripture yields.
44 (ET 438-453). 820-847. Objection: When an object is in the dusk repeated perception of it may make it clearer. Answer: But there the object of each perception is different from the preceding one, first a thing, then a living thing, then a human living thing, and so on. are the same one since they can all grasp the same object. Objection: They are consistent since they have the same expected result. Answer: Since you do not hold that heaven is that fruit I assume it must be liberation. In either case one who desires liberation will not feel any obligation to follow the injunction to meditate.
45 (ET 453-475). 848-884. If it doesn't, it cannot be valid, but we agree that it is. Objection: You say that, for example, "that tnqu art" is the pramäna for the truth, since "that" means Brahman and "thou" means ātman. Answer: We know the meaning of "Brahman" and "ātman" from ordinary usage (laukikaprayoga). Objection: Since the relation of a word to its meaning is established by the usage of elders, verbal testimony cannot be a pramäna, for it has a beginning. Since that does happen, meaning must be conventional. Do we learn it from the elders? But where did they learn it from? But no one remembers Him, or anyone else, doing so. Objection: Failure to remember a thing doesn't prove it didn't happen. Answer: Nevertheless, in the absence of any evidence through remembering what has been experienced there is no basis for postu-* lating anyone who established meanings; so we conclude they are beginningless. Thus scripture, that is, verbal testimony, is valid, both the karmakânda and jnänakäncla parts.
46 (ET 475-483). 885-902. Now, men desire to attain what is worthwhile and to avoid what isn't. Objection: The cause of the knowledge "that art thou" is, by your admission, false (mithyä); so the judgment can't be valid. Answer: Before one is enlightened the means is not known to be false; and after enlightenment it doesn't matter that it is, since one no longer depends on any pramäna once the goal has been reached.
47 (ET 484-500). 903-938a. Objection: Since both perception and scriptural authority as found in the karmakânda prove or presuppose difference between the self and Brahman, your view is impossible to substantiate. Answer: The karmakända is not opposed to the Vedānta texts, for they have different subject matters. Difference cannot be real, since reality cannot be dependent. Two absences (abhäva) cannot be related to each other, since being both absences they are nondifferent. All there is is the positive existent, which is essentially nondifferentiated.
48 (ET 501-507). Objection: Absence is itself a pramäna, and what it grasps validly are absences of objects. Answer: Certainly not. Objection: Perhaps the things are opposed, but still we can combine into a 'phrase or sentence words that are opposed, for example, "darkness" and "light." Answer: No we can't, since the one word sets up expectations that preclude the use of the other. So I conclude that perception cannot grasp absences or differences.
49 (ET 507-513). 950-960. Answer: That would be to attribute contradictory functions to it at the same time. Answer: Cognitions are momentary, and thus one cognition does not last long enough to perform a sequence of functions. Objector: You misunderstand. Answer: That description of reality involves a contradiction.
50 (ET 514-529). Answer: Is this separateness different from its locus ( = substance) or not? Objection: The locus is separate and nonseparate (with respect to different things). Answer: All right, but the locus is not for that reason differentiated, any more than a lily is composite merely because it has several distinct qualities. We cognize the different qualities, but the reality that supports that difference is the nondifferentiated locus. Arguments pertaining to the unreality of absences, difference, are repeated. The conclusion is thus drawn that all differences are superimposed on the one existent consciousness.
51 (ET 530-537). 989b-1005a. Objection: In order for a pramäna to function, its object must be unknown prior to its functioning. Answer: A pramâna destroys unknownness, therefore it cannot have unknownness as its object. Answer: If it were so we couldn't report on our sleeping state afterwards. Answer: Awareness cannot be different merely because of a difference in time. Thus experience is self-established, and it is in dependence on it that the pramänas gain their validity,
52 (ET 537-546). 1005b-1023a. Objection: You apparently suppose that achievement of Self-knowledge yields some kind of happiness or pleasure. Answer: The destruction of frustration is not the same thing as happiness, since one can experience pleasure and pain simultaneously. And those who are happy desire more happiness, thus happiness cannot be the mere destruction of frustration. The Veda is the means of coming to know the supreme happiness, and thus becomes a pramäna.
53 (ET 547-560). 1023b-1049a. Objection: If the supreme happiness, that is, Brahman or the Self, is an object of knowledge there is duality: if it is not known, it cannot be the goal we desire. Even he who desires heaven desires liberation, but not vice versa. Objection: Scripture cannot be the peculiar cause of Self-knowledge in the fashion you have stated. Answer: Then it would follow that the injunctive force of prescriptions arises from ordinary, not scriptural, sources, which is objectionable to you. Injunctions, even Vedic ones, are only instruments for effecting desires.
54 (ET 560-602). 1049b-1137a. Thus you must admit a self that remains through change of body, etc. So only scripture can grasp the true Self. The nature of that true Self is now delineated in familiar fashion. The remainder of this section glosses Śaṅkara's Bhäsya. SECOND BRÄHMAISFA
3-27 (E301-306). Either it designates difference or nondifference from existent (sat): if nondifference it is clearly existence, whereas if it is different from existence it still must exist since it is the locus of difference. And if the nihilist tries to prove his point by inference his proof will lack an example, since on nihilist assumptions nothing exists to be an example.
28-73 (E306-315). . But that cannot be right, since before its origination the effect was not there to destroy its cause. So no effect destroys its cause. Objection: The cognition of continuity through change is an error (bhränti) occasioned by the similarity between the stages. Answer: When the same thing recurs we recognize it, -that is, we perceive it, and since perception is superior to inference this perception overrides your inference. Anyway, on your thesis of momentariness no recognition is possible, but unless recognition is possible your alleged c'cognition of continuity occasioned by similarity" is impossible, since you must at least recognize similarity!
74-107 (E316-322). . " Answer: On the (Nyäya) view that there are three kinds of causal factors whose collocation (sämagri) occasions a result, that contingency would occur, if the three causal factors operate always and everywhere then everything would occur always and everywhere. In both cases effort is exerted to gain knowledge, though the kinds of effects that are manifested are different.
125-227 (E326-346). . Brahman is called "avyäkrta," "undeveloped," when considered with māyā as primary cause, but when māyā is considered as subservient It is called "inner controller" (antaryämin). Scripture, too, is illusory but gives us knowledge of the real, Brahman. THIRD BRÄHMANA
1-37 (E347-354). . Now the nature of that "death" by which one gains liberation is detailed. The gods enlisted the chanter (udgätr) of the soma sacrifice in their cause, so that right knowledge and action is prefaced by meditation on prāṇa.
38-87 (E354-358). . But the world of ignorance is nondifferent from Brahman; the Self is everything. Knowledge by its nature stands on reality, and so cannot reveal unreal things.
130-191 (E374-386). They asked the deity presiding over speech (viz., Väk) to sing a mantra on fire. The point of the story is to indicate what it is that should be meditated upon by one desirous of release, and that thing is prāṇa, because the special qualities of all the other organs and breaths rest on the vital breath. This cannot be achieved merely by knowledge, as in the case of the jiva realizing Brahman-, since both the meditator and the deity are products of Brahman. Meditation drives out all the enemies of the meditator.
192-200 (E387-388). . Or we may say that the fruit of meditation is liberation, since that is enjoined (in the seventh book below). FOURTH BRÄHMA^A
1-70 (E427-441). But what is really intended is that the result is still samsara since Prajâpati, who created the world, had his own weaknesses, fear, etc. Since even the required actions (nityakarman) lead to rebirth, one must abandon them as well. The supreme Self, afflicted by desire, etc., took on the form of a purusa; thus we worship Him as purusa. Virâj purusa, though endowed with superior knowledge and karman, became afraid like a child because of its avidyā. But though thus fearful, he examined his position like any other person and realized what was real. This shows that ignorance of the Self alone is the cause of fear.
71-166 (E441-460). . Answer: For Prajâpati the merit of his good deeds and knowledge is such that it gives immediate recollection of the great sentences. As for the complaint that indication of the means to Brahman-knowledge is pointless, since devotion, acquaintance with texts, etc., Answer: Prajäpati is an official of God, an adhikärika purusa. Though endowed with supreme knowledge and thus having realized Brahman, he is visited with fear due to the latent impression arising from the same feeling in past lives carried over by prärabdhakarman. 1.4.7;
167-222 (E460-471). Ignorance, arising from identification of Self with body, is the cause. And these in turn require objects, since without objects no cognition arises. Though the universe was manifest, the manifestation is not complete since the Self is not manifested. The Self is self-luminous, pure and free from avidyā; It is only apparently associated with avidyā, but associated thus It is the cause of the universe.
223-340 (E472-499). . The Self realizes itself without any pramäna. It realizes ignorance by outward cognition, not inwardly. ( Since the internal organ, etc., are inert (jada) and the products of ignorance, ignorance does not reside in them.
341-364 (E499-504). . He is the prāṇa of the Ckändogya; He is äkäsa and truth (or reality, satya); the unmanifest (avyäkria) of scripture is the Self itself.
365-397 (E504-511 ). . To help the person who created them. First, they create air and äkäsa and then the other three elements. Resting on ignorance, He as Brahma is the cause. Thus God, Brahman, becomes object of usage (vyavahära), since name is a genus of which "Devadatta", etc.,
398-413 (E511-525). . Or, we may say that the common purport of scriptures is the generation of the knowledge of identity, since all pramänas give rise to knowledge of the unknown and what is unknown is just the Self on whom the universe is superimposed.
414-446 (E516-523.). Objection: How can there be superimposition on the Self, since the Self has no generic or specific properties? But in the pure Self this is impossible. Answer: We need not answer this objection, since on our view ignorance alone is the cause of error. Objection: How can ignorance, not being a real entity, be the cause of samsara? Answer: False awareness isn't a real entity either; it is a product of ignorance. Answer: The "reality" of awareness is ascribable in virtue of awareness' taking the form of its object, not its nonsublatability. Therefore, through Self-knowledge duality perishes. In their own nature, however, they are not real.
447-477 (E523-530). . Objection: Error arises when we apprehend the general features of a thing but import through memory special features not actually present.
478-493 (E530-533). . Thus it has been established that samsara is a superimposition of not-Self on Self. Answer: The cause of the world is the Self in association with ignorance, that is, name-and-form. God, avyäkrta> prāṇa, Viräj, the sense organs, etc.,
494-514 (E533-537). . The "entry" of the Self is Its association with ignorance. Süträtman, first born of God, was endowed with the twin capacities of knowledge and action and is called "Hiranyagarbha." are his creations.
515-556 (E537-545). Objection: It was said that the universe was manifested. Answer: There is no difficulty in our reading. The Self is pure, nondual, etc.," refers to the Self alone, but here the agent is also implied. Objection: The Self cannot enter into the world since, being allpervasive, He is there already. Answer: No, for it is not indicated that the person who "entered" underwent any transformation. (
557-574 (E545-548). Answer: We perceive the frustration present in the conditioning adjunct (ußädhi, viz., the mind) of the Self who is identified with it. Objection: According to the text "everything is dear for the sake of the Self" the Self must have pleasure as its attribute., Answer: No, this applies to the Self only as conditioned by ignorance, as in "where another as it were, then by what can one see another, etc."
575-605 (E548-554). . Objection: According to tarkaMstra (i.e., Nyäya-Vaisesika) the qualities of the self are desire, aversion, pleasure, frustration, etc. Answer: Tarkasästra is no authority, since it conflicts with other fästras. The one Self cannot be both knower and known, being partless. Objection: But an eternal thing may have parts; for example, Vajra (Indra's thunderbolt), etc. The destruction of ignorance alone is required for liberation.
606-656 (E554-564). . The reflectionist model is defended; it provides a way of understanding how the Self "enters." and from the body. But on the other hand, just as the fire in a burning log pervades throughout the log, so the Self pervades bodies, etc., throughout. Such false notions should be abandoned.
654-670 (E564-572). . Objection: Since people do see such features, it is contradictory to assert that they do not! This is illustrated from scripture.
671-719 (E572-578). . are based on ignorance.
720-735 (E578-581). . Likewise the distinction between Self and not-Self is based on ignorance. Objection: By saying "the Self should be seen in the not-Self" you presuppose duality! Even the Self's nature as seer is false, since It is consciousness itself.
736-750 (E581-583). . He is so-called because He pervades, He takes, He enjoys objects here, He exists eternally. Thus by seeing Him everything is seen, and so the Self alone is to be cognized.
751-808 (E583-595J. "Some say (this). must be53 an initial injunction (apürua vidhi), others think it a restrictive injunction (niyama vidhi), still others an exclusive injunction parisamkhyä vidhi). Objection: Since the real Self is not fully experienced let the text constitute a restrictive injunction or even an initial one. Answer: No. Self-knowledge is obtained through the injunction pertaining to study of the Vedas. Therefore another knowledge, arising after verbal knowledge, is what is enjoined, thus meditation on verbal knowledge.
809-898 (E595-613). . Answer: These views are not correct. But liberation is not such a result. Answer: No, since from those very texts, which explain the nature of the Self, the realization arises and ignorance perishes. Objection: Injunction is required to retain the Self-realization in memory. Answer: No. Sainkara's comments on this section are then glossed.
899-920 (E614-618 ). . Objection: If the Self is not to be meditated on, the text "He should be heard, thought, meditated (nididhyäsana) on.... " will be contradicted.
921-947 (E619-623). . In point of fact meditation on the Self is a universal habit, since every judgment starts with recognition of the "I."
948-993 (E623-633). We do not approve of this since it is neither the intention of scripture nor is it reasonable. Since there are innumerable such aspects they cannot be known either simultaneously or in succession. The case of not-Self is different. Because it is not different from Self. By knowledge of Self everything is known; since the Self is the reality of the not-Self.
994-1008 (E633-635). Ordinarily, identity with Self is not cognized because of contradiction. So, first of all, the jiva should be identified as different from the body, the senses, etc., and then eventually be understood as Brahman.
1009-1028 (E636-639). . Answer: Because that obtaining is not diffèrent from knowledge, since obtaining the Self is only the destruction of ignorance. So by realizing the Self the knower obtains "fame," etc., 1.4.8;
1025-1054 (E639-645). But in the Self love is natural, as heat is in fire. The Sâmkhyas say that love of not-self is natural, since all things consist of the three gunas. Why is the Self alone lovable? Because He is the innermost, as will be shown later. the Self cannot be said to be the innermost, as It is the inner soul for each of the eight. Love for the not-Self is due to an adjunct; which should be removed to provide scope for pure Self-love.
1055-1074 (E645-649). . The remainder of this Book and the whole of the second Book are meant to explain this thought.
1089-1124 (E652-658). . Not the first, since then Brahman-knowledge would be futile. Not the first, since the same thing cannot be both agent and object. Not the second, because of infinite regress. The passage is intended to explain how none of these questions should arise.
1125-1202 (E659-673). . Bhartrprapanca says, however: Meditators who contemplate Süträtman as identity-cum-difference enjoy identity with that Süträtman, that is, a Brahmin gradually becomes liberated. But since the knowledge of identity-cum-difference does not lead to completeness, Brahman-knowledge is required. By knowing It we become the imperishable Brahman Itself. Before Brahman-knowledge we are Brahman but are ignorant of It; that is avidyā. Bhartrprapanca: But listen. However, these very same arguments prove that it is not the lower Brahman either that is being referred to, the same difficulties prevail.
1203-1232 (E673-679). . Answer: This interpretation is unreasonable since "becoming all" would be impermanent, being dependent on a means. Thus the attempt to find a secondary meaning, etc., Answer: From our experience "I am ignorant" it is clear that ignorance resides in Brahman. Furthermore, since Brahman-knowledge is enjoined wç conclude that Brahman must be unknown. When identity is realized the removal of ignorance is not possible, but for one who has realized Brahman liberation is not desired.
1237-1283 (E680-689). Objection: Jiva is different from Brahman as the jiva is enveloped by good and bad deeds that earn good and bad results. The authors of tarkasästra stress the difference. Answer: If Brahman is not known, how can one meditate on Its identity vtithjiva? Objection: Brahman-knowledge is taught for some other purpose. Other cognitions can serve other purposes, but not Self-knowledge.
1284-1304 (E689-693). . Question: What is the proof for the existence of Brahman? But proof functions to remove ignorance and reveal reality. Only one Brahman exists; before the operation of pramänas It was not a knower, but rather the witness of the darkness of ignorance.
1305-1329 (E693-698). . Brahman is not an agent but only a witness; hence there is no conflict. But avidyā is established only by the illumination of the Self. Since the universe and its origination, etc., Thus when ignorance is removed its products also perish.
1387-1435 (E709-718). . Objection: Scripture says "you cannot know the knower", so how can you assert that the Self knows itself? Answer: The Self is not known as an object, but as the witness of cognitions.
1436-1526 (E718-735). are used in their ordinary senses. Objection: If Self-knowledge can be attained without eligibility it cannot arise. Answer: No, since knowledge can be gained because of traces (samskära) acquired in past lives, as in the case of Vamadeva. Objection: Liberation might have been possible for gods and great men of the past, but not for men of our times. Thus liberation can only come after all enjoyment. Objection: But men are debtors to the gods. Objection: Repetition (abhyäsa) is required before liberation can ensue. Answer: No, for we cannot be sure how many times knowledge must be repeated, and so there will be no decision. Objection: The Self is cognized by the notion of " I "; so scriptural advice to know is merely arthaväda. Answer: No, the Self taught in the Upaniṣads is never cognizable by the notion of "I."
1527-1557 (E736-741). Objection: Since we find that even knowers of reality have desires, etc., knowledge does not remove ignorance. Answer: This is because of prärabdhakarman, which continues even after knowledge like a wheel. This kind of karma does not perish even by knowledge. Answer: Scripture speaks of liberation while living.
15584599 (E741-749). . The gift of light by the sun and of breeze by the air do not bind Him, since sun, air, and other gods are bound to do their duties. He who sees the god as different from himself does not realize reality. That is the nature of Brahman-knowledge; it deprives the knower of his agency for all action. Therefore the gods do not like men getting Brahman-knowledge. Even now we see samnyäsins who are external-object-minded.
1600-1664 (E750-762). . Since the Ksatriya is more powerful than the Brahmin the latter extols him sitting below the king's chair in the Räjasüya sacrifice. The king addresses the Brahmin as "Érahmâ", and the Brahmin replies "you are Brahmin," thus giving back the fame earned by him. But at the end of the Räjasüya the king submits to the Brahmin as he is his cause. This dharma is the ruler of Ksatriya also. It is above might; it rules over Ksatriyas. Dharma is truth (satya) and vice versa. Dharma is also a god. But it cannot give liberation, since knowledge alone is the cause of that.
1665-1714 (E762-771). . He who has performed all actions but has no knowledge of Brahman cannot be liberated. The death of the ignorant is connected with darkness, but for knowers it is the removal of darkness. But Self-knowledge alone saves him. According to Bhartrprapafica, however, the foregoing passage must be construed differently, as follows: Objection: Now action will not lead to liberation as it is perishable and the gods hold him in bondage without providing him liberation. He cannot leave off actions, since they are eternal (or required, nitya). But the state of Brahman, having no specific aspects, is eternal. Through the second combination one gets liberation.
1715-1779 (E771-782). . Furthermore, scripture tells us that when desires perish liberation ensues. Objection: After attaining Hiranyagarbhahood he enjoys all desires and then the two bodies (gross and subtle) perish. Answer: No, since in that case Brahman-knowledge would be fruitless. Selfknowledge alone is the cause of liberation in the Upaniṣad as well.
1780-1883 (E782-797). . Since he is always helping all jivas, they all desire that he should not die, and this is why they do not allow him to get knowledge of Brahman. Question: Since men are free to take up action (pravrtti) or to abandon it (nivrtti), why do they take up action instead of abandoning it? Answer: Desire (käma) is the product of ignorance. Before marriage one is single, but afterwards one begets sons, and they grandsons.
1-12 (E797-799). . In the state of ignorance every person through his actions creates the universe and enjoys its fruits. Thus each man creates the universe by his knowledge and action. This will be explained in the Madhu Brähmana.
13-94 (E799-814). .
95-206 (E814-833). . The senses are but operations of the internal organ, since being touched in the back one knows that he is touched.
207-263 (E834-844). Since through him Prajäpati enters all the prāṇas one should not kill on that day. Answer: Means that are independently causes of their respective effects should not be combined. Bhartrprapanca: But the world of human beings is obtained by ritual action (the jyotisfoma), and one overcomes that by means of one's sons. The Mahäbhärata confirms this. Here "vidyä" (in the text "vidyäya devaloha") means meditation, not Brahman-knowledge. If by "conquering" were meant abandoning it or any of the other worlds, then since the purposes of men (purusärtha) would be obtained, there would be no reason to say that such persons are eligible for performing actions.
264-301 (E844-851). . 1.5.17 indicates how this involves one*s sons. Samnyäsins who take up samnyäsa directly from brahmacarya are not eligible, since they have no sons.
302-390 (E851-868). . Answer: But this act in fact involves an injunction of samnyäsa, so the person who performs it must take up samnyäsa afterwards. Kausitaki Upaniṣad is cited, as well as Manu. Because the son fulfils the duties of his father he is called "putra" ("son"). Mîmâmsakas say that by sons, action, and lower knowledge liberation is attained. Therefore they are for those who have not yet realized Brahman.
1-45 (E868-876). . 46-93/(E876-885). Bhartrprapanca: Brahman is difference-cumnondifference. So the universe is by nature difference-cum-nondifference. Answer: This view is corrupt, since difference and nondifference in one object is inconsistent. BOOK TWO, FIRST BRÄHMA3NA
20-25 (E890-891). . Others, however, say that in this story the person who entered the body is explained. This is pointless, since it is inconsistent with the siddhäntin's espousal of the identity oïjiva and Brahman as set forth in the previous chapter.
40-204 (E894-921). .
205-247 (E921-928). The nature of what is known is unreal, since it is not associated with a person in sleep. Since before he awoke there was no trace of karma in him it is clear that karma is not his nature. When the karma that produces waking ends one goes to sleep. Thus the beginningless ignorance gives rise to samsara. But the jiva becomes one with its reflection and settles in the pure Brahman during deep sleep.
248-272 (E928-936). . Others, however, interpret the passage this way: The jiva, before waking, takes away the awarenesses (vijhana) called speech, vision, etc., This interpretation is not correct, since it says that along with the latent impressions the internal organ is dissolved. avidyā is not in the Self really. By the traces awakened by karma the jiva falls to dreaming and like a magician he creates big and small things all of which are false.
293-318 (E936-940). There is no doubt about the unreality of dreams, since the dead people, etc., Objection: How can the Self be pure, since It is wandering in dreams through the power of desire (käma), and being the seer of them militates against Its purity? Answer: No, since It is nonrelated to desires or even to ignorance. It is the immutable (kutastha) witness.
319-363 (E940-947). In what manner does sleep come about? For each sense organ ten nerves go out to fetch their objects." Spreading Its various väsanäs the Self sees various objects in dream. But a child has no discrimination, and the king might be a drunkard. Thus a third example is given, like a Brahmin who, having the experience of pure Brahman, has carried out his duties and attained final happiness. Being rid of modifications the minds of all three enjoy full happiness.
364-413 (E947-955). . has been answered. This has been fully explained by Gaudapâda. Objection: God is the creator! Answer: If so, why doesn't he always create (even in pralqya)? Whether one adopts the identity-cum-difference view or the nondifference view, in any case the cause-effect relationship cannot be defended.
414-711 (E955-987). . Since only through ignorance does the Self get the names of "prāṇa," etc., The effect of this is the arising of the knowledge of Self and nothing else. The first "truth" is prāṇa, that is, the whole world of name-and-form. Its reality derives from the reality of Brahman, its substratum.
1-31 (E987-992). . prāṇa is seated in the head preeminently, and throughout the body. When the rope becomes weak because of the exhaustion of karma, the prāṇas leave the body and it dies. THIRD BRÄHMANA
1-67 (E992-1003). . The gross form has parts, is perishable, dependent, limited spatially, cognizable by the senses; earth, water, and fire among the five elements belong here. Answer: No, for the essence should be something nonconscious, as we have here to do with the gross, not the subtle realm.
68-104 (El003-1010). . The essence of the first three elements (earth, water, fire) is the sense of sight. They are respectively '"sat" and "tyat" thus the word for "truth," satya. The prāṇas, being such products, are satya; though devoid of name-and-form they are so because of their association with the elements. The jiva's nature is a collection of väsanäs, here described by comparison with a cloth dipped in yellow-colored water.
105-148 (E1010-1017). .- Answer to Bhartrprapanca: This is erroneous, since väsanäs cannot attach to intelligence, which is not matter and indeed a completely different kind ofthing. Bhartrprapanca distinguishes three groups: (1) the five elements, (2) the supreme Self, (3 ) väsanäs. Desire, determination, doubt, etc., Objection: There are other forms in Brahman, but for the jiva väsanä alone is the form. Answer: Even so, for Brahman, which evolves as jiva, the väsanäs arise.
149-170 (E1017-1020). . The teaching of "not this, not this" only applies to the jiva (cf. Book Four). The differences are due to the intensities of the three gunas.
171-214 (E1020-1028). . So far, truth (satya) has been explained. The not-Self rejected in Brahman does not exist anywhere else since, being the product of ignorance in a substrate, it does not exist at all. The word "this" (in "not this") does not refer to Brahman, since it gives existence and illumination to the not-Self and so cannot be negated. Since the not-Self is dependent on ignorance, its annihilation is by Self-knowledge alone. Thus by repetition of "not this" man attains the supreme state of Self-awareness,
215-254 (El028-1034). However, this negation does not have negation as its purpose; rather, it purports identity. The duality is negated even before the Upaniṣads speak, since it is naturally inconstant, being absent in deep sleep. Thus identity oîjiva with Brahman is the meaning of the sentence.
1-38 (E1035-1040). . He must take up samnyäsa, ordained in scripture as the means to Brahman-knowledge. The not-Self has been rejected by "not this, not this." If there is a second entity then Brahmanhood will be lost. Just as sons, etc., To enjoin samnyäsa for liberation is why this Brähmana is begun.
39-70 (El040-1045). .
71-147 (E1045-1057). First, in order that she attain nonattachment he says that for a wife the husband is dear, not because he is the husband but because he does her good. The whole world of not-Self is disagreeable because it leads one to sorrow and confusion. But one's wife, friends, etc., Therefore love of Self is not due to any causal conditions, but is natural. There too scripture says that all is Self. But there is no injunction here, since knowledge is not a thing to be carried out by men. But the fruit, that is, the knowledge or realization, cannot be enjoined. Self-knowledge is always there but will only be realized when the adjuncts are eliminated.
148-211 (El057-10.67). .. Though the identity of jiva with the supreme Self is an existent entity and injunction has no scope, yet the Vedantic scriptures are valid inasmuch as they reveal the identity that is not known by any other pramâna.
212-249 (E1068-1074). . Meditating," here mentioned, is realization of Self in contrast to "seeing," which is superficial knowledge. That nididhyäsana is not meditation but only realization is indicated by the word "vijnänena" (which is used as a synonym for "nididhyäsana" in that last line of this text),
250-297 (E1074-1082). . This is because such a one does not see what is, but sees what is not. The Self persists in all not-Self, but the not-Selves differ and so are unreal. superimposed on it. The Chändogya says that name and other entities up to prāṇa dissolve into b human=Bmhma.n.
298-326 (El082-1087). Not only in the state of existence is there unity of Self but also in the state of origination. Just as the fire releases smoke, etc., In this list "itihäsa" ("stories") does not mean the Mahäbhärata, but only the stories given in the Vedas. " Veda" here means the bulk of the literature consisting of mantras and brähmanas.
327-485 (E1087^I113). . The dissolution of the elements (earth, air, etc.) is in Brahman through auidyä, since Brahman is the material cause of the universe. Hearing this, Maitreyï suspected the death of the Self, since her husband had said that the Self is a mass of intelligence and that It dies with knowledge. When the Self is confined to the body, etc., But this is only in the state of ignorance. All the senses are the products of gross elements, since each cognizes only the quality of the corresponding element. The energies of action and knowledge dissolve in Brahman. The text "Because when there is duality, as it were" does not allow the possibility of duality. FIFTH BRÄHMANA
1-49 (El 113-1120). . All creatures being the products of the earth are likewise honey for the earth. Therefore the relationship of enjoyer and enjoyed is common to both (earth and creatures ) as both are products of each other.
50-147 (E1120-1134). . Truth (satya in II.5.12) is the Vedic activity called dharma. ātman" (in II.5.14) means the combination of Viräj and Hiranyagarbha. But this interpretation is wrong, not being in accord with the text. The Brähmana closes with a small story designed to eulogize Brahman-knowledge. BOOK THREE, SECOND BRÄHMANA
1-31 (El 147-1152). . But that is not final liberation since they also are subject to birth and deajth. Therefore the real liberation by Brahman-knowledge needs to be taught. Death," which is of the nature of ignorance, is destroyed by knowledge. Thus Self-knowledge is the death of death.
32-165 (El 152-1176). Objection: For him who realizes the Self and then dies, is there the exit of the prônas from the body or not? But if not, the person is not dead. Answer: (IH.2.11) No. Since ignorance has been destroyed there is no rebirth, and so the prāṇas do not leave the body but are absorbed into Brahman. Since names signify the universal and not particular aspects they do not perish. What is his support? Karman also implies avidyā and traces (bhävanä), since these are also required in producing the body.
1-63 (El208-1218). . Objection: Brahman cannot be the person who teaches, since Its nature is Brahmanhood and thus It need not be taught. Answer: Brahman alone, veiled by ignorance, is the person eligible to teach. The word "Brahman" eliminates the doubt whether It is one with a second. This combination of terms indicates that it is the jiva that is Brahman of which Usasta speaks.
64-187 (E1218-1239). . Usasta (in III.4.2) complains that Yäjnavalkya promised to show the Self directly but (in III.4.1) has only proffered an inference. FIFTH BRÄHMAI^A
1-60 (El240-1249). Answer: It is not the same question; though the wording is the same, its meaning is different in that this question is about the Self's freedom from hunger, thirst, misery, and the rest of the attributes of samsara.
61-86 (E1249-1253). . It is restlessness of mind. Since the Self's association with prāṇa ends at liberation there is no trace of hunger and the rest, which are products of prāṇa. By bringing in the Sutrâtman and Viräj it is meant that in all acts of worship (upäsanä) ordained in the Upaniṣads the dissolution of all effects, the universe, constitutes liberation.
86-114 (E1253-1258). . The word "Brahmin" (brähmana) indicates eligibility here, since the other varnas are not eligible for samnyäsa. Sureśvara, however, thinks the three highest varnas are eligible for samnyäsa. If it means complete Self-realization then samnyäsa cannot be enjoined. If it means verbal knowledge samnyäsa can be enjoined.
115-148 (E1258-1264). . "
149-214 (E1264-1276). . By hearing" (sravana) four kinds of cognitions are meant. The word "panda" means knowledge, and a knower is a "pandita." By gaining stability in the Self through the sästras and one's teacher he should meditate fixedly on the Self, thus removing the wandering of the mind in not-Self. Answer: No. All actions must be abandoned, as is indicated by scripture. Liberation cannot be achieved by any means, being the beginningless Brahman. EIGHTH BRÄHMANA
1-29 (El290-1295). . Even in the First Book, where it is said that the universe was initially in the form of the unmanifest, only the inner controller was referred to.
30-72 (El295-1302). . Controllership requires ignorance, since the Self is without qualities such as controllership. When by Selfknowledge ignorance is expelled, the Self becomes immutable or aksara. But aksara is hard for even Brhaspati to know or speak of, since It is beyond all pramänas. Since It is said to be directly knowable it cannot be denied. It is called "aksara" because It is opposite to cause and effect, which are perishable because interdependent. The Brahmins who have dispelled ignorance by Brahman-knowledge say this.
73-108 (E1302-1307). Objection: But otherwise the denial leads to nihilism. Answer: No, since all denials require a substratum. But even on the second interpretation (the "restricted" negation) there is no duality, since the adjectives negated, being mutually dependent, have no independent standing and thus no reality. The word "amätra" indicates that aksara is not a hétu in inference.
109-180 (Ei307-1318). Objection: If everything is denied in aksara how can we come to know of Its existence? Answer: It is self-luminous. The difference between aksara and the inner controller is illusory, but the inference can only be in regard to the inner controller. The various parts of time-, minute, hour, etc., presuppose a controller. That men give things as gifts and thus gain heaven presupposes someone who rewards them, since nobody would part with money without a reward. The same rule applies in the case of Vedic acts. Therefore the regularity of reward for one's acts in subsequent lives cannot be merely due to the dharma arising from the act.
1-153 (El318-1342). Scripture also says "He is Brahman," meaning prāṇa. Through the Süträtman it controls the whole universe. Now the text proceeds to discuss the number and nature of these many gods according to a variety of classifications.
154-210 (E1342-1351). Opponent:.... "Brahman is bliss, but since It is consciousness as well It cognizes Its own bliss," etc. Answer: This is untenable since "cognizing something requires a body and organs," etc. All worldly happiness is brought about by some means, but in liberation the Self is bliss. He is also consciousness. BOOK FOUR, SECOND BRÄHMANA
10-33 (El360-1364). . ( Objection: It has been said that worshipers attain the nature of the objects of their worship. Answer: The king knew that, but worship also conduces to liberation, which is Brahmanhood, and the king did not know this. Answer: This is not correct, since there is no mention ofapathin Yäjnavalkya's reply, nor is there mention of Brahman-knowledge in the previous Brähmana.
34-85 (El364-1372). . " He is so called because he is the enj over of gross objects in the waking state. The right eye is more powerful than the left. He is jiva, the enjoyer. People call him "Indra," showing respect by omitting the original name, since the gods do not like people getting at the secret of the nature of the name. It is intended for meditating on Agni and Soma. Their covering, formed by nerves, looks like a net since it contains numerous holes. But the causal body has the subtlest part of the food, not just what is "as if" the subtlest part. All the other gods also pervade the nerves, since the body and the senses are common to all of them. Thus there are as many Prajâpatis as there are nerves. This pure Self is devoid of all senses and their presiding divinities; it is pure intelligence.
106-113 (E1375-1376). . Question: How can the king give fearlessness to Yäjfiavalkya (in the last sentence of this Brâhmana), since he has already attained that stage? Some reply: The sage had not attained Self-realization. THIRD BRÄHMAI^A
9-12 (E1378-1379). The latter meaning is more appropriate, according to Sureśvara, since if the sage had a vow not to talk the king would not have compelled him to talk, and there is no mention of any reason for taking such a vow.
116-155 (E1396-1403). Counterobjection: But the Self is self-revealed and so intelligence cannot be a property of It. Dehätmavädin: Because the body is the product of four elements, and when the air, one of the elements, gets out, consciousness goes out with it. But because of the recognition "I dreamt," in waking we infer that the Self is the same in both states, so the Self is different from the body. Thus their Self must be different from their bodies. Therefore, elements help elements; this is the rule. Thus the luminous thing that helps the body should be an elemental thing, like the sun, And the Self should be of the same species as the sun, since like the eye the Self is inside the body and invisible. We rest our case on perception. But if it is something general that has to be inferred (for example, fire in general inferred from smoke in general) then there is the proving only of what is already proved (siddhasädhana).
156-203 (E1403-1412). . First of all, is it correct to say it is ' 'contrary to perception," since there is no object other than Self for perception to grasp? But before the pramäna arises we cannot know that an object is unknown or that it is not.
204-239 (E1412-1418). . Further, the same body cannot be cognized both as " I " and as "this" because of their inconsistency. The Witness, consciousness itself, cannot be known. When the body dies the death of consciousness cannot be known by the inert body nor by the Self, since one cannot see one's own death. needed for seeing an object? But negation belongs to a different genus.
240-275 (E1419-1425). . Furthermore, since you invoke inference to establish the nonvalidity of inference there arises a self-contradiction. Without inference the ordinary activities of men, like drinking, eating, speaking, etc., will not be possible.
276-339 (E1426-1436). . Now Janaka asks (IV.3.7) "Which is the Self?". Since the Self is cognizable only in Its association with the buddhi and not separately, the word "vijnänamaya" is put here. Those who interpret "maya" as meaning "produced by" flirt with contradiction, since on their own interpretation the words (elsewhere) "vijnänamaya" "manomaya" etc., since the Self is not a product. He who witnesses all these modifications is the Self, by whose presence they arise and are destroyed.
340-378 (E1436-1442). function for the benefit of others, but the Self does not. The Self, "light," is self-luminous and self-evident. Since the Self is nonattached, His being the cause, the Witness, etc., Hence the view that " I " is the first illusion. Therefore Yâjnavalkya takes up dream cognitions to demonstrate the existence of the self-luminous Self, since only väsanäs are there to condition It.
471-495 (El457-1464). . But we have inference to support our view, since it is not opposed to perception and perception alone is valid. Question: But aren't knowledge and its knower different? Constructionfree (nirvikalpaka) awareness alone is valid, and it cannot grasp difference.
496-530 (El465-1470). . So light and pot are different. This does not lead to an infinite regress, since the Witness is self-revealed. Thus supported, perception, inference, and scripture can all function in cognizing external objects.
531-652 (El470-1493). . Vijnänavädin: There are no external objects. Answer: If you do not accept anything different from consciousness then you have no example for your inference, since dreaming is also consciousness. But if you accept external objects we can establish our view by inference. Thus the momentariness of things is impossible, since without existing they cannot be the causes of any useful purpose. Vijnänavädin: But the stream of momentary events (samtäna) is eternal. Answer: Not for you, because this would admit a self, the agent of the eternal stream that survives through it.
653-696 (El494-1502). . The relationship of cause and effect must be accepted between two momentary things since they belong to different times. Thus there is no evidence to prove that everything is knowledge. Nor can tünyaväda be maintained, because there is no evidence. Answer: But since nothing lasts more than a moment on your view, nothing can persist long enough to be responsible for something else.
697-741 (El502-1512). . The view that cognition has different aspects is also wrong. Finally, nirvana will never be accomplished, since there is no persisting person to enjoy it. Thus inference receives practical support.
742-808 (El512-1527). . [ The buddhist contends that the hetu in a successful inference must be either (1) a thing's nature (svabhäva), (2) an effect (kärya), or (3) noncognition (anupalabdhi).] Answer: The nature of fire is hotness, but one cannot infer that what is hot is fire, since other things (hot water) are hot.
809-830 (E1527-1531). His "death" is the departure of the subtle body. From this it is plain that it is different from the body. All its attributes are merely illusory superimpositions. The states of waking and dream are visible, the existence of another world after death is made known by the Vedas.
831-912 (El 531-1544). Here by "his own" the natural light of the Self is meant. Knowership, knowledge, etc., In dream one is self-luminous, he makes the väsanäs shine without any accessories. He is the witness of all that shines there. This is what is meant by "he dreams." But in dreaming they are absent. The witness is detached from all. The self does not enjoy happiness in dreams; everything is phenomenal.
946-948 (El549). . If he were woken up suddenly he might enter a wrong nerve and be deaf or dumb for life.
974-1013 (E1553-1559). . No väsanäs are brought to the deep-sleep state. But he is not attached to them in dream, as is shown by the fact that when he awakes he does not experience the results of his dreams; for example, having eaten in one's dream one may wake up and immediately feel hungry.
1014-1045 (El560-1565). . do. Or, the word "asanga" may mean changelessness, since change is due to activity. How is this? Because the Self is not the real agent.
1045-1066 (E1565-1569). One is unconscious and cannot wander or enjoy. Prima facie answer: The passage must be read "he does not wander (acäritva) and does not enjoy (aratva)" Reply: But the Self is said to be nonattached even in dream later in the same passage; so what is the difference? Another prima facie answer: As the Mäniükya Upaniṣad says, one enjoys bliss in deep sleep. Surefvara's answer: Each of the three stages, waking, dream, and deep sleep, are divided into three states.
1067-1146 (E1569-1570). . In deep sleep one enjoys all bliss and comes back to dreaming with his väsanäs* But he does not go out of the body. If he did his body would die. For the Gârvâka, however, the two states could occur simultaneously.
1147-1187 (E1578-1583). Therefore to discriminate the Self from karma and väsanä the text involving the word "asanga" was adduced. This interpretation (of Bhartrprapafica's ) is not correct, since the senses and their objects are mere avidyā and not something different. Therefore to say that nonattachment (asanga) is discovered by the Self through the senses is incorrect. The rest of the section is intended to discriminate the Self from the dream and waking states, as explained.
1188-1204 (El583-1593). . Now we have to decide whether consciousness is elemental or eternal. The Self gets knowledge through contact of the senses with their objects. Our position is this. In dreaming the gods have no hold on our senses. Therefore everything is a product of avidyā, by eliminating which the Self enjoys liberation. The Self is different from avidyā and its products. The relationship of avidyā with the Self is indefinable and false and so will be destroyed by Brahman-knowledge.
1205-1242 (E1593-1601 ). 3.20) dealing with the ' 'nerves" begins. There are several nerves projecting from the heart. Because of the jiva's false identification with the subtle body he experiences all kinds of things, all of which are unreal. The division of real and unreal in waking is like the division in dream, since everything in waking is also unreal. When all of these are equal the nerves will be of a thick red color.
1243-1262 (E1601-1604). All this is false. Thus being tied up with avidyā the jiva seems to be agent and enjoyer. As the Self is changeless there is no element other than avidyā, which causes Him to be agent, etc.
1263-1287 (El 605-1609). . Being the witness of the internal organ, the Self is taken to be the locus of väsanäs. In other cases the meditation is "as if " one were god, or king, thus they are not the results of vidyä. But the wholenessexperience in dream is real, not just a dream.
1288-1357 (El609-1620). . Thus it shows the real nature of the Self. This is the Self's real nature since there is no delusion, etc., which produce desire and karma. The words in this section of the text are glossed, and some variant readings are mentioned.
1358-1406 (E1621-1629). . since ignorance is absent, ignorance, which is the cause of generation. Actually, the Self is never involved in these things; His only property is consciousness, and He has nothing to do with ignorance, desire, and karma.
1407-1495 (E1630-1643). . But in deep sleep He doesn't. But in deep sleep they do not operate, and thus the Self is conscious only of Itself. But because He has no senses or objects to see, He does not see. Since the mind is absent there are no mental operations. By the words "He sees" the Self's intrinsic consciousness is implied.
1496-1536 (E1644-1651). Because there is no second thing," adduced as the reason (hetu), means because of the absence of ignorance in its operating state, though it is there in its latent causal state.
1537-1638 (E1651-1668). Others (Bhartrprapanca), however, interpret these sections differently. But He has no knowledge of individuals. Thus knowledge persists as long as the Self exists, but the Self never dies since He is the Self of all and is single. So, since the Self is shining in sleep with knowledge, He is permanent. You say knowledge in sleep is produced by the Self but does not perish, but that is selfcontradictory, since everything that originates should perish. Since the former is already made clear, the phrase "does not see" negates agency in knowing.
1639-1793 (El668-1696). . Answer: This view is false. But difference and nondifference cannot be both the property of one object. Inferences supposed to establish difference-cum-nondifference are also corrupt, since on the opponent's assumption hypothesis, reason, and example cannot be completely different, which they should be if inference is to be valid.
1794-1812 (El696-1698). . There is no internal difference in Him. By the word "water" difference from objects of different species is negated.
1813-1845 (El698-1703). . The "world" mentioned here is not any world but consciousness itself. " Brahmaloka" is Brahman that is consciousness, not a world. All happiness rising from objects are only the bliss of Brahman conditioned by buddhi and its modifications.
1846-1886 (E1703-1710). . Knowledge of the Vedas is counseled as leading from each stage to the next. Answer: No, since the Vedic knowledge referred to destroys agency and karma.
1887-1975 (E1710-1723). . In this way Yäjnavalkya completed his answer to the king's question, but the king now (IV.3.34) again asks him to explain the way to liberation. So the king asks Yäjnavalkya to explain liberation. So Yäjnavalkya proceeds to explain sarrisœra in detail. The senses, though located indifferent parts of the gross body, collect into one place that is prāṇa. When the subtle body proceeds it is waited upon by many gross bodies. FOURTH BRÄHMAI^A
43-73 (E1731-1736). . By the word "heart" the buddhi is meant. " So the jiva no longer sees colors, since that sunaspect has become one with the sun (IV.4.2) and the sense of sight has become one with the subtle body. Then persons nearby say "he does not see." Likewise with the other organs.
97-125 (El740-1744). . " The subtle body goes out through any nerve, since all are open to him. But he cannot have knowledge of everything since he is not independent. he must practice yoga. All the Sästras are intended to provide the knowledge of the various means that one can attain through body, mind, and speech either to gain uplift or to earn calamity. By "past experience" is meant those latent impressions of past deeds the fruits of which have been or have not been enjoyed.
426-146 (E1744-1747). . There are different views as to how the jiva leaves this body and takes another. Some say that the gods take the jivas to other bodies. The Sâmkhyas say tha.tj.iuas attain expansion and contraction in another body. The Vedäntin's view is that the senses and prāṇas are all-pervasive but undergo contraction in bodies as conditioned by karma.
147-184 (E1747-1753). . Thus, though not an agent, He seems to become the speaker of words through avidyā. because of väsanäs. Being saturated with merit and demerit the self becomes "one with all" (sarvamqya), because he becomes soaked with what he does. Whatever he does, that he becomes, "by good deeds he becomes good, by bad deeds bad.53
185-234 (El753-1761). . But desire is also the cause of karma, so the text says "the Self is full of desire (kämamaya)" Ignorance is the cause of desire also. There is no activity without desire.
235-250 (El 761-1763). . Thus, forgetting its real nature, it travels between this body and the future body without rest, like a water pot in a Persian wheel.
251-303 (El763-1771 ). . He has attained all bliss (i.e., all desires) by his Self-knowledge, since all the minor blisses form parts of the supreme bliss. Thus by being desirous of the Self one becomes desirous of attainment, then desireless (niskäma), and finally without desire (akäma). Now being firmly one with the Self he has no samsara. So the release of the already released is obtained.
304-323 (E1771-1774). . Hence scripture says "being already released he is released." His attainment of Brahman is only the departure of the separating ignorance.
324-375 (E1775-1782). . The view of those who believe in asatkäryaväda or ärambhaväda (i. e., the Nyâya-Vaisesikas ) is likewise wrong, since nonexistents can never come into existence.
376-390 (E1783-1786). . In deep sleep also, desires dry out but their väsanäs exist. Since the mind is a product of avidyā, desires die when the mind dies along with ignorance.
391-412 (E1785-1789). But even then the desires in the self persist, and do not die. " The desires that reside in jiva do not perish, however, since they are identical with the jiva who is released.
413-501 (El789-1803). . Answer to Bhartrprapafica: This view is against scripture. In the course ofthat explanation the first Book says that desires, etc., The view of Jaimini and Kanada that desire is a property of the self is wrong, since it is against the teaching of the Vedas. Thus the Upaniṣad indicates that all desires should be removed. Scripture overrides Kanäda's view as much as that of the buddhists.
502-531 (El803-1807). . When ignorance has been destroyed by Self-knowledge, the Self becomes bodiless, for the connection with the body was only through ignorance. But in the absence of avidyā there is no imagining at all; so a fortiori there can be no connection. The word "asarira" "bodiless," negates both the gross and subtle bodies.
532-545 (E1807-1810). . He offers Yäjnavalkya a thousand cows. Question: Why didn't Janaka give Yäjnavalkya all he has? Why only a fraction? The reason is that the king wanted to hear the means to Brahman-knowledge such as samnyasa, hearing, considering, and meditating.
545-560 (E1810-1812). . Since its content is all-pervasive it is wide. Since it is based on the old Veda it is also "old" (vitata). " Heaven" (suarga) here is Brahman-bliss and not heaven, since the context is that of liberation.
561-598 (E1812-1818). 2 (IV.4.9). Those who are ignorant suggest various paths to liberation. Scripture says that the abandonment of action alone is the means to liberation.
599-615 (E1818-1821). According to the Madhyandinas ''sambh üti" is read in place of "avidyā" but the meaning is the same. These siddhis lead to worlds that have no happiness. He has no desires.
616-623 (E1821-1822). (IV.4.13.).
624-656 (E1822-1828). (IV.4.14-16). Since he has overcome time he has no change, the years, etc., Since the cause of duality has been destroyed the knower is deathless. He is the "prāṇa of prāṇa," the life-giver of life.
657-767 (E1829-1832). Objection: If Brahman is seen by the mind then there must be dualities as between seer, seen, and sight. Answer: In Brahman there is no non-Brahman, seen or unseen.
677-698 (E1832-1835). (IV.4.20). Objection: If Brahnian is seen there must be difference between seer and seen, and if so how can It be said to be "nonobject"? Answer: First, it is seen by negating other objects. This is because the capacity of the word is inexplicable (adntyu) and sleep is illuminated by the Self, which is consciousness.
699-769 (E1836-1847). Some commentators interpret this another way. Thus he contemplates Hiranyagarbha and after attaining identity with it he looks upon Brahman as self and become Brahman. He can do them or keep quiet. But the knowledge of identity between Self and Brahman that arises from the Vedic text is not dependent on a person. AU his duties are over; he has attained the fruits of his labor.
770-834 (E1848-1857). Others interpret the stanza thus: After knowing, one must meditate. This view also is not good. AU pramänas generate knowledge of the unknown. Indeed, by meditating on a false object nobody gains the truth.
835-877 (E1858-1864). One should get knowledge of Brahman fr.om the Vedic text, This is "vijnäna." Or, by the pervasion of pramäna called ic vijnäna" knowledge arises, but there is duality of seer and seen. By the word "only" (eva) duality and mediacy in Brahman are eliminated, since these are due to ignorance and perish through Vedic knowledge. Or, "prajnä" is the knowledge of Brahman, the aim of man. Knowing the Self ("vijnäna") you must know Him as the supreme.
878-891 (El865-1866). . in the adept. Therefore there are two ignorances, one natural (naisargya), the other accidental (ägantuki). Therefore to remove this natural ignorance one must practice knowledge repeatedly after "vijnäna."
891-935 (E1866-1874). . This interpretation is not correct, since there is only one ignorance, not two. The Self is such. The knower is not the locus since he is always known. Ignorance that is necessarily removed by knowledge can never hinder knowledge from functioning. In the view of the Vedäntin, since the Self is consciousness, all the world including the buddhi is pervaded by It and hence contemplation is unnecessary.
936-961 (E1874-1878). . Knowledge of Self derived from scripture cannot be ordained to be repeated. The knowledge that destroys ignorance does not require any instrument for destroying it.
962-979 (E1878-1882). The adept should not think of many words. Since it is tiring for the speech organ, words conveying the not-Self should be avoided. By repeating it he will eventually get the desire for Brahman-knowledge. Its attributes are allcontrollership, omnipotence, and unchangingness.
980-1062 (El882-1895). Thus, the jiva's dependence upon Brahman is also denied here. He is not born, etc., Therefore He cannot become superior or inferior by karma, not being an agent; He is nonattached. Since He protects all creatures He is called "Bhütapäla." Since such a desire does not arise independently, the Upaniṣad gives us the means of acquiring such desires. Since recitation of the Vedas, etc., The word "Brahmins" (brähmana, in IV.4.22) implies the first three varnas, which are all competent for Vedic study. " By the purity of the organs earned in many lives he will get release in the first stage of life (viz., However, fasting unto death should not be undertaken by one who is able to undertake hearing and thinking (about Brahman) in this life. But it may be undertaken in Prayâga (Allahabad), etc., by inefficient persons, since death then brings him liberation.
1063-1143 (E1895-1907). By being a sage he gets Brahman-knowledge, Now the text-praises samnyäsa, speaking of the wise old men who had attained Brahman-knowledge and did not desire sons, actions, inferior knowledge, etc.
1144-1179 (El908-1914). . Objection: Why should those who desire Self-knowledge abandon action? Let them perform actions and not samnyäsa. Vyâsa tells us that neither good nor bad acts affect him.
1180-1300 (E1914-1936). . The six qualities are explained. But even in begging one should leave the idea of " I " and "mine."
1301-1345 (El936-1943). . " This is the Brahman-world, and you have attained it," says Yàjfiavalkya, and having been thus instructed Janaka gave him his empire and his self. ( By meditating on Brahman thus one gets prosperity. (
1-30 (El944-1948). . In the Madhukända Brahman was explained through scripture. The universe is not existent apart from Brahman, nor is it Brahman's nature, since the universe is inert. But the universe is not a nonentity. Therefore Brahman is full (puma), identical with the universe. Now we have to understand the fullness of the qualified Brahman by removing phenomenal difference through Brahman-knowledge, thus cognizing its nature of purity, Selfhood and bliss, fully nondual consciousness.
63-116 (E1959-1968). .
117-130 (E1968-1970). . SECOND TO THIRTEENTH BRÄHMANAS (E1970-1983) II.1-XIII.5. Further meditative forms of qualified Brahman are set forth in Brähmanas XI-XIII. ( E1983-1985) XIV.1-15. BOOK SIX (E2005-2073) I.1-V.25. Sureśvara's commentary follows thé text closely and does not add materially to Śaṅkara's.
Work 35: Taittirīyopaniṣadbhāṣyavārttika
Potter, printed pp. 521–530 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 4,088 words
TAITTIRIYOPANISADBHÄSYAVÄRTTIKA "A Värttika has been defined as a work that examines what is said (ukta), what is not said (anukta), and what is not well-said (durukta) in the original. PART ONE: SlKSÄVALLl (ON PRONUNCIATION)
32 (ET 15). Introductory section, part 7: Śaṅkara has argued that "absences cannot really have qualities," etc. PART TWO: BRAHMAVALLl (THE BLISS OF BRAHMAN)
63-69 (ET 95-98). . This objector then argues that words cannot give us any positive knowledge ex hypothesis and since we don't know Brahman by any other pramäna the sentence in question ("Brahman is truth, etc.") is about nothing at all. Sureśvara"s answer: Nothing false vitatha) is experienced except as it is dependent (älingya) on the highest reality (paramärtha). So, all falsity is based on reality. The absence of an absence (apoha) is not derived from this sentence, however, but from some other means of knowledge (viz., presumption or arthäpatti).
70-73 (ET 99-101). . Since all real entities (uastu) are known by perception it is not possible to establish the momentariness of anything. Our view is that the pot is indestructible. 13)
135 (ET 129). .
140-151 (ET 132-141). . And nothing else can be the cause of the world, since everything else is an effect. Brahman cannot even be the cause of the world by Its mere presence, since then It would always be creating and nothing would get destroyed. The only cause of the world is avidyā. Birth, destruction, etc., All candidates for the role of cause of the world cannot serve, since they all arise from avidyā.
158-162 (ET 144-148). . Before it was Sutratman, its cause, that has the form of the "compact form of knowledge" (Van Boetzelaer's rendering ofy'prajnänaghana') before it produces Viräj.
163-172 (ET 149-152). . Herbs, constituted of the five elements, are born from earth moistened by rain and provide us with food. -janyakarman). cf. This new human body is composed of the same elements and organs as its karmic predecessor was.
176-179 (ET 155-157). . avidyā" "nonknowledge," is like "amitra," "nonfriend," that is, "enemy" (i.e., it is not the name of an absence of, but of something opposed to, knowledge).
182-198 (ET 158-165). . The condition of the jiva in the womb it finds painful and disgusting, remembering its previous experiences through impressions (väsanä), and the experience of birth is likewise painful.
199-221 (ET 165-171 ). ... The misery of human life, youth to old age, is likewise expressed vividly.
232-237 (ET 177-182). . indicating the subject or "I," food (anna), etc., indicating the object or "Thou." By dissolving these sheaths in their respective causes and then dissolving even the ultimate cause itself, one may understand Brahman.
238-241 (ET 183-186). . Viräj is food, evolved from prāṇa. The buddhi, which ascertains the meaning of the Vedas, is vijnäna. 13a)
5. 320-351 (ET 230-247). . Objection: The bliss-sheath is the highest Self, because (in the next section, the Bhrguvallï) the conversation between Bhrgu and Varuna terminates when it arrives at this point; furthermore, scripture frequently identifies Brahman as having the nature of bliss. Finally, this very chapter is (sometimes) called the "ÄnandavallL" Answer: No, since bliss is an effect, something obtained. Again, Brahman is of the nature of bliss, as scripture avers; the bliss is freedom from all difference. This bliss, however, is free of all distinctions of grades of happiness, etc., The Brahman-bliss fills all five sheaths, including the änandamaya. 8.5
550-558 (ET 348-352). 26 ) Attaining Brahman by being informed is not like getting to a village by following directions, for in giving directions one is not given a description of the nature of the village, whereas in imparting knowledge of Brahman one does.
595-614 (ET 375-385). . The Self is not an empirical object, so perception, etc., are not needed, as they are in the case of someone telling you that there are fruit trees on the bank of the river (since you need your senses to confirm this statement).
615-630 (ET 385-394). . Brahman cannot be reached by word or concept; injunctions to us to know It are futile. Since Brahman is not known to us prior to realization it follows that we can't meditate on It. And one shouldn't suppose that therefore Brahman doesn't exist, for it is only through Brahman that pramäna, what is not pramäna, and what only appears to be pramä pramäbhäsa) can become evident to us at all.
631-634 (ET 395-397 ). Answer: No, since a real thing (i.e., the Self) already exists It cannot be enjoined, for an injunction can only speak of what is to be accomplished; and Self-knowledge does not need enjoining, for it-willoccur-.-(according to you) as a result of the presupposed injunction that each man should study the appropriate portion of the V e d a, it needs no additional injunction anymore than, having been enjoined to act, one needs another injunction to gain knowledge of action.
635-638 (ET 397r398). Answer: No, for knowledge manifests its object, here, the Self, without any intervening activity, so there's no scope for an injunction other than the one enjoining everyone to study the Vedas.
639-673 (ET 399-412). . Nevertheless, scripture is assuredly the pramäna for coming to know Brahman. But Brahman is not the subject matter of the sentences of the Vedas (vedaväkyärtha), for (1) the Vedic utterances are commands, and Brahman is not dependent on human effort and so cannot be the subject matter of a command; (2) furthermore, Brahman (unlike e.g., dharma,) is not the denotatum of any word (since It lacks the kinds of features that make denotation of it possible), and therefore a fortiori It cannot be referred to in a sentence; Answer: We have answered this above (at 595 ). Thus the Self is not the knower; it is the buddhi that is the knower. for as we have just said subject, object, and act of awareness are directly known and do not require a prarnäna, thus no error, doubt, or ignorance needs to be dispelled in their case, and so no additional understanding (beyond the nonrelational knowledge of Brahman) is required or need be enjoined.
674 (ET 418). Answer: An inference to the effect that Vedānta texts require injunctions (such as the one just given) is faulty, since pervasion between the h and the s cannot be established (in this case, since not all sentences are connected with injunctions, even on the Niyogavâdin5 s own presuppositions).
678 (ET 421 ). . Answer: Then it will be impossible to know Brahman arid injunctions would have no content, which contradicts your own view.
687-688 (ET 426-427). . Surehara: This is wrong. Among these are words like "milk" (uttered by one who already knows milk). Answer i It doesn't matter, it still must function independently to denote heaven or whatever.
691-692 (ET 429-430). . Answer: Injunctions are valid insofar as they successfully lead men toward their purposes (purusärtha).
699-700 (ET 432-433). . Niyogavädin: A word by itself has no validity because (1) it depends on something else toxonvey its meaning, and (2) it is a repetition (anuväda). So there must be another pramäna besides injunction.
701 (ET 433). . Or is it through words ßabda = verbal authority)? If so, words are valid means of knowing, contrary to your assumption.
702-705 (ET 434-436). . Sureśvara: Is this "difference" (bheda) a negative entity or "absence" (abhäva)? If so, it can have no relation with a sense organ and cannot therefore be grasped by any of the pramänas.
707-713 (ET 437-439). . Niyogavädin: Your arguments presuppose that Self-knowledge leads to liberation, but that assumption is based on the validity of scriptural injunction. By another injunction? On the other hand, if the injunction is subordinate to the statement it is useless, since the statement has the power to convey its own meaning.
714-720 (ET 439-442). All this does not mean that injunctions have no role to play on our view. Once Self-knowledge is realized, since ignorance is already destroyed, there is no possibility of or need for an injunction to meditate. If knowledge could not by itself remove ignorance it couldn't do so in combination with an injunction either.
Work 36: Naiṣkarmyasiddhi
Potter, printed pp. 530–550 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 8,882 words
This is an independent exposition of Advaita in 423 stanzas connected by a prose commentary. It is divided into four chapters or "books" of about 100 stanzas each. BOOK ONE Introduction (El-5; Tl-2). This superimposition is caused by our accepting the duality of things. Therefore the eradication of noncomprehension achieves every human purpose. The cessation of nonknowledge (ajnäna) comes from right knowledge (samyagjnäna), which comes only from the sentences of Vedânta scripture (ägama), since the Self, obscured by noncomprehension, cannot be grasped by the other pramänas. Thus this treatise (prakarana) is begun as representing the collected essence of the entire Upani sads (asesavedäntasärasamgraha ).
1-3 (E5-6; T2-3). .
4 (E7; T3). .
5-6 (E8; T3-4). .
7-8 (E9; T4-5). . The result does not come from action, since knowledge and action are incompatible.
9-21 (E10-15; T5-10). Objection (by a Mïmâmsaka): Action alone produces liberation. Jaimini interprets scripture as entirely exhausted in injunctive purport. Further, even if knowledge occurs the texts indicate that it must be combined with action in order that liberation be achieved. So, men of all stages of life attain liberation only through mental, bodily, and speech acts.
22-28 (E15-18; T10-13). . Answer: Since action cannot destroy avidyā it cannot cause liberation. Anyway, is liberation supposed to be the result of one act or of all (enjoined) acts together?
29 (El9-20; T13-14). So liberation does not come from action alone. If pramänas, whether ordinary or scriptural, ascertain actions to be done, then the renunciation of action is based on error (bhränti). But if all acts are based on error about what is real, like the acts of one who tries to drink the water in a mirage, then we are right and you are wrong.
30 (E21; T15-16). . It is not scripture that moves a man to action. His motives are natural; indeed, they are found in animals too. All scripture does is to illuminate.
31-35 (E22--23; T16-18). . Action cannot destroy ignorance, indeed, action depends on ignorance.
36-37 (E24-25; T18-20). . Objection: Self-knowledge itself is caused by avidyā, since scripture, pupil, and teacher are all dependent on avidyā, and without them no one acquires Self-knowledge. Answer: No. for its origination, but once having arisen it doesn't depend on them at all.
38 (E25-26; T20). . Answer: No, since avidyā has by then been sublated, it cannot in turn suppress right knowledge.
39-44 (E26-29;T20-23). .
45-53 (E29-33; T23-26). . So, with rajas and tamas polished away by performance of nityakarmans, the internal organ becomes pure like a clear mirror, naturally reflecting the light of the inner Self, and thus its only remaining desire is to dissolve in that inner Self. Since the buddhïs remaining acts have now produced this desire to dissolve within, they then come to an end with their purpose achieved.
54-66 (E33-38; T27-30). . But knowledge prompts one to action only when that knowledge is false. The reason why knowledge of the second kind is incompatible with action is that it cannot appear without destroying avidyā; since when avidyā is destroyed plurality is too, and since action requires a plurality of factors, it follows that action is incompatible with knowledge of that kind.
67 (E38; T30-32). . But the knowledge produced by scripture destroys avidyā completely and immediately, and so there is no possibility of further acts such as meditation. So the combination of knowledge and action (as proposed by the above thinkers) is impossible.
68 (E39; T33). .
69-71 (E39-40; T33-34). . But (2) if they are different, then liberation is impossible, since of two different things, -jiva and Brahman, one cannot become the other.
72-77 (E41-44; T35-39). . But as we have pointed out, action requires plurality and so contradicts the very nature of the Self, so it cannot produce liberation. Answer: If the alleged knower identifies himself with his body it shows he isn't a knower after all, so of course he can perform actions.
78 (E44-45; T40-41). . Answer: No, since difference and nondifference are inconsistent vith each other.
80-84 (E45-48; T41-44). . But no one can exhaust results laid down by actions in infinite numbers of previous births, and in any case no one can avoid performing an occasional kämya act. Objection: The karmic results can be destroyed by performing nityakarmans. On your own view nityakarmans have no results.
85-89 (E49-51; T45-49). . The reason might be thought to be that there are many passages speaking of ritual action but few speaking of knowledge. Objection: In texts like Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.7 and II.4.5 scripture enjoins men to gain Self-knowledge through meditation. Answer: No. Not being the subject of an action it cannot be enjoined. The Self is self-revealed and thus does not depend on any pramäna, including scripture, to give us knowledge of It.
91-96 (E52-55; T50-53). . Since Jaimini believes he is different from his body, he must be beyond the scope of injunctions to act, beyond the pramänas, beyond pleasure and pain, for there should be no relation at all between Self and body on his principles.
97-100 (E55-57; T53-55). . And you cannot go around supplying such words indiscriminately, but only when the meaning requires them. BOOK TWO
1 (E58; T57). .
2-3 (E59-60; T57-59). Objection: There are four possible ways one might obtain the ultimate end: (1 ) by the not-Self suddenly disappearing; (2) by remembering a sentence that one had heard before; (3) by being reminded of a sentence one had heard before; (4) by merely hearing the words of the sentence.
4-8 (E60-61;T59-61). . Answer: The correct alternative is (4), since Self-knowledge arises directly from what is conveyed in the sentences themselves.
9-23 (E62-66; T62-65). .
24-27 (E66-68; T66-69). . Answer: No. Answer: But the Self is not given in perception. Furthermore, since the Self is without parts or activity the thing corresponding to "I" cannot be an attribute of It. Objection: Then it comes to be object at some later time. Answer: If by "it" you mean the subject, the Self, it cannot do so then any more than now.
28-45 (E68-74; T69-76). . Objection: In the great sentence "I am Brahman" the word "I," according to you, refers to the ego sense; yet since it is expressly identified with the Self in the sentence, it cannot be not-Self, and so must be nondifferent from the Self.
46-53 (E74-77; T76-79). . In this way it is the ahamkära, sharing the characteristics of Self and not-Self, which is the root of all evil, even though there is no real relationship between it and the Self.
54-56 (E77-79; T80-83). And it is appropriate that the word whose primary meaning is the ego sense be secondarily used to speak of the Self, for the ego sense is internal to everything else except the Self, is extremely subtle, and imitates the vision of the Self, and it cannot exist without the Self.
57-73 (E79-84; T83-90). . Objection: If experience is accepted as the Self we will be at fault whether we hold that the Self is subject to modification or whether we deny it. If it changes, it is noneternal; but if it doesn't, it can't be a knower (pramätr). Answer: When smoke rises is space (kha) divided or not? The Self illuminates everything, but "illumining" is not the name of an act; thus though changeless the Self can still function as witness. It never sleeps.
74-96 (E85-92; T90-98). . Since even it turns out to be illusory, how can the suffering arising from the bodies of others affect one after true knowledge is attained? The whole universe, along with the ego sense, comes and goes before consciousness, and is thus as unreal as the lights seen when one presses his eyeball with his finger.
97-102 (E92-95; T98-101 ). . But we disagree with them when they derive all of it from prakrti, for prakrti is not-Self and quite distinct from the self-revealed Self. So, the distinction between Self and notSelf arises only on the level of the pramänas and is based on avidyā.
103-109 (E95-98; T102-104). . Answer: Everyone recognizes that awareness based on falsehood iapramä) is sublated by awareness based on veridical knowledge (pramä). But they are all objects and require a witness that is different from all of them.
110-119 (E98-102; T105-109 ). . Objection: The witness will need another witness to witness it, so an infinite regress will result. Answer: No, since the witness, unlike the factors of ordinary knowing, is self-aware. Objection: By what argument (nyäya) do you establish that? Answer: The awareness of the intellect is established only by locating it in the eternal, changeless, self-established pure consciousness. Thus all not-Self is a false superimposition (mithyä adhyäsa) on the pure Self. Nor is the Self the effect of which ignorance is the cause, since It is not an effect of anything, being eternal and changeless. Objection: How can the Self be the object that ignorance conceals, since ignorance and the Self are incompatible, the Self being intrinsically knowledge, nonrelational, and productive of the very opposite of ignorance? Answer: The Self seems to become separated (into knower, knowledge, known) only through ignorance, just as the rope appears to be different from the snake; in reality the Self, like the rope, is quite unaffected. Thus the present Book explains the meaning of the sentences of scripture such as "that art thou," etc., by applying the method of reasoning through positive and negative concomitance [anvayavyatireka ).
1-3 (El08-109; Til7-118). When a man understands that the text "that art thou" means "I am Brahman" he loses his ego sense and his sense of possession, having grasped something that is beyond the range of speech or thought, since it depends not only on the direct meanings of the constituent words (e.g., "that" and "thou") but on their secondary meanings as well.
4-5 (El 10-111; Tl 18-120). . But if he takes up the practice from natural inclination no such fault ensues. Answer: Our view is that he takes up the practice as the result of an injunction, for example, as phrased in Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad IV.4.23, which commands men who have attained equanimity, etc.,
6 (El 11-112; T120-121). . Answer: Awareness based on difference is the effect of avidyā, since in the witness there is no difference whatsoever.
7-8 (E112-114; T121 -126 ). . Answer: Everything is unknown before our first awareness of it arises in the buddhi; it exists (then) through the one existent, and it is that existent which is that unknown thing.
9-18 (El 14-119; T126-132). . Objection: The meaning of any sentence, whether ordinary or scriptural, is relational. Answer: Consider the sentence "the äkäsa in the pot and the äkäsa in the sky have the same locus." When predicated of the buddhi, the ego, etc., they may be discriminated and contrasted as qualities, but when predicated of the Self they are not limitations of the Self, the Self is not affected by discriminations and contrasts, since in the Self consciousness and interiority are Its very nature.
19-21 (E119-120; T132-133). That the Self is the witness underlying the stream of ideas is clear when one recognizes that an idea cannot be aware of itself after it disappears, nor can an idea know itself as it arises.
22-28 (E121-124; T134-136). But when one knows that the meaning must relate to the inner Self and not the not-Self, the words "that" and "thou" will come to be known to denote the same thing.
29-32 (E124-127; T136-137). Question: But since the body, etc., have been shown by reasoning to be not-Self why does one continue to suppose that they are the Self? Answer: One doesn't. likewise cease.
33-42 (E127-132; T137-141). . Scripture indicates directly and simply the Self, which cannot be known by the other pramänas. Upaniṣadic support for these remarks is cited.
43-46 (E132-133; T141-142). . It must be because there is a contradiction between scripture and sense perception. Answer: No, there can be no such contradiction, for the two means relate to entirely different subject matters.
47-56 (E134-138; T142-148). . Objection: The Self cannot be validly indicated by such texts as "that art thou" alone, since they are merely declarations and so require pramänas to make them authoritative. The contrasts between Self and not-Self are once again reviewed.
57-58 (E139-141; T149-154). . Answer: No, for inference gives us only mediate knowledge. Answer: That undermines the possibility of final liberation, since there would always be the possibility of returning. Answer: No, since we all recognize that we are the very same person who went to sleep and while asleep had no experiences. Answer: It is there, but there is nothing to manifest it, no operation of the internal organ (antahkarana), since the internal organ is dissolved during sleep.
59-62 (E141-145; T155-159). . Question: How do you know this difference between the pure Self's awareness and that of the Self as associated with the ego? Answer: By reasoning, since the object as witnessed by the pure Self neither hinders nor helps the Self, and so is judged as a mere "this."
63-70 (El 45-148; T160-165). . In 11.2-3 above we distinguished four ways of obtaining liberation, that is, four kinds of hearers. That art thou" produces knowledge (pramä) in the aspirant for liberation just as "you are the tenth" produces it in the puzzled fellow who is counting the company as nine. Again, both knowledges are incorrigible once they arise.
73-75 (E150-151; T165-167). . Objection: If the Self is nondual as you say, why do the Upaniṣads continually refer to the Self as agent, knower, etc.? Answer: To deny an erroneous idea one has to use language initially in such a way as to refer to it in order to deny it.
76-80 (El51-155; T167-173). . Answer: No, since both terms mean the same Self, free from duality and mediacy; since Brahman and Self are identical there is no room for a substance-attribute construction. Answer: We do not claim that what the word "that" denotes directly destroys the ideas of suffering and duality.
81-86 (E155-158; T173-177). . But scripture can't contradict perception, since they pertain to entirely different subject matters; thus they can both be pramänas. Objection: But suppose the two pramänas speak about the same thing in conflicting ways? Answer: This cannot occur between scripture and perception.
87-89 (E158-160; T178-179). . In fact, however, such a Self is not known through any of the pramänas, for the pramänas can only deal with objects, never with the subject itself. Again, if meditation negates the limited, suffering nature of the Self, how can it produce right knowledge, since such knowledge will contradict perception and the other pramänas?
90-93 (El60-161; T179-181). . Objection: When one has discriminated the Self from the not-Self by reasoning on the basis of the scriptural sentences like "that art thou," one then meditates on the ideas that result. Answer: No. Answer: No, since all it can do is to reveal things as they actually are; it cannot change the nature of things. So effects, whether of actions or of meditation, cannot be considered stable.
94-104 (E162-167; T182-188). . the latter that the Self is pure, nondual, etc., one must surely pick scripture over perception, since what perception and the other pramänas produce are judgments subject to error and subsequent rejection, whereas what scripture speaks to is self-illuminating and so eternally valid. To suppose that they do contradict each other is a result of our ignorance, since there is no contradiction in reality.
105-106 (E167-168; T189). . Answer: It is just as when we wake somebody up from sleeping by uttering his name.
108-109 (E169; T191). Answer: Empirical objects are neither real nor unreal, and yet they produce results; thus something can be (relatively) "false" and yet produce something (relatively) "real."
111-112 (El70-171; T192-193). .
116 (E172; T194). .
123-126 (E175-177; T196-199). . Objector: Knowledge derived from words is mediate, but it becomes indubitable through meditation. Opponent: Brahmasūtra IV. Answer: But we do admit that scripture enjoins us to hear and study the great sentences, so this objection does not apply. BOOK FOUR
1 (El71; T201). .
19-35 (El84-190; T208-215). .
41-42 (El92-193; T217-218). .
65-66 (El93; T218; E200-201; T225-226). .
72-77 (E203-205; T227-230). .
Work 37: Dakṣiṇāmūrtivārttika / Mānasollāsa
Potter, printed pp. 550–560 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 3,920 words
G. Markandeya Sastri writes: "It is not easy to accept this tradition (that Sureśvara wrote this work) after a perusal of the contents as well as perhaps language of this book. CHAPTER ONE
1-3 (E3-6; Tl-2). The (Daksinärhürti ) hymn is addressed to the guru's own Self, than which there is no greater wealth, that Self who, having entered into the universe It created, remains in the mind manas) of everyone.
4-7 (E8; T2-4). . In what does this existence, this appearing, reside? What is self (jiva)? What is the means to that knowledge? How can the Self be the knower and doer of everything?
8-15 (El4-22; T4-6). . Just as, in dreams, the world exists in one's Self but appears to be external, so it is in the waking state too. Both kinds of objects (dream and waking) are impermanent and insentient (jada). Gaudapädakärikäs I.16 quoted here).
16-20 (E25-26; T6-70). . " Even God Himself, deluded by may a, seems to have only limited power and limited knowledge. To be "God" is to be in control; to bejiva is to be dependent.
21-31 (E30-43; T7-11). . Having thus the powers (sakti) of God we infer the jivas are God. But when the highest Self is directly known all beings from Brahma down to the lowest plant are mere constructions (kalpanä) as if imagined in dream. CHAPTER TWO
1-6 (E40-50; T13-16). . There are three kinds of cause: inherence, noninherence, and instrumental cause. Each effect resides in the place occupied by its cause.
7-8 (E51; T16). .
9-14 (E55-62; T17-22). . Answer: Since existence (astitva) is found in every created thing (but atoms are not created), where do the atoms come from? Again, consciousness cannot arise from either atoms or prakrti, since neither are themselves conscious things, and consciousness must be located in a conscious locus.
15-16 (E63-64; T23). .
17-19 (E65; T24). . Kanada and Sugata (i.e., the Buddha) accept in addition inference. The Paurânikas add to these inclusion (sambhava) and tradition (aitihya).
20-30 (E70-76; T27-29). .
31-41 (E78-85; T29-32). . From sattvic ahamkära comes the antahkarana and the sense organs. From the rajasic ahamkära come the action organs. These together with the five prāṇas (breaths) make up the twenty-four categories of Sāṃkhya-sästra (i.e., fourteen organs, five breaths, and five elements).
42-43 (E86-87; T33-34). .
44-52 (E88-97; T35-38). . Objection: Do you mean that there are many Gods, one for each universe in succession like the seed and the sprout? Answer: No. He has absolute freedom (svacchandakaritä).
53-57 (E98-102; T38-39). . Then samsara would never stop, and the teaching about liberation would be pointless. CHAPTER THREE
1-7 (E103-112; T40-44). . We cannot distinguish the world from its illumination, any more than waves can be distinguished from water. And since products (pot) rest in their causes (clay), the world, indiscriminable from illumination, must rest in the highest Lord.
8-9 (El 13-115; T44-45). .
10-18 (El 16-124; T45-48). . But since God and jiva, the primary denotata of "that" and "thou" respectively, cannot bear such a relation to each other, these words must be understood in a secondary sense laksana).
19-25 (E126-135; T49-52). The sentence does not mean that the jiva is a part or mode of God, since God is partless and without change. And it doesn't merely recommend meditation.
26-32 (El35-150; T52-53). .
32-40 (El50-158; T53-55). . But the essential (svarüpa) definition of the Self is saccidänanda. That great Self delivers all from samsara, for He is God Himself. CHAPTER FOUR
1-6 (E150-157; T56-60). . Objection: The pot, cloth, etc., shine as self-existent, not through God's light. Answer: Stanza 4 of the Daksinämürti hymn answers this. Objects cannot exist by themselves; they depend on God for their being.
7-22 (El59-177; T60-66). . buddhi is like the clear side of the mirror because sattva dominates in it; thus it can take on the image chäyä) of an object. Likewise the sense organs, because of their connection with the antahkarana. Other nädis are described, and the Katha Upaniṣad quoted.
23-27 (El78-181; T66-69). . But the Self is throughout covered by māyā and appears deluded, ignorant, etc. When the Self wakes up It is illuminated as saccidänanda in the awareness "I slept happily."
28-38 (E181-197; T70-72). . The first is the highest Brahman, without differences, like äkäsa without, dirt. The third, impure ego, is the Self conjoined with body, etc., One should meditate on the first of these three; then the Self shines fully.
1-8 (E198-209; T73-77). . There is no liberation; käma and artha are the ends of man. Others say that the self is the breaths (prāṇa), or the senses, or the buddhi.
9-28 (E212-236; T77-83). . Answer: The body is not the self, since it is visible and constituted. but as we know, there are conscious blind and deaf people, etc.
28-32 (E236-240; T84-85). . Further, the self would be perishable.
32-36 (E240-243; T85-86). .
1-12 (E245-256; T87-92). are aggregates of the five skandhas, (\) rüpa, including objects and organs; (2) vijnäna, consciousness; (3) samjnä, including names, qualities, motions, ideas, and natural kinds; (4) samskära, attachment, dharma, and adharma, etc.* ( There is no self beyond these five.
13-20 (E257-268; T92-95). . As to the theory of the skandhas, an aggregate, like a pot, require? a cause, a maker, and cannot make itself. The self is no more a nonexistent than äkäea; both have functions, äkäsa's being to provide space, the self's to provide consciousness.
21-32 (E269-283; T95-99). . " Liberation is the removal of this māyā, CHAPTER SEVEN
1-8 (E284-294; T100-103). . Answer: Recognition is a judgment of the form "this is the same thing as that" by which we cognize once again something we have seen before. In the case of the Self we recognize the omniscience, etc., notions produced by māyā.
9-20 (E295-310; T103-108). Question: Then recognition means memory. Answer: Memory (is not itself recognition; rather it) provides us with the materials whereby we can recognize the persistence of the same entity (the Self) through time.
21-33 (E315-328; T108-112). . How the world is a result of false attribution is explained. This truth is attested to by smrti, by perception, by tradition, etc. CHAPTER EIGHT
1-12 (E326-345; T113-114). . Answer: This has been answered in the foregoing, but it will be repeated in brief again as in this science repetition is no fault. All notions of difference are false, caused by māyā. " But māyā is sublated, like deep sleep, by Self-knowledge.
13-16 (E346-349; T116). . " māyā" is a name for an appearance that is contrary to reason. It is not nonexistent, since it appears; it is not existent, since it is sublated.
17-28 (E350-360; Tl 16-118). . But the Self is not bound by the mind's doings, any more than the sun is affected by smoke, vapors, etc., CHAPTER NINE
1-6 (E361-368; T119-122). . Question: How does this māyā cease? Answer: Through devotion to God. By devotion to this distributive form one obtains the collective (samasti) form, as has been ten times taught in scripture.
7-20 (E369-376; T122-125). .
21-48 (E377-397; T125-132). .
1-25 (E398-416; T133-138). .
Work 38: Pañcīkaraṇavārttika / Praṇavavārttika
Potter, printed pp. 560–562 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 1,078 words
PANGIKARANAVÄRTTIKA or PRANAVAVÄRTTIKA This is supposed to be a commentary on a work of Śaṅkara's, but the ascription of the Panclkarana to Śaṅkara is extremely dubious, as was indicated above.
1972. 1-2 (ET 9-11). .
3-11 (ET 13-18). From Brahman arose äkäsa; from äkäsa, air; from air, fire (light); from fire, water; from water, earth. From these arose the great, all-pervasive principle called Sūtra. These elements also produce the gross (sthüla) elements, which in turn produce Viräj. The effect of the gross elements is Viràj, which is the gross body (sthülaSanra) of the disembodied Self.
12-13 (ET 18-19). .
14-29 (ET 19-29). . Awareness having sound, etc., for its content is called the waking state. the aspects pertaining to the elements are objects, sounds, sights, touches, etc., as objects and Prajäpati is its god. The buddhi takes as object what is ascertained (? Thus is to be understood the waking state. 30-3la (ET 29-30). The visva (referred to in Śaṅkara's first verse) should be seen as (identical with) Viräj so that difference (bheda) will be removed. 31b-
37a (ET 30-33). . It has five sense organs, five action organs, and four internal organs, that is, the manas, buddhi, ahamkära, and citta. There are also the five prāṇas and five subtle elements. 37b-
38 (ET 34-35). That which possesses the notion of both (the dream state and the subtle body) is called taijasa, which should be identified with Hiranyagarbha.
42-43 (ET 37-38). That which has the notion of both (deep sleep and the causal body or ignorance) is called präjna, and one should identify it with God.
44-49 (ET 39-43). . How this is symbolized in the "om" analysis is recapitulated following Pancikarana, verse six.
50-65a (ET 44-59). . Pancikarana's verse six, on the nature of the Self as contemplated in samädhi. When one has come to see the Self nothing remains to be known, the Self is peace, bliss, without a second. After prärabdhakarman is exhausted the liberated one attains the status of Visnu, transcendent reality.
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Padmapāda
Padmapāda extends Śaṅkara’s inquiry into superimposition, error, the relation of words, and the epistemic role of scripture.
The reality of superimposition determines whether knowledge can remove bondage.
Inquiring into Brahman → Superimposition → Theories of error → Self-luminosity → Sentence meaning
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| First Varṇaka | Avidyā and superimposition: Problem of error |
| Middle Varṇakas | Inquiry and authority: How texts convey knowledge |
| Final Varṇakas | Word meaning and negation: Knowledge ends error |
Padmapāda: historical introduction
Potter, printed pp. 563–564 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 318 words
Padrnapäda is said to have been Śaṅkara's first pupil, and one who stayed with his master throughout Śaṅkara's career. Eventually, tradition affirms, Pädmapäda was made the head abbot of the Puri monastery, but he did not stay there and in fact is alleged to have saved his teacher's life in the affair with Abhinavagupta. His only known authentic work is titled Pancapädikä. "2
There are, however, indications that Padmapäda's commentary originally covered more than its present extent.3 Furthermore, the fact that the known manuscripts break off at the end of the comment on Sūtra I.1.4 without any ending verses suggests that the present state of the work is incomplete.
Work 39: Pañcapādikā
Potter, printed pp. 564–597 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 14,051 words
FIRST VARI^AKA I.I (E7-14; Tl-5). Objection: Then why doesn't the Brahmasūtras begin with verse II.3.29? Answer: That passage is an answer to an objection against an interpretation of the Sūtras which makes their meaning converge (samanvaya) (on. Brahman), and thus that interpretation must be introduced first to make the objection relevant.
II.6-7 (E15-19; T5-6). .
III.8-9 (E19-21; T6-7). . Objection: What is the nature of this difference? Answer: "Difference" means that there is no mutual relation between them as there is, for example, between a universal and the particulars in which it inheres.
IV.10-12 (E21-23; T7-8). . " as well as their properties." Thus it is false mithya). The word "false" has two meanings: it may signify negation or inexpressibility (anirvacaniyata). Here it signifies negation.
V.13-15 (E23-26; T8-10). . "...
16 (E27-30; Tll-12). . Objection: Since superimposition is said to be the product of false knowledge, how can it be said to be "natural," that is, beginningless? Answer: It must be admitted that the power of avidyā exists in both external and internal things by their very nature. Thus avidyā is only the cause of the appearance of something of a different nature (from the nature the thing really has).
VII.17-18 (E30-32; T13-14). . Where is the superimposition in that? Answer: Since the ego sense is a superimposition its auxiliary (upakarana) must also be so.
VIII.19-22 (E32-37; T14-16). . Answer: In this case, however, it is not enough merely to point to a man saying "that is mine"; one has to show what the cause is öf that notion. Objection: Even so, all that needs to be done is to prove the existence of something falling under that definition, nothing more. One doesn't need then to go on to show its possibility i Answer: True.
IX.24 (E39-42; T17-18). So the meaning is that there is an appearance, in a manner that resembles memory, of something given to us in the past by a pramäna,
X.25-26 (E42-44; T19-20). Objector to the akhyätivädin: It can't be memory, since, for example, a boy who has never tasted anything bitter may because of sickness taste bitterness in something sweet I Akhyätivädin: He must have experienced bitterness in some previous birth; other wise he could just as well taste some taste heretofore unknown.
XI.27-30 (E45-48; T21-24). . Padmapäda: What does it mean to say that it is "not recognized as a case of memory"? So the knowledge of x when only j> is in contact with the sense organ is not a case of memory, but a case of superimposition.
XII.31-36 (E48-50; T24-27). . If it is correct, there should be no sublation of it, but there is. Likewise here. Akhyätivädin: No, since on that analogy there would be no sublation, -rather we would say "the shell has resumed its former state!" But that's wrong, since whichever idea produces the apprehension of silver cannot be the one in which the silver is manifested, since they occur at different times. And it can't be produced by some other awareness altogether, since then the valid cognition of some other person might also manifest the silver.
XIII.37-43 (E51-55; T27-32). . Anyathäkhyätivädin: But it has been well argued above that such failure to recognize never occurs anyway. Padmapäda (? As a consequence the false silver-in-shell appears as the supporting object. So the silver is made of may à. If it had been real (päramärthika) it would have been grasped by everyone, since its cause would not be vitiated. Whereas, given that the silver is made of māyā it follows that only those whose organs are faulty perceive the silver.
XIV.44-48 (E55-59; T33-36). . Objection: The (Advaita) definition of superimposition underpervades its definiendum, since it fails to extend to dream and sorrow (soka); in these two false awarenesses there is nö contact (of the senses) with anything that could be confused with something else. Answer: They are not cases of memory, for an object is immediately manifested. Objector: They are not memory-/^, since these awarenesses arise merely because of the traces born of previous pramänas. Answer: Memory is just the appearance of a content arising from a previous pramäna. Objection; Then the manifestation of the dream objects is internal only. Answer: There is no fault here.
XV.49-51 (E59-60; T36-37). . Objection: The definition (of superimposition) overextends to include the superimposition of Brahman on names. Since it involves neither a faulty cause nor the manifestation of a false object, it is not a superimposition (yet on your definition it must be). Objection: It is evident that memory is voluntarily produced and that it can be suppressed by the internal organ.
59 (E62-66; T40-42). . Objection: Why is that view wrong? Answer: No, for the light parts are the locus. Answer: No, it is not like the seed and sprout, for there seed 1 depends on sprout 1, which depends on seed 2, which depends on sprout 2, etc., but here we have only two things. Furthermore, when sublation occurs it does not involve mere denial, but denial of something in some locus. But the superimposed object is not nonexistent.
60-61 (E66-68; T42-43). . Objection: Isn't your view that everything is nonexistent? Answer: Who said so? Still, we agree that at the dawn of vidyä the false object disappears altogether.
XX.64-66 (E69-71; T44-46). The doublemoon case is intended to show that the difference between jwa and God, in the form of the non-Self-nature of the jiva, is only appearance.
XXI.69 (E73; T47-48). . Answer: We know this from scripture and from presumption of the sruta kind (hutärthäpatti). For example, Chändogya Upaniṣad VIII.3.2, Mundaka Upaniṣad III.1.2, etc., tell us.
XXI.72 (E75; T49-50). .
XXII.73-81 (E75-82; T50-54). . Answer: This happens because of the false notion "I am a man." Objection: If the idea of " I " has the same locus as the body, then the existence of an independent Self is impossible to prove, since we do not have such an idea and since scripture and inference cannot prove if perception is opposed to them. Therefore anyone who believes in the Self must admit that the idea " I " denotes the Self and not the body, etc., And so the statement "I am a man55 is not a false notion, but a metaphor. Answer: Even if the idea of " I " denotes the enjoyer distinct from the body, etc., Answer: Yes, it is jugglery; it is the work of avidyā. XXIII.
84 (E84-86; T56). The Self isn't nonobject... for it is the object of our notion of T.. *. " Objection: How can the Self be an object (visaya)? Can anyone disagree with this?
XXIV.85-87 (E87-90; T57-58). The knower, known, and knowledge (pramiti) are all immediately given; however, the known (prameya) is given as object whereas the other two are not. So the Self is known as both "this" and "not this." What is external cannot be Self, andso the Self cannot be the "this." So pramäna is inferred from experience anubhava) that manifests both the "this" and the "not this."
XXV.88-94 (E90-97; T58-66). . The first alternative is wrong, since if experience is unconscious the world will not be made known. Answer: How can the Self make something known using experience which is ex hypothesi unconscious? Answer: But the destruction of experience cannot be established, since experience is not something that is born (and so it can't be destroyed). Answer: True, but the ego sense is not the Self (the ultimate knower) since if it were there could be no deep sleep, since the ego sense would manifest itself even in the absence of any object. Answer: That cannot be right, for the thesis is that the ego sense is naturally conscious of itself; so it should naturally manifest itself whether an object is there or not. Answer: True, we do say that, but the memory is (produced by Self-awareness and ) not produced from traces laid down by experiencing pleasure; rather it is because of the absence of any sense perceptions that we say this.
XXVI.95-97 (E98-99; T66-68). The ego sense is not an evolute (of prakrti), for if it were it would have no relation to the Self and function as "this" only; but since it functions as both "this" and "not this" it is to be understood as falsely attributed to the Self because of its intimate relation with the internal organ (antahkarana), just as the crystal falsely appears red because of its proximity to the hibiscus.
98-100 (El00-102; T69-70). . Objection: The red color appears, but it is not that the crystal appears red. Answer: Then the crystal's own color should also appear. Answer: Then how could we see it? Objector: We see it because it is not discriminated from the red color. XXVIII.
101-103 (El02-104; T70-72). . Thus the ego sense is viewed both as "this" and "not this." ( the Self) is identical with Brahman (and not, as in the ego sense case, merely the apparent sharer of consciousness with Brahman).
XXIX.104-111 (E104-109; T72-76). . Question: Why are they identical? Answer: For example, Devadatta has certain features when outside the house, and he is also recognized to have those same features when he goes inside. Answer: The cause of the mat rolling up is the dispositional tendency (samskära ) it has gotten because of being rolled up for a long time, not the removal of any circumstance. Opponent: Well, doesn't "that art thou" sublate error? Answer: No, what it says is that the jiva ( = reflection or pratibimba) has the same nature as Brahman ( = prototype or bimba). Answer: We don't say that a single thing can really manifest itself completely in separate places at the same time, but we do say that such a thing is single.
XXX.112-114 (EÎ10-112; T76-78). . Answer: Though Devadatta's knowledge that the reflection in the mirror is identical with his face cannot destroy the mirror, which is why the separation continues to appear, the jiva? Answer: That's why scripture alludes to the case of the ropesnake.
XXXI.115-118 (El 12-114; T78-80). . Answer: Yes, and the difference is that in all three cases, mirror image, rosy crystal and rope-snake, traces must operate, but in the first two some other object is present whereas in the last one there is no such entity there. XXXII.
119-121 (E114-117; T80-83 ). . The result of this act is an experiencing of the object, so that the result of the act has the same object as the act itself. XXXIII.
122-134 (El 18-133; T83-100). . Objection: If objective things like blue color are consciousness by nature (as is implied in the above) then how is that different from the buddhist position? Answer: In this way: blue and yellow, etc., are mutually exclusive awarenesses, but immediacy (aparoksatä) is not multiple in this way, since it is known as one while the manifestations of objects are different. So blue color, etc., But the difference between the " I " awarenesses from moment to moment is not known to us (normally) because of the extreme similarity in the " I " awarenesses. Padmapäda: If the nature of consciousness is to cognize difference, but difference is not cognized, then nothing will be known at all. Vijnänavädin: But since awareness of a single thing is (on our view ) erroneous of course a pramäna doesn't prove it! Vijnänavädin: But persistent entities are not real, because they lack efficiency (arthakriyäkäritva). Not successively, for since it is unchanging there is no cause for its not producing anything or everything at any time. Padmapäda: If so, no awarenesses exist, since they are all selfrevealed (svasamvid) and need no other awareness to produce awareness of their objects. Or if the series in question is different from the one characterizing the "cognizer" of the first awareness, then another's awareness cannot be grasped by the senses, and inference does not grasp what is real anyhow, since it only grasps universals. Padmapäda: That can't be right. Padmapäda: The difference, however, is that we hold there to be a permanent Self, and you don't. Objection: (Since you hold that the object is presented immediately because it manifests consciousness,) you should hold that the object of inference is known immediately, since it too must manifest consciousness. Answer: No, since in inference, unlike perception, the object is not operative in producing the functioning and so is not manifested in the inferential cognition, it may be far away or even absent at that time. Answer: Because that object is related (by pervasion) to the hetu (which is immediately presented).
XXXV.136 (E135-136; T102-104). .. It is not that the Self becomes fit for superimposition only because It is the object of the " I " notion; It is so because It is immediately experienced. belongs to me and which to someone else. XXXVII.
138-140 (E137-138; T104-106). Objection: Śaṅkara first explains superimposition and only then tells us that superimposition is avidyā whose opposite is vidyä, surely this is a perverse order of exposition!
166 (E160; T124). .
179-182 (E170-172; T132-135). . Objection: If so, the Vedantic teaching becomes invalid, since it. Answer: No; the teaching (viz., " that art thou," for example) is independently capable of producing indubitable Self-knowledge. Objector: Then what's the point of tarka? Answer: It removes obstacles arising from the natural feeling that the doctrine of the unity of the Self is an improbably (or impossible ) one XLVIII.
183-184 (E173-174;. T135-137). . Objection: Awareness of the identity of the jiva and Brahman is no different from the awareness that the self is distinct from the body. Answer: No, they are quite different. should disappear, since it has avidyā as its condition. XLIX.
185-186 (E174-175; T137-138). Objection: Not all the Vedantic texts expound vidyä. Answer: True, but the object of these meditations is Brahman, so it is appropriate that exposition of Vedānta begins by explaining the identity of the jiva with Brahman, etc.
1.1-2 (E180; T142). Opponent (an Anärambhaka): SinceJaimini (in the Mimämsäsütras) investigates the whole meaning of the Vedas as indicated by his opening sentence ' 'Then therefore the inquiry into dharma," and since Brahman-knowledge is enjoined, it is included under dharma, and since there is no further doubt that would require further inquiry, the inquiry into Brahman (brahmajijfiäsä) is already accomplished.
7. (E180-183; T142-145). . Thus, since no action pertains to the Self, there must be a separate inquiry into It; and that is why the first Sūtra here announces such an inquiry.
IV.10-11 (E184-185; T146-147). . In order to refute this notion this first Sūtra is proposed.
V.12-15 (E185-187; T147-150). Though the Self cannot be the object of the injunction, nevertheless it is through méditation (on It) as enjoined by scripture that liberation is achieved.
VI.16-17 (E188-189; T150-151). For example, when the Upaniṣad (Brhadäranyaka Upaniṣad IV.5) says that "all this is the Self," it doesn't mean merely to state that everything is the Self, since that would make the Self unconscious like the world, but rather that knowledge of reality arises from the elimination of non-Self, and so one should postulate kalpayati) an injunction in connection with this passage that has the effect of "know all this as the Self."
VII.18-20 (E189-190; T151-153). .
VIII.22 (E190-191; T154). .
IX.23-26 (E191-193; T154-157). . Again, Brahman will be both something to be achieved (in liberation) and something already achieved (as knowledge), something to be known for the first time (as the object of an injunction) and already known (since the knowledge is enjoined to be re-acquired).
X.27-29 (E193-195; T158-159). . Ärambhavädin: If what you say is right, any injunction involving subordinate items will be useless (since contradictory). For example, since "sprinkle the rice with water" involves knowing the rice through some other pramäna, perception, say, on your reasoning this will constitute a contradiction. a lower sentence") cannot be (or express) a. pramäna.
XI.30-32 (E195-196; T160-162). . Anârambhavadin: Then the injunction is hardly necessary, since the verbal knowledge is the pramäna and one naturally meditates on the truth once one has realized it.
XII.33-35 (E196-198; T162-165). .
XIII.36-37 (E199-200; T165-166). . Furthermore, the object of an injunction doesn't always have to be an actual thing; one may be enjoined to meditate, for example, "on speech as a cow," etc.
XIV.38-39 (E2OO-2O1; T166-167). . Anärambhavädin: Therefore, we conclude that words like "Self," "Brahman," etc.,
XV.40-43 (E201-204; T167-169). . Furthermore, the words "then therefore" suggest that one needs to understand what dharma is in order to use ritual action as a means to heaven, etc. But this proves also that dharma does not exhaust the meaning of the Vedas.
XVI.44-47 (E205-208; T169-172). Likewise, in Jaimini's second Sūtra it is said "dharma is that object whose mark is codanä," not that dharma is the object whose mark is the Vedas in general.
51 (E208-210; T172-175). Padmapäda: True5 they seem to say that, but in the context we must conclude they are referring to only a part of the Vedas when they speak thus, for âabara also indicates that the need to inquire into dharma should lead one not to terminate his studies after studying the Vedas.
52-55 (E211-215; T175-178). . Padmapäda: If so, the first Sūtra should have read "then therefore the inquiry into the meaning of the Vedas." Präbhäkara: The word "dharma" is used instead merely to indicate that the meaning of the Vedas serves human purposes. THIRD VARI^AKA
1.1-6 (E216-219; T179-182). . Objection: The first Sūtra means that an inquiry [vicara or mimämsä) into Brahman should be started, since that is the natural meaning of the word "jijnäsä."
II.7-10 (E219-222; T182-184). . Answer: No one can desire to acquire Brahman-knowledge, since its acquisition precludes happiness, requiring cessation of all senseobject contact. Objector: But with it one obtains bliss! Answer: No, satisfaction breeds repulsion, since it destroys appetite for objects.
III.11-13 (E222-224; T184-187). Answer: But all the general mandate enjoins is that people learn to recite the words of scripture; so that understanding the meaning of the Vedas is separate from the injunction to study them.
14 (E224; T187). . So we still need to know in advance who the adhikärin is, that is, who possesses the unique antecedents of the inquiry into Brahman.
V.15-17 (E224-226; T187-190). . Objector: Then, since the mandate doesn't specify the adhikärin, it will become useless. Answer: If so there will be no obligation on the student to study! VI.
18-20 (E226-228; T190-191). Answer: That nonoptionality arises from the constancy of the teacher's desire for a result, that is, money, but it is still not obligatory in the relevant sense, since there are other ways of making money and one does not incur sin by not making a career of teaching.
VII.21-25 (E228-231; T191-195). . Padmapäda: That latter "mandate" is only ancillary to the duty a man has to support his ancestors by instructing his son, investing him, etc. Since it involves some very technical issues in grammar and exegetics it is not further summarized here.)
XV.52-54 (E245-247; T209-211). Answer: That would be all right if the results of actions always purified a man in the same life and thus prepared him for Brahmanknowledge; but the purification may be due to acts performed in previous lives as well, as is attested by scripture.
XVI.55-56 (E247-248; T211-212). .
XVII.57-61 (E248-251; T212-215). . Thus something must be postulated, denoted by the word "then," after which the inquiry into Brahman is to be taken up. XVIII.
62-66 (E251-253; T215-217). .
XIX.67-70 (E253-255; T217-220). . Objection: Since the scripture indicates that the results of meritorious acts are imperishable, discriminating men do not necessarily renounce the objects of enjoyment. Answer: The scriptural passages you interpret'as indicating the imperishability of meritorious acts are mere arthavädas, being contrary to other scriptural passages that enjoy the support of reasoning. FOURTH VARNAKA
1.1-2 (E264-265; T229-230). . Objection: "Is Brahman generally known to us or not?" Because of this dilemma the present work has neither purpose, subject matter or relation.
II.3-8 (E265-268; T230-234). .
III.10-15 (E268-272; T234-239). . Answer: The exegesis (mimämsä or vicära) assists one in understanding of Vedānta and thus of Vedānta's subject matter, that is, Brahman, just as preliminary sacrifices are auxiliary to the main one and so have heaven as their result too. Objection: The analogy is incorrect, since in the sacrifice case the auxiliaries are necessary for the result, whereas in the present case one does not need exegesis to know Brahman, one can be enlightened directly by hearing a text, according to you. Answer: Still, the exegesis removes doubts about the meaning of the text that is heard. and as a result seems to belong in the category of doubtful assertions.
IV.16-23 (E272-277; T239-244). . Objection: How is "Brahman... known to us", that is, by what means? Answer: Since it clearly (from context) does not mean a member of the Brahmin caste, or Brahma, or the individual soul (jiva), etc., one concludes it means some other thing. The case is analogous to the word "heaven." The meanings of words like "heaven" are not made known merely from their use. Answer: Well, you admit that fittingness, etc.,
V.24-25 (E277-278; T244-245). Answer: True, and that's why there must be inquiry into it, through providing reasons such as the next one offered by Śaṅkara, "(2) because Brahman is known to each person as his Self.... "
VI.26-29 (E278-280; T245-246). .
VII.30-33 (E280-282; T246-247). .
VIII.34-37 (E282-286; T248-250). .
IX.38-40 (E286-289; T250-254). .
X.41-43 (E289-292; T254-257). .
1.1-4 (E293-295; T258-260). .
II.5-8 (E296-298; T261-263). . The world of name and form": each system of philosophy has its own categorial classification of things in the world; this represents the Advaita classification.
III.9-11 (E298-301; T263-265). .
IV.12-14 (E301-303; T266-267). . Answer: "This last argument by itself is not sufficient.... " SIXTH VARI^AKA I-II (E314-316; T277-278). " Objection: If so scripture is dependent on human intellects. Answer: No; like Brahman it is changeless and eternal. Answer: It doesn't "arise" in time, but it is dependent on Brahman, as the snake is dependent on the rope. Objection: Then how do you maintain that Brahman is omniscient?
1.1-4 (E319-321; T281-283). . " Objection: Scripture is not the means of knowing Brahman.... " Objection to the objection: Since the Vedas are not written by human beings scripture needs no other pramänas to corroborate its validity. Likewise perception and scripture conflict on certain points, and scripture must give way to perception. Furthermore, scripture is invalid since it is devoid of significance for human values.
5-6 (E321-322; T283-284). Being cannot be proved, and so those passages should be understood as providing one with a description of the world-cause to use in the meditations enjoined in the general injunction that one should study his branch of the Vedas.
III.7-8 (E322-324; T284-288). . Answer: The fourth Sūtra answers all this by appealing to the congruence (samanvaya) among the Vedantic texts. What is this congruence? What is excluded by this "congruence" is a relation such as that between an action and its object.
IV.9-11 (E324-326; T288-290). . Objection: The question related to the validity as exemplified in sentences such as those in the second Sūtra (''Brahman is that from which birth, etc."), so why are we now given a different illustration (by Śaṅkara)? Answer: He has a reason. Objection: Yes, and since that is so scripture as a whole cannot be a pramäna by which to prove Brahman. Answer: Even though words generally must relate to perceptible things, still, consider how a child learns the language. He does so by observing the behavior of those who hear a word. V.I2-
13 (E326-328; T290-291). . Anyway, how can one suppose that what is not of human origin and so requires the assistance of no other pramänas can be invalid? Objector: As we said, because of the analogy of the picture, that is, pramänas sometimes conflict. Answer: The analogy is faulty. Furthermore, your implied analysis of the picture example is incorrect. In fact, touch corroborates sight in this case.
VI.14-16 (E328-330; T291-294). . Objection: Only injunctions are valid, since the subject matter of scripture is actions. Answer: No, that will involve mutual dependence. Objection: That is only because perception has nothing to do with actions. But for scripture, which does have to do with actions, the test of validity must derive from its satisfying some human purpose. Answer: But there are two ways in which one may hope to have one's purposes satisfied. NINTH VARI^AKA
1.1-2 (E331-332; T295-296). . Objection: Even though scripture does provide proof of Brahman, still this occurs only in conjunction with injunctions to act, for otherwise communication would be impossible. Communication arises from human desire to obtain what he wants and avoid what he dislikes. Meditation is still required after Brahman-knowledge.
II.3-4 (E333-335; T296-299). . Answer: What is the source of that knowledge having Brahman as its object that is enjoined in injunctions to meditate? Answer: But we see no results arising from that! Answer: If so an injunction is without purpose (since one can have pleasure without it). Answer: There's no proof of that. Answer: One does not directly realize the object on which he meditates if that object is beyond the range of immediate awareness.
III.5-6 (E335-337; T299-300). Answer: We ne?d to know what pramäna it is obtained by, and what its content is, in order to know what to say about it.
7-9 (E33 7-339; T300-303). . Objection to this opponent: Since on your view liberation has a beginning it must have an end, which is wrong. Opponent's answer: No, for scripture says • 'he does not return again" (Chändogya Upaniṣad IV. 15-6; VIII. 15.1; Brhadâranyaka Upaniṣad VI.2.15). Objection: But reasoning (tarka) leads to the opposite conclusion.
V.10-13 (E339-342; T303-304). .
14 (E342; T304-305). .
15-16 (E342-343; T305-306). .
VIII.17-19 (E344-345; T306-307). .
IX.20-21 (E345-347; T307-308). Answer: No; the statements like "that art thou" do not provide knowledge of Brahman in which Brahman is the object of knowing, but rather they serve to remove from Brahman the distinctions born of.avidyā; among those distinctions are those between knower?
X.22-26 (E347-350; T308-311). . Liberation is not something that can be produced. But action cannot produce liberation in any of these ways.
XI.27-34 (E350-354; T311-315). . Objection: "But knowledge... is itself a mental act." Answer: "No... f they -are entirely unlike each other."
XII.35-37 (E355-357; T315-318). .
XIII.38-40 (E357-359; T318-319). . Opponent: Mimämsäsütra 1.2.1 states that the Veda only speaks of actions, and that statements that do not do so are without sense. Answer: You don't properly understand the Mimämsäsütra.
XIV.41-46 (E359-364; T320-323). . Objection: What you are saying is irrelevant. Answer: But there are many statements (even in the karmakända) in which there is no word expressing action and yet it is clear what the words mean.
XV.47-52 (E364-369; T324-327). . And you can't assume that the 'not'... itself denotes some other (opposed) action, for... what 'not' means is passivity, inaction...,5' XVL53-
54 (E369-371; T327-328). . You objected earlier that since the Brahman-knower remains in samsara statements of Brahman's nature are without purpose. XVIL55-
57 (E371-375; T328-332). .
This study follows the selected discussions and qualifications in the supplied volume. Historical attributions or omitted original-language passages should not be inferred as established where the source itself leaves them unresolved.
Totaka / Trotaka
The attributed dialogue turns worldly dissatisfaction into instruction about the nondual identity disclosed by the Upaniṣads.
A teacher discloses identity rather than manufacturing it.
Impermanence → renunciation → instruction → knowledge
| Element | Meaning in this chapter |
|---|---|
| Disenchantment | Impermanent outcomes: Seeking the permanent |
| Guru | Teaching the Upaniṣads: Identity recognized |
| Knowledge | Neither ritual nor product: Freedom |
Totaka: historical introduction
Potter pp. 598–600 · 179-stanza work, selected synopsis
Advaita tradition makes Totaka a quiet young man named Giri, who became a devoted but not overly quick pupil of Samkarâcârya. He is credited with composing a work of 179 stanzas called Srutisärasamuddhärana. There is also a brief set of eight verses, Totakästakay ascribed to this person. "1
In the following summary "E" references are to the edition by R. Krishnaswami Iyer (Srirangam, n.d.). The work is untranslated. 156ff.
Work 40: Śrutisārasamuddhāraṇa
Potter, printed pp. 598–600 · Study by Karl H. Potter · Source 935 words
aRUTISÄRASAMUDDHÄRAJNTA
1 (E1). The poem opens with reverence for Hari.
2-6 (E8-11). The path brings him to a guru, who instructs him that the Self is not the body nor the internal organ nor the five sheaths, but.
7-13 (E12-18). . But all thought functions require an unchanging consciousness to make them evident.
14-20 (El9-24). First there is the notion "I see"; then the appropriate sense organ faces toward the relevant object, and so practical affairs are accomplished.
21-33 (E24-34). . Thus the ego sense must be an attribute of the internal organ, standing in the same relation to the Self as do the other functions.
34-45 (E35-46). What is the relation between the individual self and the highest Self ? Actually, the world has no origin, since it is not true, and so.
46-106 (E46-96). . Now all the Upaniṣads teach identity, but "that thou art" is particularly apt for the purpose.
116-132 (E103-117). . Just as the gold is true, jewelry untrue, or the threads true, the cloth untrue, so whatever comes to be is untrue.
133-150 (El 17-130). . But if that character was not there before, then something new has arisen, and it will perish, having a beginning, and the Sârnkhya view will.
151–178 (E130–151). Brahman is described primarily through negation, while consciousness is affirmed.
Totaka’s historical identity is not independently established.
Hastāmalaka
A short verse sequence answers a question of personal identity through the repeated recognition of awareness as the witness.
The recurring affirmation identifies awareness as Self.
Question → negation → witness → reflection → Self
Hastāmalaka: historical introduction
Potter pp. 601–602 · Edeltraud Harzer · 14 verses
Potter reports the fourteen-verse poem and treats Hastāmalaka’s historical identity as uncertain.
Work 41: Hastāmalakaślokāḥ
Verse 1. Identity is questioned by the teacher.
Verse 2. Awareness transcends caste and life-stage.
Verse 3. Awareness is unbounded like space.
Verse 4. Heat belongs to fire; awareness remains.
Verse 5. The individual resembles a reflected face.
Verse 6. The mirror passes; the face remains.
Verse 7. Thought cannot grasp its own witness.
Verse 8. One sun appears in many waters.
Verse 9. One awareness illuminates many minds.
Verse 10. Awareness makes illuminated objects known.
Verse 11. Moving reflections do not move the sun.
Verse 12. Clouded understanding misjudges the light.
Verse 13. Purity pervades objects without contact.
Verse 14. Many reflections do not divide Viṣṇu.
The biography and authorship remain uncertain.
Master Takeaways
01. The expression **Advaita** denies an ultimately second reality, not the everyday appearance of multiple bodies, acts and persons.
02. **Ātman** and **Brahman** are identified through scriptural reasoning rather than fused by an act.
03. **Bondage** is analyzed through mistaken appropriation of bodily, sensory and mental states.
04. **Knowledge** can remove a false attribution; action can produce an outcome but not an unconditioned Self.
05. **Śravaṇa**, **manana**, and **nididhyāsana** are distinguished even where authors dispute their relative roles.
06. **Superimposition** explains why the subject of experience can be confused with what it reveals.
07. **Gauḍapāda** subjects waking, dream and deep sleep to a strong nonorigination argument.
08. **Śaṅkara** defends the independent force of descriptive Upaniṣadic declarations against injunction-only readings.
09. **Maṇḍana** investigates the scope of words, meditation and injunctive force in the Brahmasiddhi.
10. **Sureśvara** argues that liberating knowledge is not another ritual product.
11. **Padmapāda** uses the contest among theories of error to clarify the removal of avidyā.
12. **Scriptural authority** is limited to the subject matter on which the text can disclose what ordinary perception does not.
13. **Causal analogies** such as clay/pot, gold/ornament and seed/sprout are explanatory instruments, not interchangeable proofs.
14. **Reflections** model an apparent plurality of knowers without dividing consciousness into parts.
15. **Māyā** and **avidyā** are used in more than one explanatory register, and the authors do not always agree about their treatment.
16. **Deep sleep** tests the distinction between absence of a known object and absence of awareness.
17. **The five sheaths** separate bodily and psychological conditions from the witnessing principle.
18. **The identity sentence** requires close attention to literal and indicated meaning, not a simple equation of everyday individuals.
19. **Karma and renunciation** belong to an ethical and practical account whose relation to final knowledge remains contested.
20. **Authorship** must be assessed separately from doctrinal coherence, especially for hymns and later teaching manuals.
21. **A commentary** is a philosophical argument shaped by its opponents and the constraints of a transmitted text.
22. **Liberation while living** names a change in understanding under conditions where embodied experience can continue.
Frameworks and mental models
| Model | What it says | Use it when |
|---|---|---|
| Witness and modification | The known state changes; its disclosure is not another state | Examining mind and perception |
| Adhyāsa | The subject and the object are confused | Explaining bondage |
| Three states | Waking, dream and sleep disclose different kinds of apparent object | Testing continuity |
| Two orders of discourse | Practical reality differs from final nonduality | Resolving apparent contradictions |
| Sentence meaning | Literal and indicated meaning must be distinguished | Interpreting identity teachings |
| Karma and knowledge | Produced results differ from removal of ignorance | Comparing paths |
Some source works are traditionally attributed to early authors even though Potter records doubts. In several places the volume itself summarizes selected passages rather than the complete original. Those limits are stated openly, not silently resolved.
Who’s who
| Thinker | Role in the source |
|---|---|
| Gauḍapāda | Nonorigination and the four states |
| Śaṅkara | Principal commentaries and theory of superimposition |
| Maṇḍana Miśra | Language, reason, injunction, and realization |
| Sureśvara | Vārttikas and Naiṣkarmyasiddhi |
| Padmapāda | Pañcapādikā and theories of error |
| Totaka | Teacher–pupil teaching poem |
| Hastāmalaka | Fourteen-verse assertion of witness-consciousness |
About this book
Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṃkara and His Pupils: Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume III by Karl H. Potter (ed.), 1981. This is a chapter-by-chapter study of the book, with summaries, maps, tables and diagrams; short quotations keep their page references. It is shared free for personal study, is not for sale, and is not endorsed by the author or publisher. Please read and buy the original.
Insight Editions · rajeshrmahapatra.com/insight-editions